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This dissertation argues that military and political decisions made by U.S. 
policymakers to wage war in Vietnam produced economic consequences that severely 
undermined the entire American objective of preserving an independent, anticommunist 
South Vietnam. The escalation of war in 1965 ultimately sent over two million 
Americans to serve in combat or support roles in South Vietnam. The overwhelming 
presence of Americans, which peaked at over half a million in January 1969, in turn 
created numerous problems for the urban South Vietnamese population. The 
extraordinary amount of wealth brought into South Vietnam, including in the form of 
commodities, foreign aid, and American soldiers’ purchasing power, disrupted South 
Vietnamese society and economy. Due to high levels of inflation, the sudden influx of 
American wealth into a small developing country created incentives for South 
Vietnamese to work for the Americans, who provided better compensation than South 
Vietnamese employers. Those who worked for the South Vietnamese state in the armed 
forces and the civil service received fixed incomes and could not keep pace with growing 
wartime inflation. The inundation of American soldiers and dollars into the country also 
 vii 
led to widespread corruption both among Americans and South Vietnamese, which I 
argue was destructive to state legitimacy in South Vietnam. Oftentimes, South 
Vietnamese citizens had to make the morally difficult choice to engage in corrupt actions 
in order to support their families. The American presence thus exacerbated socio-
economic inequality in South Vietnam and contributed to eroding the national morale of 
those tasked with serving and fighting on behalf of their country.  
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 1 
Introduction 
 
 From 1965 to 1973, the United States fought a war in Vietnam that took the lives 
of at least three million Vietnamese and around 58,000 Americans. For the first time in 
American history, the United States suffered defeat at the hands of a nation that was 
economically, militarily, and technologically weaker. The Vietnam War, as it is known in 
the United States, defined an entire generation of Americans and transformed American 
society, politics, and diplomacy. In Vietnam, the ending of the American War, as 
Vietnamese call it, reunified the country under communist rule and marked the end of 
decades of military conflict. In American and Vietnamese society today, scars of the 
conflict are still visible, memories still alive, and debates about its lessons still fraught 
and contentious.  
This dissertation argues that military and political decisions made by U.S. 
policymakers to wage war in Vietnam produced economic consequences that severely 
undermined the entire American objective of preserving an independent, anticommunist 
South Vietnam. The escalation of war in 1965 ultimately sent over two million 
Americans to serve in combat or support roles in South Vietnam. The overwhelming 
presence of Americans, which peaked at over half a million in January 1969, in turn 
created numerous problems for the urban South Vietnamese population. The 
extraordinary amount of wealth brought into South Vietnam, including in the form of 
commodities, foreign aid, and American soldiers’ purchasing power, disrupted South 
Vietnamese society and economy. Due to high levels of inflation, the sudden influx of 
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American wealth into a small developing country created incentives for South 
Vietnamese to work for the Americans, who provided better compensation than South 
Vietnamese employers. Those who worked for the South Vietnamese state in the armed 
forces and the civil service received fixed incomes and could not keep pace with growing 
wartime inflation. The inundation of American soldiers and dollars into the country also 
led to widespread corruption both among Americans and South Vietnamese, which I 
argue was destructive to state legitimacy in South Vietnam. Oftentimes, South 
Vietnamese citizens had to make the morally difficult choice to engage in corrupt actions 
in order to support their families. The American presence thus exacerbated socio-
economic inequality in South Vietnam and contributed to eroding the national morale of 
those tasked with serving and fighting on behalf of their country.  
When confronted with the problems of inflation and corruption in South Vietnam, 
U.S. policymakers responded by taking actions that merely addressed the problems 
temporarily. To fight inflation, U.S. policymakers instituted a commodity-import 
program that weakened South Vietnamese industrial development. Moreover, when the 
deployment of American troops to South Vietnam led to prices increases for South 
Vietnamese citizens, the U.S. military appealed to soldiers’ self-interest and virtue to 
convince them to stop spending instead of formally restraining soldiers’ ability to spend 
money. Once they began to face widespread criticisms of black market corruption among 
Americans and Vietnamese, policymakers in Saigon and Washington responded by 
undertaking visible efforts to shut down the storefronts of black markets without 
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addressing the root causes of corruption. These temporary solutions to complex economic 
and social problems often angered both American and South Vietnamese citizens.  
Ultimately, the political choices of American and South Vietnamese policymakers 
during the war were constrained by decisions that preceded them and dynamics in the 
relationship between the United States and South Vietnam. To be sure, U.S. policymakers 
were not completely blindsided by the consequences of their wartime policy. In fact, 
some administration officials, including somewhat surprisingly, Robert McNamara, 
presciently anticipated the social, economic, and cultural impact of the American 
presence on the South Vietnamese population. However, policymakers faced multiple 
constraints that limited their responses to problems. Though the spending habits of 
American troops, both symbolically and in reality, created new tensions between 
Americans and South Vietnamese, American officials could not simply take away 
soldiers’ freedom to spend their money how they wished. After all, the U.S. military 
made the decision to boost soldier’s morale to fight in an unpopular war by compensating 
them generously for their efforts. With regard to combating corruption, American 
policymakers understood that admitting publicly that corruption was a problem in South 
Vietnam would undermine support for the war. Furthermore, removing or punishing all 
South Vietnamese officials who were corrupt could destabilize the country’s leadership; 
South Vietnam’s political fragility thus gave Saigon leaders leverage over the range of 
policy options open to U.S. officials. Because both South Vietnamese officials and 
American servicemen and civilians participated in corrupt activities, it was politically 
necessary for American leaders to downplay the severity of corruption and adopt face-
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saving perfunctory measures to address it. In essence, then, the problem of corruption 
was allowed to grow, tearing apart South Vietnamese society and eating away at national 
morale. The ways in which American leaders sought to mitigate the consequences of their 
policy decisions, I argue, also rendered those efforts self-defeating. 
Since the end of the conflict, scholars and observers have fiercely debated the 
reasons why the United States lost the war in Vietnam. Among American scholars, many 
of whom experienced the conflict first-hand, two divergent strands of interpretations 
dominate the field. “Orthodox” perspectives of the Vietnam War assert that U.S. officials 
misinterpreted the nature of the conflict in Vietnam and that American defeat proved 
inevitable.1 Conversely, “revisionist” views of the war posit that the United States would 
have won the Vietnam War if various American leaders’ actions, in part driven by 
domestic concerns, had not hindered progress.2 Both lines of interpretation have largely 
engaged debates on whether the United States should have fought the war and whether 
the conflict could have been won.  
While studies of the Vietnam War in the 1970s and 1980s overwhelmingly 
interpreted the conflict as a chapter of American history, beginning in the 1990s, scholars 
have increasingly internationalized and “Vietnamized” the field of Vietnam War Studies. 
                                                
1 Some major “orthodox” studies of the Vietnam War include: George C Herring, America’s Longest War: 
The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 5th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2013); Gary R. Hess, 
Vietnam and the United States: Origins and Legacy of War (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1998); George 
McTurnan Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam (New York: Knopf, 1986). 
Journalists have also authored "orthodox" works, such as: David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest 
(New York: Random House, 1972); Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin, 1997); Neil 
Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (New York: Random House, 
1988). 
2 Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2006); Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years 
in Vietnam (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1999). 
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Eschewing the exclusive focus on American policymaking of traditional historiography, 
historians have used multi-archival research to determine the ways in which foreign 
countries, including Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and China, contributed to the 
causes and consequences of the war.3 Meanwhile, other scholars have “Vietnamized” the 
study of the conflict by employing recently available archival sources from Hanoi to 
explore North Vietnamese motives in the struggle.4 Within the last decade, in particular, a 
set of historical studies analyzing the failure of nation-building in South Vietnam from 
1954 to 1963 have debated the political legitimacy of Ngo Dinh Diem who governed the 
newly formed Republic of Vietnam from 1955 until his ouster and assassination in 1963.5 
This wave of “new Vietnam War scholarship,” much of which focuses on nation-building 
                                                
3 Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Ivan R. Dee, 1996); Mark Atwood Lawrence, 
Assuming the Burden: Europe and the American Commitment to War in Vietnam (University of California 
Press, 2005); Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in 
Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); James Hershberg, Marigold: The Lost Chance 
for Peace in Vietnam (Stanford University Press, 2012); Kathryn Statler, Replacing France: The Origins of 
American Intervention in Vietnam (University Press of Kentucky, 2007); Cheng Guan Ang, Vietnamese 
Communists’ Relations with China and the Second Indochina Conflict, 1956-1962 (Jefferson, N.C.; 
London: McFarland, 1997). 
4 Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, Hanoi’s War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2012); Pierre Asselin, Hanoi’s Road to the Vietnam War, 
1954-1965 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013). 
5 Philip Catton’s book, Diem’s Final Failure, explicates Diệm’s nation-building and reform efforts, 
particularly the Strategic Hamlet Program, while Edward Miller’s dissertation demonstrates that Diệm had 
distinct ideas about nation-building that often clashed with American priorities. Geoffrey Stewart’s 
dissertation similarly presents Diệm as an independent actor promoting his own nation-building plans. 
Jessica Chapman’s forthcoming monograph, From Disorder to Dictatorship: Ngo Dinh Diem’s 
Construction of South Vietnam, based on her dissertation, investigates Diệm’s failed efforts to consolidate 
his power and deliver democracy to his country from 1953 to 1956. Jessica Elkind’s dissertation examines 
the role of non-state actors in attempting to implement nation-building policies. See, respectively: Philip 
Catton, Diem’s Final Failure: Prelude to America’s War in Vietnam (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 2002); Edward Miller, Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South 
Vietnam (Harvard University Press, 2013); Geoffrey Stewart, “Revolution, Modernization, and Nation-
Building in Diệm’s Vietnam: Civic Action, 1955-1963” (PhD diss., The University of Western Ontario, 
2009); Jessica M. Chapman, Cauldron of Resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and 1950s 
Southern Vietnam (Cornell University Press, 2013); Jessica Breiteneicher Elkind, “The First Casualties  : 
American Nation Building Programs in South Vietnam, 1955-1965” (PhD diss., University of California, 
Los Angeles, 2005). 
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and aims to move away from the American-centric orthodox versus revisionist debates, 
has informed our understanding of the motives and logic behind the decisions of 
American policymakers and Diệm.  
This dissertation proposes a different periodization for understanding U.S. nation-
building in South Vietnam and contributes a new way of explaining the failure of that 
process through examining the effects of the American presence on the South Vietnamese 
economy and society. While some of the most recent scholarship on American nation-
building in South Vietnam has contended that the failure of nation-building by 1965 
sparked the beginning intensification of war,6 I argue that the construction of an 
independent, anti-communist South Vietnam, the ultimate political goal sought by the 
United States, was an ongoing process during the military conflict. In fact, disagreements 
over methods and strategies of nation-building between Vietnamese and American 
policymakers from 1954 to 1963 carried over into the post-1965 period. Examining the 
unintended consequences of the massive deployment of American soldiers and dollars to 
South Vietnam, my dissertation demonstrates that nation-building in South Vietnam after 
the commencement of war involved attempts to resolve major social and economic 
problems, including inflation and corruption, that were crucial to establishment of an 
autonomous, anti-communist nation below the seventeenth parallel.  
Departing from previous scholarship that focuses primarily on the military and 
political dimensions of the war, my dissertation argues that ensuring South Vietnam’s 
                                                
6 James M Carter, Inventing Vietnam  : The United States and State Building, 1954-1968 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
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economic viability was just as, if not more, important to the goal of nation-building than 
victory on the battlefield or at the negotiating table. Building on arguments articulated by 
historian Gabriel Kolko,7 my dissertation draws upon a variety of American and 
Vietnamese sources to illustrate the transformations to South Vietnamese life wrought by 
the American presence. Tracing the various disruptions to South Vietnamese life as well 
as the ways in which American and Vietnamese policymakers attempted to rectify those 
dislocations, this dissertation shows that the unforeseen effects of the American presence 
and efforts to mitigate the harm produced by their presence were detrimental to the 
American goal of building a sustainable, independent, anti-communist South Vietnam.  
U.S. NATION-BUILDING IN SOUTH VIETNAM, 1954-1965  
 
 The history of American involvement in Indochina dates to long before American 
marines landed at Da Nang in 1965. As the threat of global communism cast a pall on 
U.S. domestic and international politics in the early twentieth century, American leaders 
exhibited strong interest in the political futures of lands far away from its own shores. 
After World War II, many European empires began to loose their grip on their colonies, 
but they did not give up their colonized territories without a struggle. In French 
Indochina, Western imperatives in the Cold War and the Vietnamese fight for 
independence coincided in a conflict between French forces and Vietnamese communist 
                                                
7 Kolko has argued that “the war’s economic and social impact on South Vietnam between 1965 and 1970 
was decisive to its eventual military conclusion.” Additionally, Kolko has written that the “RVN’s very 
existence was linked to sufficient economic and military aid, surpassing in importance the outcome of 
battles or diplomacy, for the very artificiality of the economy and the war’s impact left it vulnerable to 
countless potentially fatal problems.” Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and 
the Modern Historical Experience (New York: The New Press, 1994), 199, 223. 
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nationalists, the Viet Minh. As a Cold War ally of France, the United States, despite its 
own anti-colonial roots, chose to assist the French in its ultimately failed attempt to re-
conquer its former colony rather than support the cause of the Viet Minh or remain aloof 
from the war. During the last years of the conflict, the United States bankrolled 
approximately eighty percent of the cost of the war.8  
 After the French defeat at the battle of Dien Bien Phu, the United States continued 
to invest in the establishment of an anti-communist state in southern Vietnam. Under the 
Geneva Accords ending the First Indochina War in 1954, Vietnam was partitioned at the 
seventeenth parallel. The victorious Viet Minh governed what would become the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, or North Vietnam, under the leadership of Ho Chi 
Minh. Meanwhile, the State of Vietnam below the seventeenth parallel, initially headed 
by emperor Bao Dai, soon became the Republic of Vietnam, or South Vietnam, under the 
leadership of a returned Vietnamese exile named Ngo Dinh Diem in 1955. Popular 
among American policymakers during his three-year stay in the United States, Diem’s 
devout Catholic faith and intense anticommunist nationalism made American leaders 
believe that he was the one man in South Vietnam who could provide a counterweight to 
the attraction of Ho Chi Minh in the north. The U.S. commitment to fully support Ngo 
Dinh Diem politically, economically, and militarily as the first president of South 
Vietnam initiated what would become a nearly decade-long partnership between 
American leaders and Diem.  
                                                
8 Lawrence, Assuming the Burden; Statler, Replacing France. 
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 Interpreting the outcome of the Vietnam War necessarily depends upon one’s 
understanding of Ngo Dinh Diem. Indeed, how scholars evaluate Diem as a leader affects 
how they interpret the politics surrounding his downfall and the decision of American 
leaders to end the nine-year alliance in 1963. On the one hand, orthodox scholars of the 
war often view Diem as an authoritarian and ruthless leader who foreclosed whatever 
scant opportunities may have existed for the long-term stability of South Vietnam as a 
nation. According to orthodox views, then, America’s deteriorating relationship with 
Diem over the years was indicative of a hopeless situation in South Vietnam, rendering 
the Vietnam War an ultimate tragedy. Revisionists, on the other hand, often praise 
Diem’s leadership, arguing that the American decision to remove Diem was one of the 
costliest mistakes of the war, which doomed America’s efforts in Vietnam and 
guaranteed South Vietnam’s eventual collapse.  
 Interpreting the nature of the alliance between the United States and Ngo Dinh 
Diem has stirred vigorous scholarly debate. Some scholars have argued that American 
Cold War geostrategic concerns to contain and roll back communism undergirded the 
U.S.-Diem partnership,9 while others have asserted that cultural and ideological 
assumptions of American policymakers, especially their views on race, gender, and 
religion, motivated the alliance.10 Meanwhile, other historians have contended that the 
                                                
9 Herring, America’s Longest War; Kahin, Intervention; Robert D. Schulzinger, A Time for War: The 
United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975 (Oxford University Press, 1997); David L. Anderson, Trapped by 
Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953-61 (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2013). 
10 Mark Bradley, Imagining Vietnam and America: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919-1950 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2000); Robert Dean, Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the 
Making of Cold War Foreign Policy (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003); Seth Jacobs, 
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U.S.-Diem alliance was borne out of economic calculations, namely that the United 
States aimed to secure a global liberal economic order, and trade in Southeast Asia would 
enhance the economic resilience of allies like Japan and Britain.11  
While research on the U.S.-Diem alliance emphasizing American geostrategic, 
cultural, and economic considerations often suggest a more deterministic view of the 
history of U.S. relations with South Vietnam, a new wave of scholarship on the politics of 
nation-building in South Vietnam under Diem have stressed the agency of Vietnamese 
actors. Within the last decade, scholars have mined Vietnamese archives to argue for a 
different interpretation of Diem, one that complicates the often simplistic binary portrayal 
of Diem as either a corrupt dictator or a “wise and effective” leader, as revisionist Mark 
Moyar argues.12 Since a multifaceted understanding of Diem cannot be achieved without 
taking into account the difficult process of building a nation in South Vietnam, these 
scholars have demonstrated, through primarily Vietnamese sources, that Diem was not a 
passive recipient of American nation-building directives, but instead actively resisted 
American policies that conflicted with his own visions of Vietnamese development. 
Integrating the study of American foreign policy with Vietnamese Studies, these scholars 
have shed new light on the highly contingent course of U.S.-South Vietnam relations 
leading up to Diem’s demise.  
                                                                                                                                            
America’s Miracle Man in Vietnam: Ngo Dinh Diem, Religion, Race, and U.S. Intervention in Southeast 
Asia (Duke University Press Books, 2005). 
11 Andrew J. Rotter, The Path to Vietnam: Origins of the American Commitment to Southeast Asia (Cornell 
University Press, 1989); Marilyn B. Young, The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990 (New York: HarperCollins, 
1991); Kolko, Anatomy of a War. 
12 Moyar, Triumph Forsaken, xiv. 
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All of these studies outline the challenging multidimensional nature of nation-
building in South Vietnam. As a former exile and a leader without a solid base of popular 
support, Diem encountered numerous difficulties in his path to garner the loyalty of 
South Vietnamese citizens. Diem’s path to consolidating power in the early years of his 
government strongly influenced his relations with the United States and the set the stage 
for future political challenges. As Jessica Chapman has argued, Diem perceived 
“political-religious organizations,” namely the Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, and Binh Xuyen, as 
threats to his power and branded them as communist and pro-French enemies through 
government propaganda.13 Though these groups had nationalist ambitions and popular 
support from citizens, Chapman contends, American policymakers chose to prop up 
Diem over the leaders of political-religious groups: “Rather than search for ways to 
cooperate with or even appease political-religious leaders and their noncommunist 
nationalist allies, U.S. officials dismissed them as venal, inept, immoral, and politically 
immature.”14 Chapman argues that American support of Diem’s leadership enabled Diem 
to build an authoritarian state using terror tactics that spawned the formation of the 
southern insurgency group, the National Liberation Front.  
While Chapman examines the early southern political landscape to explain 
mounting challenges to Diem’s power, Matthew Masur argues that cultural programs 
aimed to strengthen attitudes around a South Vietnamese nation failed to win the hearts 
and minds of the public and contributed to growing opposition to Diem’s leadership. As 
                                                
13 The Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, and Binh Xuyen have often been referred to as “sects,” but Chapman uses the 
term “political-religious organizations.”  
14 Chapman, Cauldron of Resistance, 41. 
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Masur demonstrates, in first two years of South Vietnam’s existence, Diem deployed 
information and propaganda campaigns to create an ideological and cultural basis for the 
new nation. He advertised the European philosophy of Personalism, which according to 
Masur, “incorporated the most important elements of Diem’s political philosophy: 
strident anti-communism, a strong national leader, and a belief in sacrifice for the 
improvement of the nation.”15 Although the United States and South Vietnam 
coordinated cultural nation-building initiatives early on, as Diem’s power stabilized, 
South Vietnamese nation-building programs later stressed the Vietnamese origins of the 
South Vietnamese nation to increase the government’s legitimacy, while the United 
States focused on selling the benefits of American capitalism and culture to South 
Vietnam. These different kinds of campaigns sometimes contradicted one another, as the 
American promotion of high living standards, for example, undermined Diem’s message 
of sacrifice. Combined with the unpopular reality of Diem’s domestic programs, 
unsuccessful efforts from the United States and South Vietnam to galvanize national 
support around South Vietnam reflected profound misunderstanding and tension between 
the two allies. Though it is difficult to ascertain the degree to which failures of cultural 
nation-building were directly responsible for Diem’s downfall, Masur’s research 
nonetheless shows that the cultural aspects of nation-building revealed major challenges 
to Diem’s political position and to the relationship between Diem and American leaders.  
                                                
15 Matthew B Masur, “Hearts and Minds: Cultural Nation Building in South Vietnam, 1954-1963” (Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Ohio State University, 2004), 18. 
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Building on the works of Chapman and Masur, Nu-Anh Tran’s study of 
anticommunist nationalism in the Republic of Vietnam from 1954 to 1963 interprets the 
politics of Diem’s regime as part of the longer historical evolution of Vietnamese 
nationalism. Examining four elements of nationalism: anticommunism, anticolonialism, 
antifeudalism, and Vietnamese ethnic identity, Tran proposes the concept of “contested 
nationalism,” which recognizes that both the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the 
Republic of Vietnam competed for national legitimacy, as a framework for understanding 
the Vietnam War.16 Tran concludes that “there was significant support for a 
noncommunist Vietnamese state below the 17th parallel, but Ngo Dinh Diem was unable 
to channel popular political sympathies into support for his regime.”17 Instead of 
collaborating with anticommunist nationalists, Diem treated them as rivals to his 
leadership and deprived his administration of the necessary popular support.  
In addition to the political and cultural components of nation-building, the 
economic dimensions of state formation during Diem’s tenure have been a major topic of 
research by historians. In particular, the study of American and South Vietnamese visions 
for modernization and economic development has illuminated major tensions between the 
two countries.18 Phillip Catton’s examination of land reform programs in the South 
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Vietnamese countryside demonstrates that Diem’s efforts to find a third alternative to 
development besides communism and capitalism ultimately cost him his life. Catton 
argues that Diem believed that a “Vietnamese version of Personalism” could “serve as a 
framework for the modernization of South Vietnam.”19 Accordingly, Diem attempted to 
apply his philosophy in implementing his vision of land reform with dismal results for 
South Vietnamese peasants. Diem’s central nation-building plan, the Strategic Hamlet 
Program, was designed to combat the National Liberation Front and strengthen the 
regime by mobilizing peasant support and reducing the government’s dependence on 
American aid. By forcibly uprooting peasants from their ancestral homes into strategic 
hamlets, however, the program engendered only resentment. Thus, while Diem aimed to 
modernize his state on his own terms, conscious that too much reliance on the United 
States would undermine his regime’s legitimacy, American policymakers eventually 
found him untenable as an ally. Ultimately, Catton concludes, “the Americans assumed 
the role of kingmaker in November 1963 in an attempt to find a responsive and reliable 
client that would follow the U.S. recipe for nation building.”20 
In a more recent work examining economic development and nation-building in 
South Vietnam, Edward Miller argues that contrary to previous depictions of Diem as an 
American puppet or a traditionalist limited by backward thinking, Diem was in fact an 
“aspiring modernizer and nation builder” who envisioned a uniquely Vietnamese path of 
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development for his country.21 In reassessing Diem and giving agency to Vietnamese 
actors in the construction of South Vietnam, Miller argues that Diem also holds some 
responsibility for the failure of nation-building and for his own downfall. Using the 
struggles over nation-building to examine American-South Vietnam relations, Miller 
contends that nation-building was a “field of contest involving multiple American and 
Vietnamese agendas” and concludes that the U.S.-Diem alliance was “undone not by a 
clash of civilizations but by clashes between different kinds of civilizing missions.”22 
Miller shows that Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, not only orchestrated Diem’s rise 
to power but also actively rejected American prescriptions for his nation.  
One of the major difficulties of nation-building in South Vietnam was that 
Americans and Vietnamese disagreed vehemently over the ideas and methods of 
constructing a nation. As Miller argues, even before Diem entered the political scene in 
Saigon, American policymakers fought over the strategies and possibilities for economic 
development in South Vietnam. Linking the New Deal’s liberal reforms to American 
development projects abroad, Miller argues that American officials often quarreled 
amongst themselves about the best ways to go about economic development. Many New 
Dealers were “high modernists” who believed in top-down, state-centralized projects, 
while “low modernists” favored small-scale, local initiatives to achieve social change.23 
With the rising popularity of modernization theory in the 1950s and early 1960s, the 
appetite for low modernist approaches to state building led to collaboration between 
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social scientists within the ivory tower and American government officials to use 
American foreign aid to pursue various development projects in the Third World. Those 
on the ground in Vietnam, therefore, such as the Michigan State University Advisory 
Group’s Wesley Fishel, CIA operative and advisor Edward Lansdale, and American 
advisor Wolf Ladejinsky, reflected the diversity of opinions regarding the best models of 
development. They and other American advisors sent to Vietnam disagreed not only with 
each other but also with Diem over important issues such as land reform, rural 
development, counterinsurgency, and strategic hamlets.24  
As Miller demonstrates, unlike their American counterparts, Diem and Nhu 
believed that relocating rural dwellers into new communities in previously unsettled 
areas, rather than simply redistributing land, was the best way to realized the personalist 
revolution in South Vietnam they envisioned. Through creating agrovilles and, later, 
Strategic Hamlets, the Ngo brothers insisted that security in the countryside could be 
achieved and that social, political, and military reforms could take place. Moreover, they 
maintained, rural residents would cultivate a spirit of self-sufficiency that would be 
necessary to wean South Vietnam off from American economic aid.25 Indeed, much of 
the Ngo brothers’ resistance to American methods of rural development and 
counterinsurgency often stemmed from their desire for South Vietnam to survive without 
American aid. As Nhu once stated, dependence on foreign aid was like “being close to 
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death.”26 Although the Ngo brothers desired a firm commitment for America’s defense of 
South Vietnam, Nhu believed that the presence of American troops in South Vietnam 
would “damage the RVN government’s credibility both at home and abroad.”27 
Vietnamese and American policymakers therefore did not see eye to eye on how they 
could strike the right balance of reliance on American support and independence from it, 
a source of major frustration on both sides of the alliance.  
In addition to studying the ideas and actors behind nation-building in South 
Vietnam, scholars have also scrutinized the American-funded construction efforts 
required to create a physical state infrastructure below the seventeenth parallel. Unlike 
other scholars who have placed nation-building in South Vietnam in the context of 
Vietnamese history, James Carter frames the process of state-building as a part of U.S. 
foreign policy. Carters asserts that in 1954, American officials undertook state-building, 
the formation of political institutions and infrastructure as opposed to the more cultural 
and ideological tasks of building national identity, to “invent” the state of South 
Vietnam.28 According to Carter, America’s ambitious state-building enterprise in 
southern Vietnam was flawed from the start; when the program showed signs of failure, 
the United States shifted to building a military infrastructure to wage war against 
communists.29 He argues, then, that the Vietnam War resulted not from the external 
aggression of the North Vietnamese or the National Liberation Front insurgency, but 
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from the failure of the U.S. experiment to build a viable state infrastructure centered 
around Saigon and the U.S. government’s refusal to acknowledge that failure.  
In order to build a stable state infrastructure, the United States sought to repair 
and invigorate the war-damaged economy of the newly decolonized South Vietnam 
through a commodity import program. As Carter has written, beginning in 1955, the 
United States introduced the Commercial Import Program (CIP) as the primary tool to 
send massive amounts of foreign aid in the form of grants to South Vietnam without 
aggravating inflation. Under the CIP, the United States played the role of an international 
banker who mediated the importation of commodities between Vietnamese businessmen 
and global suppliers.30 The United States subsidized South Vietnam by creating a system 
whereby South Vietnamese business importers could use local currency to purchase U.S. 
dollars at prices below the official exchange rate. U.S. and South Vietnamese officials 
would approve and grant licenses to local businessmen to participate in the CIP as 
importers. After receiving licenses, Vietnamese importers would use their dollars to 
purchase and import a variety of commodities. The piasters received from these currency 
transactions entered into a counterpart fund for the Saigon government to pay its military 
and civilian expenditures. The CIP thus enabled Diem to avoid taxing the South 
Vietnamese population and maintain his political support.31   
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The effects of the CIP, as Carter contends, contradicted America’s long-term 
state-building goals in South Vietnam. The program subsidized politically connected 
South Vietnamese importers and government officials and “nurtured a web of graft and 
cronyism.”32 Vietnamese businessmen earned windfall profits even before they imported 
any commodities because of the favorable exchange rate granted to importers.33 While 
project aid for improving transportation, public administration, industry, agriculture, 
health, education and other infrastructure priorities comprised 13 percent of total aid to 
South Vietnam, the CIP constituted 87 percent.34 Given that the CIP comprised an 
overwhelming proportion of American aid to South Vietnam, the program, Carter argues, 
also stifled the development of local industrial production. As a result, the CIP, instead of 
helping South Vietnam become economically self-sufficient, ended up increasing South 
Vietnamese dependence on American funds.  
In addition to the reality of foreign aid running counter to U.S. state-building 
goals, American policymakers’ confidence in the power of technology, Carter maintains, 
led to state-building efforts that disrupted local traditions and antagonized rural residents. 
Like other scholars of nation-building in South Vietnam, Carter demonstrates that 
American policymakers and intellectuals enthusiastically endorsed modernization theory 
and believed that American models of development could be exported directly to Third 
World societies. Carter demonstrates that beginning in 1954, a range of American groups, 
including universities, private foundations, and religious organizations, collaborated with 
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the U.S. government on countless projects aimed to build a viable state infrastructure.35 
Among these was the Michigan State University Advisory Group,36 which assisted Ngo 
Dinh Diem with funding and training a national police force and educating Vietnamese to 
work in public administration. Despite some successes in building political institutions, 
however, Diem faced a slew of mounting domestic political problems, including rising 
discontent from Buddhists and a growing southern insurgency. From 1960 to 1963, 
Carter argues, state-building objectives “essentially remained in place, while the 
preferred solution to a range of problems relied increasingly upon military technology 
and firepower.”37  
The turning point for Carter is 1961, when the Kennedy administration shifted 
from developing state-infrastructure to building the military infrastructure necessary to 
wage war in South Vietnam.38 After Diem’s assassination from late 1963 to 1965, Carter 
maintains, “the United States moved from an ailing aid and assistance project in 
Southeast Asia to direct military intervention and large-scale base building and major 
war.”39 To this end, a consortium of American construction companies, Raymond 
International and Morrison-Knudsen (RMK) and Brown and Root and J.A. Jones 
Construction (BRJ), which merged to form RMK-BRJ in 1965, became the sole 
government contractor for construction projects in South Vietnam, profiting immensely 
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from the war.40 Meanwhile, the building of military infrastructure transformed the South 
Vietnamese countryside. Though private companies provided employment to thousands 
of Vietnamese during the construction miracle of 1960s, these construction projects also 
brought major dislocations and disruptions to South Vietnamese citizens, particularly 
those in the rural areas. 
 One of the central dilemmas that these works on nation-building and state-
building during the Diem period address is how South Vietnam be could be viewed by its 
own citizens as a legitimate country when it survived only because of American aid. 
Indeed, overwhelming amounts of American foreign aid had the likelihood of not only 
fostering economic complacency and dependency but also aggravating inflation in a 
country that lacked industrial production capabilities. As Carter puts it,  
Large-scale aid created little incentive for the Saigon leadership to foster internal 
growth, and at the same time, it threatened spiraling inflation and a loss in 
standard of living for those who might otherwise support Diem. However, Diem 
could not remain in place to carry out U.S. objectives without this arrangement, as 
many officials recognized.41 
 
I argue that this tension between the need for American assistance to survive but also the 
avoidance of permanent dependency on the United States, with which Diem and his 
brother grappled deeply, figures prominently in his successors’ relationships with the 
United States as well.  
This dissertation contests the traditional periodization of nation-building in South 
Vietnam and argues that the nation-building process continued after war began in 1965. 
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As Fredrik Logevall has argued recently, although structural forces have been immensely 
valuable in explaining some of the rationale behind policy decisions, it is important to 
recognize that American escalation of war was far from inevitable.42 Logevall has argued 
persuasively that American deliberations to escalate war from late 1963 to early 1965 
reflected profound disagreement and debate within the Johnson administration.43 
Moreover, the unique personalities, experiences, and ways of thinking of individual 
policymakers, especially Lyndon Johnson, heavily influenced the outcome of decisions. 
The studies above have emphasized the contingency of policy decisions that shaped the 
U.S.-Diem alliance. However, they all agree that nation-building in South Vietnam failed 
by 1963 and that its failure precipitated the military conflict. Even Carter, who takes his 
account of American state-building up to 1968, argues that the political project to build a 
viable state was doomed by the early 1960s.  
My dissertation proposes understanding nation-building as a continual process in 
the post-1965 period. After the commencement of war, American policymakers still 
hoped to achieve the goal of an independent, anti-communist South Vietnam, but they 
also faced new obstacles and challenges resulting from escalation. As this dissertation 
demonstrates, the ways in which American and Vietnamese policymakers responded to 
the unintended consequences of military escalation and the buildup of American troops 
affected the future political fate of the country. This dissertation explores the logic by 
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which American and Vietnamese policymakers made the decisions they made and why 
their decisions had the effects they had.  
THE AMERICAN WAR IN VIETNAM, 1965-1975 
 
While historians have only recently examined South Vietnamese politics and 
nation-building up until Diem’s assassination in 1963, research on the origins and 
consequences of American escalation of war began during the war itself and has 
amplified since the end of the conflict. Though the scholarship on the war is too vast to 
summarize comprehensively, the following discussion presents some of the broad 
patterns of thinking that seek to answer these fundamental questions: why did the United 
States intervene in Vietnam, and why did the United States ultimately lose the war? 
These analyses not only tie back to interpretations and assessments of the U.S.-Diem 
alliance, but also reveal broader implications of the future of U.S. foreign policy and 
America’s place in the wider world.  
Answers to the large questions driving scholarship on the war have often fallen 
widely into two different interpretive categories: liberal orthodox and conservative 
revisionism.44 Put simply, orthodox scholars often view American intervention into 
Vietnam as a preventable mistake and see the war as unwinnable and, therefore, 
inadvisable. Revisionist scholars tend to argue that intervention was the right decision 
and that the United States could have won the war if not for a range of errors and 
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disturbances committed by Americans. Although the conflict between orthodox and 
revisionist views animated debates in the early decades after the war, since the 1990s, 
historians within the academy have mostly been engaged in different lines of argument 
within the orthodox interpretation. With the exception of Lewis Sorley’s A Better War 
and, more recently, Mark Moyar’s Triumph Forsaken, which present scholarly historical 
examinations of the war,45 revisionist studies often offer arguments based on unprovable 
counterfactuals.46 Given that historians rely upon primary documents as the source of 
their scholarship, it is not surprising that revisionism has been marginalized in the 
academy. As Logevall has remarked, that “the American decision for war was the wrong 
decision is taken as axiomatic” now among historians.47 Though this dissertation broadly 
agrees with the orthodox outlook, it does not presume that the United States was destined 
to lose the war, as much of the scholarship does.  
Before delving into the recent scholarship, however, it is important to note some 
of the earliest books written about the war that formed the basis of the liberal orthodox 
interpretation of the Vietnam War. Indeed, many of the books authored in the late 1960s 
and 1970s, including those from journalists Bernard Fall, David Halberstam, and Robert 
Shaplen, document first-hand American experiences of the war and are critical of the 
U.S. decision to intervene in Vietnam.48 Tracing the process of decision-making for 
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military escalation, for example, Halberstam argues that the hubris of the “best and the 
brightest” within the Kennedy and Johnson administrations led the United States into 
quagmire in Vietnam.49 Others argued that the United States tragically misinterpreted the 
nature of the conflict. Naval officer William J. Lederer and journalist Frances FitzGerald 
assert that American policymakers’ lack of knowledge of Vietnamese history, culture, 
and language condemned the war to failure from the very beginning.50 Moreover, they 
underscored that American officials failed to truly understand Diem and erred in 
partnering with him. Scholars have also argued that America’s ally, South Vietnam, was 
not worth defending.  Neil Sheehan’s A Bright Shining Lie, for example, suggests that the 
corrupt and unstable Saigon regime as well as the unwillingness of South Vietnamese 
soldiers to fight for their own country was indicative of a fruitless alliance.51 In 
suggesting the futility of the American war effort in South Vietnam, then, these authors 
have maintained that escalating war was a regrettable decision. 
Since these early works on the Vietnam War, historians have continued to offer 
various reasons why the United States ultimately lost the war, often linking the answer to 
this question to why the United States was wrong to intervene in the first place. One of 
the most common explanations provided by historians is misguided leadership from 
America’s top policymakers. Lyndon Johnson’s role in leading the United States into war 
has been a large topic of research, with early scholarship harshly critical of his 
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hawkishness and skeptical of his motives, including his obsession with electoral 
prospects and his commitment to domestic programs.52 More recent scholarship has 
painted a more sympathetic and evenhanded picture of Johnson to argue that he did not 
simply ignore the warning signs from his advisors but instead orchestrated a middle 
course road between the doves in his administration and hawks in the military 
establishment.53 Scholars have also widened the circle of actors responsible for the 
decision to escalate war to include other presidents, including Eisenhower and Kennedy, 
and members of the cabinet, including McGeorge Bundy and Robert McNamara.54 
Internal bureaucratic infighting, lack of knowledge about Southeast Asia, the personal 
hubris of policymakers, for example, have been cited as primary factors that drove the 
United States into a war it could not win.  
In addition to underscoring the flaws and mistakes made by American 
policymakers, historians have also argued that failure on the part of the American 
military led to U.S. defeat in Vietnam. In fact, military participants in the war and other 
scholars have claimed that the lack of a clear winning strategy on the battlefield was to 
blame for communist victory.55 Scholars have also criticized the strategies that military 
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leaders did employ, especially the strategy of attrition under General William 
Westmoreland.56 H.R. McMaster contends that the interservice rivalry among the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff prevented them from coming to consensus on a carefully thought out plan 
to defeat the communist insurgency.57 Instead, military decision-making often fell to 
civilian officials in the Department of Defense, including McNamara, who lacked crucial 
advice from military leaders. James Wirtz asserts that intelligence failure among military 
officials caused American forces to be surprised by North Vietnamese attacks during the 
Tet Offensive, a major turning point for the United States in the war.58 These works, 
generally revisionist, represent the view that the United States could have won the war if 
not for deficiencies in military strategies or leadership.  
Scholars have also pinpointed the problematic methods of war assessment as a 
major reason for American defeat. Critical of U.S. policymakers’ blind faith in superior 
technology, sociologist James William Gibson argues that American civilian and military 
leaders pursued a production-oriented model of war, what he calls “technowar,” in which 
American officials viewed body counts as the ultimate measure of the war’s success.59 
Convinced of the power of technology to wreak destruction, Gibson asserts, American 
“war managers” had no responses to counter communist guerrilla tactics and strategies. 
Most recently, Gregory Daddis has argued that American military leaders’ obsession with 
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body count statistics, which validated flawed counterinsurgency techniques, caused them 
to neglect more important but difficult to measure progress in the political sphere, 
especially the Vietnamese population’s support of Saigon.60 Daddis concludes, “that the 
army never could determine if it was winning or losing goes far in explaining the final 
outcome of the war in Vietnam.”61 
Besides identifying the political and military shortcomings of American civilian 
and military leaders, historians of the Vietnam War, examining the international 
dimensions of the conflict, have also argued that Vietnamese communists played 
important roles in the escalation of war and undertook strategic courses of action that led 
to communist victory. As William Duiker has argued, “the most significant fact about 
that conflict is not that the United States lost but that the Communists won.”62 Adding to 
previous scholarship on Vietnamese wartime decision-making, recent scholars have 
demonstrated the extent to which Vietnamese actors shaped the course of the conflict. 
Robert Brigham has shown that the National Liberation Front succeeded, to a certain 
degree, in portraying itself as the legitimate representative of the South Vietnamese 
people and deploying diplomacy strategically to turn domestic and global opinion against 
the United States and the Saigon regime.63 Brigham concludes that “the Front’s 
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diplomatic accomplishments were critical to the revolution’s success.”64 Similarly, Lien-
Hang Nguyen has examined the international and domestic context in which North 
Vietnamese leaders escalated war and pursued peace. As she argues, “it was Hanoi’s 
global campaign—more than its military battles or political struggle to win the hearts and 
minds of the South Vietnamese people—that proved victorious in the end.”65 Employing 
declassified Vietnamese archival sources, these works and others have demonstrated that 
American defeat in the conflict cannot be explained without taking into account 
communist strategy in Hanoi and within the National Liberation Front.  
Additionally, scholars have looked beyond the United States, North Vietnam, and 
South Vietnam to explain how the war turned out the way it did. Using newly available 
archival documents from the former Soviet Union, China, and other nations, historians 
have provided new perspectives on non-American and non-Vietnamese decision-making 
that affected the outcome of the conflict. In particular, scholars have argued that both the 
Soviet Union and China used their foreign policy toward North Vietnam and the United 
States to advance their own agendas and their status within the communist realm. Despite 
initially competing for closer relations with Hanoi, Chinese and Soviet desires to achieve 
détente with the United States later outweighed their alliance with Hanoi and ultimately 
contributed to a negotiated peace in Vietnam. Soviet leaders, as Ilya Gaiduk has 
demonstrated, crafted their policies toward Hanoi with aim of bringing North Vietnamese 
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and American leaders to settle the conflict in a way that would serve Soviet interests.66 
Motivated by the fear that Hanoi would lean closer to Beijing rather than Moscow, 
Gaiduk asserts, Soviet leaders gradually stepped up their support of Hanoi, though they 
later strived for improved relations with the United States after China achieved 
rapprochement with the Americans. Qiang Zhai, on the other hand, has shown that 
China’s contributions of military and economic aid to North Vietnam arose from its 
ambitions to counter the American threat in Asia. As Sino-Soviet tensions deteriorated, 
however, Chinese leaders shifted to a strategy of convincing Hanoi to accept a peace 
settlement when they believed that the Soviet Union could ally with Vietnam against 
China. These works and others, including those on international peace initiatives, have 
enriched our understanding of the international dynamics of ending the war.  
While most of the scholarship on the Vietnam War focuses on the military, 
political, and diplomatic aspects of the conflict, a smaller subset of works explore other 
dimensions of the conflict during the period of direct American intervention, including 
the process of nation-building. Focusing on “the other war” in the non-military sphere, 
Richard Hunt and Pamela Conn chronicle the failure of American pacification efforts to 
win the hearts and minds of South Vietnamese citizens during the Johnson years.67 Conn 
in particular argues that, though Johnson was deeply committed to pacification, the lack 
of strong Vietnamese leadership condemned “pacification’s fundamental objective, the 
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building of an independent democratic nation, to doom.”68 Nation-building during war, I 
argue, was not predetermined to fail, as Conn suggests. In fact, the deployment of large 
numbers of American troops to South Vietnam changed the process and nature of 
building a nation below the seventeenth parallel. Winning the hearts and minds of the 
South Vietnamese population became a more complicated task owing to new challenges 
posed by the presence of over half a million American soldiers. This dissertation centers 
on the interrelated economic problems of inflation and corruption resulting from the 
American presence and asserts that the ways in which policymakers reacted to those 
problems often aggravated the task of building a nation.   
As soldiers in wartime South Vietnam, GIs also functioned informally as nation-
builders, as their actions and behaviors had serious implications for American-South 
Vietnamese relations as well as the stability of the nation. Few books, however, discuss 
the social, cultural, and economic effects of the American presence of soldiers and their 
dollars. Embracing the “cultural turn” in international history, recent scholarship on the 
Vietnam War has examined how gender stereotypes and American consumer culture, for 
example, developed in wartime South Vietnam. Heather Stur analyzes the contradictions 
between stereotypes of Vietnamese women and American men and women sent to 
Vietnam and their real lived experiences.69 Stur asserts that tropes of the American girl-
next-door, the Vietnamese dragon lady, the “John Wayne” protector of civilization, and 
the gentle warrior reinforced the goals of U.S. foreign policy in Vietnam. Meredith Lair, 
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on the other hand, examines the translocation of American consumer culture to South 
Vietnam during the war.70 Focusing on GI consumerism, Lair revises the traditional 
portrayal of the GI experience as being marked by danger and deprivation and argues 
instead that the majority of GIs sent to Vietnam served in the rear and enjoyed relatively 
high standards of living. Building on these works on American soldiers in Vietnam, this 
dissertation examines the effects of the American troop presence as it pertained to 
growing economic, social, and cultural problems in South Vietnam. It contends that what 
appeared to be the unintended economic consequences of troop deployment, in fact, also 
had major social and cultural implications. 
Although the argument that economic considerations gave rise to American 
intervention and then failure in Vietnam is not itself new, this dissertation examines how 
the economic effects of American deployment ended up weakening Saigon’s legitimacy. 
Economic arguments explaining American defeat arose in the late 1960s, when a radical 
interpretation of the war asserted that American motives for global dominance caused the 
United States to go to war in Vietnam. This radical interpretation emphasized in 
particular that American desires for economic expansion in the form of markets and raw 
materials undergirded U.S. intervention abroad. Best embodied by Kolko’s Anatomy of a 
War, this radical critique of American intervention suggests that American leaders’ 
singular focus to rule the global capitalist system caused the United States to fumble 
against revolutionary nationalist movements in the Third World. Departing sharply from 
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the radical interpretation, my approach to analyzing the economic aspects of the Vietnam 
War focuses on the unintended economic consequences of the American presence in 
South Vietnam, instead of on the possible economic and ideological motives of U.S. 
intervention. 
In scrutinizing the role of American soldiers and dollars in Vietnam, this 
dissertation also contributes to the emerging field of the history of American capitalism. 
Since the financial crisis of 2008, historians of the United States have produced important 
books on the history of American business and capitalism.71 Their works, however, often 
focus on domestic finance and capitalism and do not situate the American economy 
within a larger international and global framework.72 This dissertation examines the 
global influence of the American economy, embodied by soldiers and dollars, into 
wartime South Vietnam and traces the effects of American economic policy, including 
generous foreign aid, problematic exchange rates, and strong GI purchasing power, on 
the South Vietnamese population. Despite American Cold War efforts to demonstrate the 
superiority of capitalism in the Third World, I argue, the extension of American 
capitalism across the globe to Vietnam had the unintended effects of undermining the 
political legitimacy of Saigon and hampering American nation-building goals. 
More broadly, this dissertation is a story of what happens when large numbers of 
American soldiers occupy a foreign land in the context of war. As such, it engages with 
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an established set of literature in the history of American foreign relations that examines 
the process of Americanization and the effects of American GIs on local populations, 
including in Japan, Germany, Austria, and South Korea.73 The presence of soldiers in 
post-World War II Europe and East Asia generally improved American relations with 
those regions. In the case of South Vietnam, however, the presence of American soldiers 
during a raging war harmed more than helped the United States’ purported goal of 
developing the country into an independent, productive, and industrial nation. Although 
South Vietnamese often embraced many aspects of American culture, especially in urban 
areas, by the end of the war many citizens, as we will see, found the American presence 
alienating and damaging to South Vietnamese national morale.  
Uncovering the war’s impact on the Vietnamese, this dissertation analyzes South 
Vietnamese society, economics, and culture to provide a new explanation for how and 
why nation-building continued to pose challenges to U.S. and South Vietnamese 
policymakers during the war. Drawing on primarily U.S. government archival sources 
and Vietnamese perspectives in English-language sources, this project contributes to 
scholarly research that aims to present a more accurate picture of South Vietnamese 
politics, economics, society, and culture during the war. Despite vast scholarship on the 
Vietnam War, few books have been written that explore South Vietnamese perspectives 
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of the war. The few that do exist, including the abovementioned recent scholarship on 
nation-building, have made path-breaking contributions to the field of Vietnam War 
studies. Robert Brigham’s study of the South Vietnamese armed forces, for example, 
demonstrates that South Vietnamese military policies antagonized much of its citizens, 
while David Hunt, David Elliott, and Jeffrey Race have interviewed peasants to illustrate 
the social process of the revolutionary movement the southern countryside.74 Although 
this dissertation is not heavily based on Vietnamese-language sources, it examines South 
Vietnamese social, economic, and cultural problems that have deep American origins. 
Indeed, some of the major obstacles that some have argued contributed to South 
Vietnam’s downfall, especially corruption, were exacerbated by the overwhelming 
American presence. This dissertation investigates the ways in which the American 
presence transformed South Vietnam and how American policymakers reacted to those 
evolving dynamics.   
ARCHITECTURE OF THE STUDY 
 
This dissertation is presented in five thematic and chronological chapters. The 
first chapter focuses on the deployment of American combat troops and the encounters 
between Vietnamese civilians and American GIs from 1965 to 1966. This chapter 
demonstrates that the introduction of American troops to South Vietnam caused 
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enormous disruptions to Vietnamese society and major dislocations in the economy. The 
presence of Americans produced severe income disparities, as those who worked for the 
Americans in the new service sector economy were able to keep pace with inflation, 
while those in more traditional occupations could not. I argue that the Vietnamese 
citizens whose jobs were most crucial to the South Vietnamese state in enforcing law and 
order and maintaining the functions of the state—ARVN (Army of the Republic of 
Vietnam) soldiers and civil servants—were also the most marginalized because of 
inflation. 
The second chapter analyzes American policymakers’ responses to the economic 
effects of the growing American presence from 1966-1968. In particular, they worried 
about the inflationary effects of soldiers’ spending in the local economy and attempted to 
mitigate the harm caused by GI consumerism. Military officials launched a campaign 
appealing to soldiers’ sense of morality and virtue to spend less and save more. The 
campaign conveyed conflicting messages to soldiers, however, and failed to prevent the 
wealth within the boundaries of American military bases from spilling out into the 
Vietnamese economy.  
The third chapter uses congressional investigations in 1969 to explain how black 
marketing in goods and currency operated and argues that the American presence, in 
addition to the wartime economic climate, made corruption far more egregious during the 
war. Consumer and luxury goods available at American PXs found their way into the 
local economy, where such commodities were unavailable on the legitimate market and 
in high demand. Moreover, the unrealistic exchange rate of the American dollar to the 
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Vietnamese piaster made it financially rational for everyone in Vietnam to participate in 
the currency black market. I suggest that so long as the United States continued to fight 
the ground war and import a slew of consumer goods for GI consumption and so long as 
South Vietnamese leaders held leverage over their American counterparts on economic 
matters, particularly the exchange rate, American soldiers and civilians continued to 
supply the black market because it made rational sense.  
The fourth chapter examines how American and South Vietnamese officials went 
about dealing with the problem of black market corruption from 1969 to 1970. This 
chapter argues that officials approached corruption as a low-level criminal and moral 
problem instead of as a symptom of larger economic and diplomatic problems. I focus on 
two anti-corruption measures—one a newspaper campaign designed to identify 
individuals involved in the black market and the other a joint U.S.-South Vietnamese 
effort to raid the black markets—to show that American officials worked on chasing 
individual transgressors instead of addressing the economic rationality motiving black 
market transactions. Policymakers pursued anti-corruption efforts that arguably worsened 
already low morale on the ground, while high-level American and South Vietnamese 
organizations and individuals continued to profit from the black market and divert funds 
out of Vietnam. The misdiagnosis of the root causes of corruption and the misplaced 
efforts of government officials to fight corruption also allowed the economy to worsen in 
the meantime.  
The fifth chapter studies the confluence of American troop withdrawal, global 
inflation, the implementation of austerity measures, and the gradual decline of economic 
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aid in South Vietnam from 1970 to 1973. This chapter argues that the combination of 
these trends further damaged the economy and undermined the legitimacy of the state. 
When the United States ended direct involvement in Vietnam, South Vietnamese leaders 
no longer held the leverage to continue overvaluing their currency. When President Thieu 
finally devalued the piaster in 1970—thereby aggravating inflation—and imposed heavy 
taxes on even basic commodities, a severe recession ensued. The South Vietnamese 
population, already suffering from massive unemployment resulting from the withdrawal 
of Americans, protested these drastic economic reforms.  
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Chapter One: South Vietnamese Encounters with the American 
Presence, 1965-1966 
On May 5, 1966, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee J. William 
Fulbright concluded a series of lectures at Johns Hopkins University’s School of 
Advanced International Studies on a controversial note. The American presence in South 
Vietnam, Fulbright argued, demonstrated “that ‘fatal impact’ of the rich and strong on the 
poor and weak.” Citing reports that the influx of American soldiers and dollars into South 
Vietnam had not only worsened inflation but also caused profound social, cultural, and 
economic dislocations, Fulbright lamented that “what [the South Vietnamese] fear, I 
think rightly, is that traditional Vietnamese society cannot survive the American 
economic and cultural impact.” Many Vietnamese families, for example, were forced to 
“peddle [their wives and daughters] to American soldiers as mistresses” or bar girls. 
“Both literally and figuratively,” Fulbright asserted, “Saigon has become an American 
brothel.” American difficulties in Southeast Asia, he argued, could be explained not by “a 
deficiency of power but an excess of the wrong kind of power.”75 
Unsurprisingly, Fulbright’s comments drew immediate criticism from his more 
hawkish colleagues. Barry Goldwater called on Fulbright to resign as the Foreign 
Relations Committee chair, charging that his critique of American power “lends aid and 
comfort to our enemies.”76 So incendiary were Fulbright’s remarks that the senator had to 
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retract his statements later that month, regretting his claim that the Johnson 
administration embodied an “arrogance of power” and his characterization of Saigon as 
an “American brothel.” Fulbright acknowledged that his statements lent themselves to 
interpretations that he did not intend. “I had not thought I was maligning the brave young 
Americans in Vietnam,” he explained. “What I was referring to was the inevitable impact 
on a fragile Asian society of Western soldiers…behaving in the way that is to be 
expected of men at war.”77 Although Fulbright attempted to offer an explanation as to 
why South Vietnamese were “shockingly ungrateful” to Americans in Vietnam, his 
observations were nonetheless construed as unpatriotic. 
While charges of anti-Americanism from American hawks at home forced 
Fulbright to recant parts of his speech, a very real and powerful form of “anti-
Americanism,” as American policymakers called it, had begun to percolate throughout 
South Vietnam. Only a month before Fulbright’s lecture, protesters in Saigon had burned 
American jeeps, assaulted American soldiers, and paraded down streets shouting, “Down 
with the American imperialists.” Buddhist leaders, comparing the United States to the 
communists, claimed that Americans threatened South Vietnamese independence.78 
Particularly in Saigon and other cities, discontent with the United States manifested 
through public demonstrations, newspaper editorials, and even physical violence. Given 
the enormous amount of American economic aid to South Vietnam, why indeed were 
some South Vietnamese frustrated with the United States?  
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Among various parts of the South Vietnamese public, indignation toward the 
United States not only focused on the destructive consequences of American ground and 
air power in Vietnam but also on the social, cultural, and economic transformations 
wrought by the American presence. The physical destruction of the countryside due to 
American counter-insurgency and bombing campaigns was an obvious source of 
resentment toward the United States. The war destroyed entire villages and displaced 
millions of peasants from their ancestral homes, turning them into refugees seeking 
asylum in crowded urban areas. In the cities, however, where the devastation of war was 
less evident and the comforts of American aid more prevalent, Vietnamese citizens had 
reason to protest the American presence as well. This chapter examines the impact of 
American soldiers not as agents of violence but rather as agents of social, cultural, and 
economic change. Unlike nationalist sentiments expressed as a part of Vietnam’s long 
history of resistance against foreign invaders, South Vietnamese criticisms of the United 
States focused directly on the effects of American social and economic might on their 
traditional society.79 
Although South Vietnamese businessmen and government officials benefited 
immensely from American economic aid policies, the inundation of American soldiers, 
dollars, and goods beginning in 1965 produced widespread discontent among several 
important segments of the South Vietnamese population. Vietnamese ambivalence 
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toward the United States often depended on how individuals experienced and interacted 
with the American presence, if at all. This chapter asserts that the social and economic 
impact of the American deployment of troops was devastating for many urban South 
Vietnamese. The arrival of American soldiers transformed the local economy into a 
service-sector economy, creating severe income disparities and social rifts within 
families. Those who worked for Americans, as bar girls, taxi drivers, and translators, for 
example, were able to keep pace with inflation, while those in more traditionally 
respected occupations, like doctors, lawyers, and civil servants, could not. The new South 
Vietnamese economy generated new kinds of class and labor conflicts that eroded faith in 
the stability of wartime South Vietnam. This chapter argues that the American presence 
ultimately alienated populations of South Vietnam that mattered the most to the 
legitimacy of the state, including the middle class, civil servants, and ARVN soldiers.  
Despite vast literature on the Vietnam War, South Vietnamese attitudes toward 
the United States after 1965 have mostly been left out of historical accounts.80 In addition 
to the challenges of language and sources, the traditional focus on high-level American 
decision-making has prioritized the perspectives of elite American and Vietnamese actors 
over those of ordinary Vietnamese. Since the 1980s, however, historians have begun to 
explore how South Vietnamese experienced the American presence. Most recently, 
historian Nu-Anh Tran has argued that the physical presence of Americans caused South 
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Vietnamese to invoke Vietnam’s national history, the uniqueness of Vietnamese culture, 
and the idea of proper Vietnamese womanhood in their constructions of identity.81 
Despite new scholarship using Vietnamese-language sources, however, a full 
understanding of South Vietnamese perspectives on American intervention has continued 
to elude scholars.  
Providing insight into South Vietnamese attitudes toward Americans is especially 
important given the American and South Vietnamese goal of winning “hearts and 
minds,” a strategy that has continued to figure into American interventions abroad.82 
Only by uncovering the opinions and perspectives of those whose “hearts and minds” 
were targeted can we evaluate the effectiveness of such campaigns. Examining the South 
Vietnamese frame of mind, I argue, is essential to understanding the gradual erosion of 
national morale and state legitimacy that led to the downfall of South Vietnam. Indeed, 
the social and economic disturbances caused by the influx of American soldiers and 
dollars, I contend, provide a key answer to why the political project of building a 
legitimate nation proved so much more intractable than winning the war militarily, 
despite overwhelming emphasis on the latter both historically and historiographically.  
This chapter begins with an overview of the U.S. decision to Americanize the war 
in the spring of 1965 and its consequences for South Vietnam. After surveying the South 
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Vietnamese experience of war in the countryside and in the cities, the chapter then 
examines how wartime inflation and changes to the national economy affected South 
Vietnamese life. It continues with an analysis of South Vietnamese criticisms of the 
American presence and the social and cultural transformations it wrought on the country. 
In particular, Vietnamese critics decried the gender and generational conflicts that 
resulted from the American presence, which they perceived as affronts to Vietnamese 
culture and tradition. This chapter then turns to South Vietnamese discussions about the 
problem of taxi drivers as a window into how troubled class and labor relations 
manifested in sharp debates about South Vietnamese national identity. A loss of national 
morale was most evident among the ARVN rank-and-file, perhaps the segment of the 
South Vietnamese population that was most marginalized during the war. Finally, the 
chapter comes full circle with implications of what U.S. policymakers like Fulbright 
understood to be the unintended consequences of the American presence in South 
Vietnam. 
THE AMERICANIZATION OF WAR 
 
 After the assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem in November 1963, the American 
nation-building endeavor in South Vietnam appeared more threatened than ever before. 
Indeed, after eight years of American economic and military aid to prop up South 
Vietnam, the country could not stand on its own politically, economically, or militarily. 
By the time the coterie of generals led by Duong Van Minh overthrew Diem, the 
country’s imminent collapse was a real possibility. Though some American leaders 
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initially relished that America’s shaky partnership with Diem was now over, the power 
vacuum created by Diem’s ouster soon became a major problem for U.S. policymakers. 
Between 1963 and 1965, twelve “revolving door” governments took office in Saigon, 
consisting primarily of generals who led coup after coup to depose one another. Not until 
the military government of Air Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky as prime minister and General 
Nguyen Van Thieu as president took power in June 1965 was there any semblance of 
stable leadership in Saigon.  
The political fragility of Saigon contrasted with growing political determination in 
Hanoi, as party leaders ramped up plans to reunify Vietnam under communist rule. 
Haunted by missed opportunities at Geneva in 1954 and the cancellation of national 
elections two years later, North Vietnamese leaders had begun strategizing for national 
reunification as early as 1959. That year, party officials agreed that political organization 
and military agitation were essential to fomenting revolution in southern Vietnam. They 
declared that the “fundamental path of development for the revolution in South Vietnam 
is that of violent struggle.”83 By the end of 1959, Hanoi began sending troops and 
equipment down the newly-built Ho Chi Minh Trail to infiltrate below the seventeenth 
parallel. Party leaders also collaborated with southern communist insurgents in 1960 to 
create the National Liberation Front (NLF) of South Vietnam, a political organization 
that aimed to achieve national reunification. Within two years, therefore, communist 
leaders in Hanoi had laid the political and military infrastructure for war. By 1963, it was 
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clear that North Vietnam, wary of an all-out military confrontation with the United 
States, aimed for the NLF to achieve victory before Americans could intervene in full 
force. At the Central Committee’s Ninth Plenum in December 1963, communist 
leadership ordered NLF insurgents to increase political and military operations to bring 
down the Saigon regime.84  
In light of the rapidly growing insurgency in South Vietnam and during a period 
of national mourning after Kennedy’s assassination, Lyndon Johnson, who lacked 
extensive credentials in foreign policy, continued the middle course in Vietnam pursued 
by his predecessor. Like Kennedy, Johnson was a Cold Warrior dedicated to fighting 
communism around the globe, but he also doubted the importance of Vietnam to 
American national security. “I don’t think it’s worth fighting for, and I don’t think we can 
get out. And it’s just the biggest damn mess that I ever saw,” Johnson lamented privately 
to National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy in May 1964. He continued, “What in the 
hell is Vietnam worth to me?... What is it worth to this country?”85 Just as Kennedy did, 
Johnson postponed the decision to deploy American ground troops to Vietnam as long as 
he could, knowing full well that there would be no turning back once that decision was 
made. Like the three presidents before him who paved the road for increased American 
involvement in Vietnam, Johnson gradually upped the number of military advisers from 
16,000 at the time of Kennedy’s assassination to 23,300 by the end of 1964.  
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Unlike his immediate predecessor, however, Johnson personalized the stakes of 
Vietnam, while his concern with domestic politics limited his range of options in 
Southeast Asia. Ever the politician, Johnson was deeply preoccupied with his chances of 
winning the 1964 presidential election. Despite significant polling leads over his 
Republican opponent, Barry Goldwater, Johnson believed it was necessary to appear firm 
on Vietnam without making pivotal decisions until after the election.86 Moreover, he 
believed that a staunch anti-communist stance in Vietnam was crucial to his ability to 
shepherd through his sweeping set of liberal domestic programs, the Great Society. After 
all, Johnson had seen what “the loss of China” had done to the Truman administration 
politically. He later recalled, “I knew Harry Truman and Dean Acheson had lost their 
effectiveness from the day that the Communists took over in China.”87 Johnson was 
determined to avoid that same fate with Vietnam. 
In the summer of 1964, an incident in the South China Sea offered Johnson the 
opportunity to burnish his anti-communist credentials just in time before the November 
election. On August 2, North Vietnamese boats fired on the American destroyer USS 
Maddox, which was engaging in electronic espionage in the Gulf of Tonkin. During the 
brief episode, the Maddox opened fire and the Vietnamese ships launched torpedoes in 
response before retreating. Two days later, the Maddox and the USS Turner Joy reported 
coming under attack by North Vietnamese boats. Although the second attack was 
questionable at the time and was later found to have never occurred, Johnson ordered 
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retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnamese naval installations and oil storage 
facilities. He also took advantage of the incident to encourage Congress to quickly grant 
him greater powers to undertake additional military action. On August 7, the House and 
Senate passed, with little debate and near unanimous votes, the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution, which authorized the president to take “all necessary measures” to resist 
North Vietnamese aggression. Having successfully fended off Republican criticisms for 
being weak on communism, Johnson was able to moderate his position on Vietnam, 
garner the support of centrist voters, and win the largest presidential landslide victory in 
American history.88   
While Johnson strategized to secure his place in the White House, the situation in 
South Vietnam grew increasingly dire. In Saigon, political turmoil continued to threaten 
the stability of the state. In August 1964, General Nguyen Khanh’s usurpation of 
dictatorial powers severely curtailed civil liberties and provoked numerous public 
demonstrations. His hold on Saigon was so weak that ARVN officers jostling for power 
threw him out of office briefly, but Khanh returned to leadership after agreeing to enter 
into a political alliance. As historian Mark Bradley writes, by the fall of 1964, “the 
legitimacy of the South Vietnamese government was in shambles.”89 Meanwhile, leaders 
in Hanoi, bolstered by increased assistance from China and the Soviet Union, began 
sending North Vietnamese troops, the People’s Army of Vietnam, down the Ho Chi Minh 
Trail into South Vietnam for the first time in September 1964. Soon after, North 
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Vietnamese forces engaged in direct combat with Army of the Republic of Vietnam 
(ARVN) soldiers.90  
In light of the political crises in Saigon and communist incursion into southern 
Vietnam, the Johnson administration made a series of decisions between late 1964 and 
early 1965 that would lead the United States to pursue a full-scale war in Vietnam.91 
Although Johnson and his advisers deliberated their actions slowly during this time, all of 
their options centered on expanding the war to preserve an independent and non-
communist South Vietnam. That is not to say, however, that Johnson was unconcerned 
about an open-ended conflict in Southeast Asia. In fact, he worried that American 
intervention could precipitate a larger war involving nuclear powers, weaken the fragile 
South Vietnamese government, and harm his Great Society agenda. Despite these 
concerns, though, Johnson assumed that American escalation would eventually force 
North Vietnam to withdraw its support for the NLF. More specifically, American power 
in the form of bombs and ground troops, Johnson believed, would force the North 
Vietnamese communists to negotiate an end to the war on American terms. At the start of 
1965, Johnson significantly intensified the war by approving a two-phase plan of aerial 
bombardment: the first would target the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, while the second 
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would comprise a sustained bombing campaign against North Vietnam over a few 
months. This second part of the plan, Johnson recognized, would likely require the 
deployment of American troops to protect U.S. airbases.92  
By the spring of 1965, then, the Johnson administration concluded that the United 
States would assume the responsibility of fighting communist insurgents on behalf of 
South Vietnam. On February 7, the NLF attacked the American base at Pleiku, killing 
eight Americans. Already committed to the use of American air power, Johnson 
authorized retaliatory strikes against military bases in North Vietnam. The following 
month, on March 2, the gradual and sustained bombing campaign, Operation Rolling 
Thunder, began. A few days later on March 8, 3,500 U.S. Marines landed in Danang to 
guard the American air base and free South Vietnamese soldiers for combat. As the 
Johnson administration became preoccupied with American military strategy on land and 
in the air, however, the presence and actions of American soldiers and civilians would 
generate a different set of problems for U.S. policymakers.  
THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE EXPERIENCE OF WAR  
 
Although U.S. policymakers believed that direct American intervention would 
stabilize South Vietnam, intensification of war only further destabilized the country. As 
historian Gabriel Kolko noted, the United States in Vietnam “unleashed the greatest flood 
of firepower against a nation known to history,” causing an indescribable amount of 
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human suffering.93 Indeed the Pentagon estimated that between 700,000 to 1,225,000 
South Vietnamese civilians were killed and wounded from 1965 to 1972.94 In 1975, the 
U.S. Senate estimated the civilian casualties in Vietnam to be 1.4 million. However, as 
the journalist Nick Turse argues, the most recent and sophisticated analyses of casualties 
suggest a figure of 3.8 million deaths in Vietnam is a more reasonable and accurate 
estimate.95 The shocking level of violence and destruction in rural South Vietnam was 
undoubtedly a major source of anger toward the United States.  
U.S. leaders long believed in the power of economic development and technology 
to modernize underdeveloped countries, but the American nation-building program in 
South Vietnam arguably harmed more than helped the vast majority of the country’s 
population: peasants. Since the late 1950s, the United States granted millions of dollars to 
U.S. contractors to build and improve the country’s physical infrastructure, not primarily 
to improve Vietnamese living standards but rather for the purpose of combating the 
growing southern insurgency. As historian James Carter has written, during the 
“construction miracle of the decade” in the 1960s, American engineering companies 
literally laid the groundwork that made military operations possible. They built and 
refurbished roads, bridges, canals, hospitals, port facilities, and airfields that would allow 
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for an efficient and large-scale war.96 This “paradox of construction and destruction,” 
Carter argues, facilitated extensive violence particularly in the countryside.97  
Despite the need to protect the local population, American military strategy to 
root out communist insurgents in the South Vietnamese countryside also had the 
unintended effect of alienating many peasants. From 1965 to 1967, the mission to “search 
and destroy” enemies in the country displaced peasants from their ancestral homes. 
Intense bombing and shelling, widespread chemical destruction of crops, and forced 
removal of peasants by ground troops turned peasants into refugees.98 During the war, 
approximately four million South Vietnamese, or 25 percent of the population, left their 
villages due to military operations.99 Refugee camps set up to house peasants temporarily, 
however, proved more similar to concentration camps than places of safe haven. 
Insufficient food, cramped quarters, and squalid conditions further marginalized villagers. 
For millions of refugees, heading to the cities to seek food, shelter, and employment was 
the only viable option.100   
One of the most consequential transformations of wartime South Vietnam, then, 
was forced urbanization. In 1960, only 20 percent of South Vietnam’s population resided 
in urban areas; that figure increased to 26 percent by 1964, 36 percent by 1968, and 43 
                                                
96 Carter, Inventing Vietnam, 157. 
97 Ibid., 181. 
98 Gibson, The Perfect War, 229. The exact numbers of refugees generated by the war is unknown for a 
variety of reasons, including the logistical difficulty of tracking the numbers and the fact that American 
officials were not the most concerned with uncovering the consequences of its military policies. The U.S. 
Senate estimated that there were around 5.8 million refugees from 1964 to 1972, while the RVN estimated 
that 7 million refugees were created by the war. Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 201. 
99 Herring, America’s Longest War, 205. 
100 For more information on the experiences of refugees, see Gary Dean Murfin, “War, Life and Stress: 
The Forced Relocation of the Vietnamese People” (PhD diss., University of Hawai’i, 1975). 
 53 
percent by 1971. According to Kolko, this rate of urban growth was five times that of all 
underdeveloped nations during the same decade.101 Cities like Danang, Hue, Nha Trang, 
and Can Tho, for example, expanded drastically, while metropolitan Saigon grew to a 
lesser degree. This abnormal pace of growth not only created great disparities between 
rural and urban South Vietnam, but also within the cities, which were not equipped to 
accommodate the influx of newcomers. Cities lacked the physical infrastructure to 
address increased demand for basic necessities like healthcare, education, employment, 
and housing. Shantytowns built on the outskirts of towns to shelter refugees were worlds 
apart from the old city centers, the domain of the urban bourgeoisie and middle class. As 
new urban-dwellers from the countryside found themselves coexisting with longtime 
residents, cities became the sites where tradition and modernity clashed.  
Amid rapid and forced urbanization, the arrival of American troops in South 
Vietnam further transformed the demography of fast-growing cities. From 1963 to 1965, 
the number of American military personnel in South Vietnam increased from 16,000 to 
over 385,000. By the end of 1965, there was roughly one American for every fifteen 
Vietnamese in Saigon.102 The number of American troops would later peak at 543,400 in 
April 1969.103 The American presence in South Vietnam was therefore not only visible 
but also unavoidable, particularly in areas where troops were stationed.  
The arrival of GIs immediately transformed the look and feel of cities such as 
Saigon and Danang. The sight of military vehicles and barbed-wire fencing and the 
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sounds of planes and helicopters reminded residents of the urgency of war.104 Meanwhile, 
the cooptation of Vietnamese spaces by Americans suggested that the impact of the 
American troop deployment was more than just military. Tu Do Street in Saigon, for 
example, once known as the Fifth Avenue shopping destination of the city, became lined 
with bars that catered to American GIs. In fact, the proliferation of people, buildings, 
vehicles, and consumer goods made cities more packed than ever before. Traffic, for 
example, became busier and more congested with various types of transportation filling 
the road, including military vehicles, cars, scooters, and bikes. As the New York Times 
reported in August 1965, the war “quickened the tempo of life” for soldiers and civilians 
alike in Saigon.105 Intensification of war thus not only precipitated mass urbanization in 
South Vietnam but also changed the composition, functions, and challenges of its cities.    
The heightened pace of life in urban South Vietnam inevitably multiplied the 
occasion for cultural misunderstanding and social tension. Daily friction between young 
American GIs and local Vietnamese in the cities revealed major cultural contrasts 
between Americans and Vietnamese that seemed insurmountable.106 Instances of reckless 
driving, public urination, and drunken behavior by young American GIs were a few 
examples that strained relations between guests and hosts. U.S. officials, mindful of the 
importance for Americans to maintain good relations with Vietnamese citizens, were not 
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unaware of the growing friction between GIs and locals. In August 1966, Ambassador 
Henry Cabot Lodge conveyed to the State Department his “continuing concern and 
worry” about American soldiers’ behavior in Saigon. Unconfirmed reports claimed that 
high-ranking South Vietnamese officials even urged Lodge to pursue stricter discipline 
among GIs.107  
Though disruptive actions by troops obviously caused Vietnamese to resent the 
American presence, the mere presence of Americans and the existence of their wealth 
also contributed to latent Vietnamese anti-Americanism. Far from the bombs dropped on 
the countryside, many urban citizens—both those newly arrived from the countryside and 
those long established before the American intervention—nonetheless found the war 
immensely disruptive and destructive. The flood of American soldiers and dollars into 
South Vietnam radically altered the nature of South Vietnamese society. The American 
dollar, the most highly sought-after commodity in South Vietnam, appeared to be at the 
very root of Vietnamese concerns about the loss of national and cultural identity.108  
WARTIME INFLATION AND THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ECONOMY 
 
While American economic aid to South Vietnam skyrocketed to unprecedented 
levels after 1964, the intensification of war further distorted the South Vietnamese 
economy. As the U.S. Agency for International Development concluded in 1975, the 
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period from 1965-1967 in South Vietnam “was unlike anything ever experienced by an 
underdeveloped country.”109 The escalation of war destroyed agricultural production and 
turned South Vietnam, which was a leading exporter of rice under French colonialism, to 
a net importer of rice by the end of 1965.110 Industrial production, on the other hand, rose 
during 1964-67 because of military construction and the need to equip troops, though it 
would decline rapidly in 1968. By 1967, approximately 40 percent of South Vietnam’s 
gross national product consisted of American-financed imports, which would rise to 50 
percent by 1970. In fact, the proportion of manufacturing as part of the RVN’s gross 
domestic product dropped so much that South Vietnam was the only major Asian nation 
to undergo deindustrialization during this period.111 These trends suggest not only that 
South Vietnam’s wartime economy was overwhelmingly dependent on American aid but 
also that short-term fixes to the economy, like the import of American-financed goods, 
harmed South Vietnam’s long-term economic prospects. 
Ordinary Vietnamese citizens experienced these economic transformations most 
directly through the prices they had to pay for goods. Although inflation naturally occurs 
in countries during war due to increases in government and military expenditures, 
inflation in South Vietnam rose at rates that alarmed American and Vietnamese officials, 
who feared that it could be politically destabilizing.112 In 1965, for example, prices soared 
by more than 100 percent. One estimate indicated that consumer prices increased 900 
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percent between 1964 and 1972.113 Over the course of the American presence in South 
Vietnam, inflation rates varied between 16 and 60 percent.114 In comparison, the rate of 
inflation averaged around 4.5 percent in the period from South Vietnam’s founding in 
1955 to 1964.115 To illustrate the skyrocketing prices of basic food commodities, the cost 
of an egg rose from 2.1 piasters in 1960, to 6.4 piasters in 1966, 8.8 piasters in 1967, 13.4 
piasters by 1968, and 21.9 in 1970. The price of one kilogram of rice increased from 5 
piasters in 1960, to 13.4 piasters in 1966, 28.2 piasters in 1968, and 53.2 piasters by 
1970.116 Rising prices thus affected even life’s most basic necessities, and no one in 
South Vietnam was immune to the effects of inflation.  
Inflation, however, was not only a macroeconomic problem but also a social one 
as well. Indeed, inflation, then as now, has different effects on different people and tends 
to worsen social disparities. In the case of wartime South Vietnam, the addition of a 
sizeable population of foreign troops needing a multitude of services and having the 
purchasing power to pay generously for such amenities played a key part in compounding 
social and economic problems. American soldiers’ consumer habits directly affected 
Vietnamese lives, as “Vietnamese labor and bodies [became] sources of gratification” for 
American GIs.117 In order to boost soldier morale, the American military contracted with 
business firms to provide service-oriented institutions, including dry cleaning, 
barbershops, beauty shops, massage parlors, and ice cream stores to serve the many needs 
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and desires of soldiers. Many of the small businesses that provided service to American 
GIs were actually owned and operated by local Vietnamese.118  
By turning South Vietnam into a service-sector economy, then, the American 
presence divided Vietnamese citizens, benefiting some Vietnamese but alienating many 
more. Like the drastic inequalities between urban and rural South Vietnam, the 
inequalities within the cities were just as pronounced. In addition to the socio-economic 
backgrounds that distinguished between refugees displaced from the countryside and 
those who had roots in urban areas, Vietnamese experienced inflation in various ways 
depending on their occupations. During the war, there were both “winners” and “losers” 
in the inflationary economy of urban South Vietnam, usually determined by their income 
and whether they worked for newly-arrived Americans, in the case of the winners, or for 
local Vietnamese people, in the case of the losers. In the new Vietnamese economy after 
the U.S. buildup, the losers were often the winners before the arrival of Americans, and 
vice versa. These role reversals explained why some Vietnamese welcomed the increased 
presence of Americans while others resented their growing numbers.   
Among the people who lost the most after American escalation were members of 
the urban Vietnamese middle class, who found the presence of Americans to be socially 
and economically disastrous.119 Those who trained and worked as doctors, nurses, 
teachers, accountants, civil servants, journalists, scholars, army officers, writers, lawyers, 
and scientists, for instance, “all those who served their own people but not the 
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Americans,” found themselves making less money and falling in social status.120 
Government employees and members of the armed forces, for example, faced stagnant 
wages and salaries, which put them at a huge disadvantage in the inflated economy.121 
Those who belonged to the urban middle class often adhered to their beliefs in traditional 
hard work and education and refused join the new service economy centered on GIs, 
preventing them from taking economic advantage of the American presence. 
On the contrary, those who benefited the most from South Vietnam’s inflationary 
economy often built their lives around the American presence. Indeed, the American 
consumer economy presented many service job opportunities for Vietnamese, and those 
who could find work serving Americans often earned more money than people who 
pursued more traditionally respected occupations. Moreover, in the first few months of 
the American military buildup, Vietnamese serving Americans were paid in U.S. dollars, 
a much more secure currency compared to the Vietnamese piaster. Vietnamese who 
owned businesses, shops, bars, hotels, or fleets of taxis, for example, “grew rich beyond 
their wildest dreams.”122 As anthropologist Neil Jamieson has explained, the arrival of 
Americans fundamentally altered the labor economy in urban areas:  
Inflation was no problem for those who could tap the wealth of the Americans; 
and tens of thousands of Vietnamese served us as companions, bartenders, 
hostesses, waiters, busboys and doormen. Other Vietnamese made our beds and 
shined our shoes; washed, pressed and mended our clothes; gave us haircuts, 
manicures, and massages; sold us chewing gum, peanuts, candy bars, cigarettes, 
dirty post cards, gaudy paintings on velvet, custom-made suits and shirts and 
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shoes, wallets, and briefcases; washed and drove and repaired our vehicles. On 
the whole, we paid well for the goods and services we received, and our spending 
generated many jobs.123  
 
As Jamieson’s suggests, Vietnamese who worked for Americans were handsomely 
rewarded for their labor and were able to live, if not thrive, on their earnings as long as 
Americans remained in the country. As we will see in the last chapter, suggestions that 
certain segments of the South Vietnamese population resisted American withdrawal and 
wanted the war to continue because of personal profits were thus not unreasonable.  
SOUTH VIETNAMESE CRITICISMS OF THE AMERICAN PRESENCE  
 
As social, cultural, and economic transformations in South Vietnamese society 
grew more conspicuous, a virulent and unique form of anti-Americanism developed 
among those who benefited the least and lost the most from the American presence. 
Unlike the nationalist rhetoric expressed to oppose previous foreign invasions of 
Vietnam, Vietnamese criticisms of the American presence during the war were grounded 
in specific accusations of how Americans had harmed traditional Vietnamese society, 
especially the family. Characterizing the American influence as “devastating, 
disintegrating, [and] explosive,” the South Vietnamese Information Minister, Ton That 
Tien, differentiated the impact of Americans from earlier foreign occupiers.124 In an 
article in The Asia Magazine titled “The Americanization of Vietnam,” Tien argued that 
the presence of Americans was more ubiquitous and destructive than that of the French, 
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who were in Vietnam for over a hundred years, or the Chinese, who ruled Vietnam for 
over a thousand. “Neither French nor Chinese,” he argued, “had intruded so self-
righteously, so extensively and so deeply into Vietnamese life—nor threatened to crush it 
under the overwhelming weight of numbers, power, money and crusading zeal.”125 Ton’s 
estimation of the impact of the American presence represents a highly subjective but 
common view among Vietnamese regarding the overpowering military and economic 
might that the United States brought to South Vietnam in such a short timespan. After all, 
such a sudden and vast infusion of men and money to a country naturally produced a 
forceful economic and cultural shock on its society.   
Trenchant criticisms of the American presence focused heavily on its corroding 
effects on the traditional Vietnamese family, particularly the roles of Vietnamese women. 
Due to the nature of the changing labor economy in South Vietnamese cities, Vietnamese 
women frequently interacted with American GIs. Because most South Vietnamese men 
of military-service age were required to join the ARVN, women became the primary 
workers.126 Of the 330,000 employees of Saigon’s wartime labor force, for example, 
approximately 250,000 were women.127 These women worked a range of jobs from 
cleaning rooms to laundering clothes to fulfilling the emotional needs for sex and 
companionship of American GIs. Because the American military could not import 
services for troops, Vietnamese women provided the necessary labor for the functioning 
of American logistics and support for soldiers. As young men dominated the population 
                                                
125 Ton That Thien, “The Americanization of Vietnam,” The Asia Magazine, 17 September 1967, 8. 
126 Stur, Beyond Combat, 50. 
127 Ibid., 51. 
 62 
on military bases, the U.S. military also helped promote the employment of local 
Vietnamese women to fill the void that men who left their families, girlfriends, and wives 
in the United States experienced. Beyond the military bases, Vietnamese women also 
worked in entertainment venues that catered to American troops. During the course of the 
war, at least 200,000 Vietnamese women became prostitutes serving American troops 
and an unknown number worked as bar girls.128 In fact, Saigon alone had over one 
thousand bars and over a hundred nightclubs, employing 25,000 bar girls.129  
That Vietnamese women consorted with American GIs for a living brought shame 
to many Vietnamese families. The very public ways in which American soldiers 
fraternized with Vietnamese women often contributed to families losing face in society. 
Traditional tight-knit families fractured when some Vietnamese women left their 
husbands for American men. Even when women remained with their husbands, their 
families were still humiliated by their work as bar girls and prostitutes. Although 
prostitution was viewed as immoral among Vietnamese, women who became prostitutes 
sacrificed their dignity in order to provide for their families financially.130 At the same 
time, however, the shame of having members of one’s family, including wives, sisters, 
and daughters, engaged in such work sometimes drove Vietnamese men to commit 
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suicide.131 The consequences of South Vietnam’s emergent service economy on family 
life was thus symbolic of the impact Americans had on Vietnamese society. 
In addition to shifting family dynamics, the American troop presence also shaped 
notions and features of Vietnamese womanhood. Americans GIs not only changed 
Vietnamese women’s work but also their conceptions of beauty. As Saigon’s cosmetic 
surgeons attested, the popularity of plastic surgery operations could be attributed directly 
to the American buildup in 1965. Magazines that American GIs brought to Vietnam, 
most notably Playboy, were shared widely with Vietnamese, including bar girls. As GIs 
expressed their desires for Vietnamese women to look more like American pinups, many 
Vietnamese women altered their bodies through cosmetic surgery to attract and maintain 
more clients.132 Bar girls who could afford it went under the knife to acquire rounder 
eyes, bigger breasts, and larger, more defined noses to look like Playboy bunnies.133 A 
former army doctor turned plastic surgeon, Vu Ban, observed that for bar girls, plastic 
surgery “became part of their livelihood…[and] helped them get jobs and American 
husbands.”134 For about 50,000 piasters or about $100, women could acquire a slimmer 
nose or double eyelids, while more complicated procedures, like breast or hip operations, 
could cost around 200,000 piasters, or about $400.135 Ngo Van Hieu, owner of a well-
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known cosmetic surgery clinic in Saigon, estimated that about 40 percent of her 
customers were bar girls, and the rest were often members of “Vietnamese high society” 
including movie stars, singers, and wives or government and military officials.136 One 
doctor, Pam Ba Vien, estimated that as many as eighty to one hundred such operations 
were performed weekly in Saigon, while other Vietnamese women, especially wives of 
generals and ministers, went to Japan for their procedures.137 Women like Nguyen Thi 
Nhan who worked in Saigon’s most exclusive bars were not ashamed of their new looks 
and, in fact, felt they were more beautiful after their cosmetic procedures.138 Explaining 
the popular trend, Hieu asserted, “Vietnam has been a suffering country. People don’t 
know if they’re going to be alive tomorrow, so they want to keep whatever they have. As 
a result they concentrate on keeping their beauty and sensual-type things.”139 Whether 
women changed their bodies for employment prospects or for personal reasons, their 
decisions nonetheless had great cultural implications. Surgeries to correct what one 
doctor called “natural Asian defects” represented a physical loss of Vietnamese women’s 
attributes, suggesting that the American presence literally transformed Vietnamese 
womanhood as well.  
As some women adopted western standards of beauty, Vietnamese laments on the 
loss of traditional womanhood also focused on the disruptive effects of American 
consumerism. The influx of foreign consumer imports through the CIP and the 
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availability of black market PX goods undoubtedly shaped Vietnamese ideas about taste 
and style and influenced how Vietnamese spent their money. Women’s spending on 
fashion items became a topic of concern among some Vietnamese, who believed that 
spending on unnecessary goods directly contradicted the traditional practice of thrift and 
austerity. An advice column for women in Quyet Tien, one of Saigon’s newspapers, 
stated, “From the day that Americans came to Vietnam in droves, the conflict increased 
in intensity, and the majority of our women threw themselves into an excessively 
extravagant life.” Though the author recognized that the American presence was partially 
responsible for women’s lavish spending, the author also criticized Vietnamese women 
for indulging in the present instead of saving for Vietnam’s future:  
The cause of the present expensive way of life is that we are spending far too 
much on the conflict, and are buying far too many foreign goods, but that we are 
producing far too little. This is a grave weakness. In such a situation, what do we 
women do? Everyday we still buy face powder, lipstick, perfume, jewelry, 
blouses and skirts and the silks of foreign countries…Precisely because of the 
lack of conscience of the great majority of women about the future of the nation, 
we women have lost the virtue of thrift of the people of Vietnam.140  
 
Indeed, as historian Alec Woodside has written, there existed in traditional Vietnam a 
“centuries-old proposition that the good life can be attained only by a degree of personal 
austerity…and by rigorous public management of the society’s resources.” In the context 
of war, women’s interest in American and international fashion was thus considered to be 
frivolous. As evident in the covers of Vietnamese women’s magazines during the war, 
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western standards of fashionable clothing and hairstyles began to change how 
Vietnamese women dressed, groomed, and made themselves up, which often required 
additional spending. What critics viewed as the weakening of traditional virtues like thrift 
after the arrival of Americans, however, was also the result of global forces beyond 
Vietnam. Indeed, sexual liberation for women in 1960s combined with the prevalent 
consumer culture of the decade to influence the consumption habits of women 
everywhere, including in Vietnam. 
Like the sexual revolution, global consumer and youth culture existed apart from 
the raging war in Vietnam, but the presence of American troops brought elements of 
consumer, youth, and popular culture immediately to Vietnam. Through the import of 
radios and television sets and access to the U.S. Armed Forces channel, Vietnamese 
families watched shows such as “Batman,” “Gunsmoke,” “Mission Impossible,” and 
“Combat.”141 Among youths, the segment of the Vietnamese population that arguably 
enjoyed and emulated American popular culture the most, symbols of what was 
considered by American standards to signify “cool” appeared in their preferences for 
entertainment, clothes, and food. Armed Forces Radio playing rock ‘n’ roll music, for 
example, was more popular among teenagers than Vietnamese radio.142 Children 
consumed newly-introduced beverages like Nescafe and Coca-Cola. Girls and young 
women wore miniskirts and makeup and openly talked about sex, a traditionally taboo 
topic in Vietnamese society. Young men, on the other hand, embraced a new image of 
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themselves by smoking cigarettes, riding motorcycles, and wearing sunglasses. Young 
Vietnamese men who evaded the draft were often referred to as “cowboys” who rode 
around loudly on their motorbikes and sometimes even stole from American soldiers. The 
wide-ranging influence of global youth culture and the American troop presence thus 
shaped the experience of growing up in Vietnam.  
Vietnamese who deplored the loss of Vietnamese womanhood also believed that 
the American presence corrupted Vietnamese childhood. As Kolko has written, many 
children of former peasants ended up working in the sidewalk economy and resorting to 
crime, drug addiction, and prostitution.143 “This whole generation of young people is 
falling into wells of depravity, especially youth from poor families,” 50-year-old novelist 
Do The bemoaned. He recounted a story in which a thirteen-year-old girl approached him 
in a café in Saigon and asked him to buy her a cup of coffee. According to The, she 
complained, “Goddam these Americans…. They’ve been making love to me all day and I 
still haven’t got any satisfaction.”144 The and other intellectuals like him often interpreted 
stories like this young child becoming a prostitute as representative of the harmful impact 
of Americans, which fueled their anger toward the United States. Other critics lamented 
the American presence for pulling Vietnamese children and teenagers further and further 
away from their parents and elders. “The younger people have lost their faith in the older 
generation,” said Nguyen Van Trung, the Dean of the Faculty of Letters at Saigon 
University. “They have seen people talking about revolution and then stealing money 
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from the people. This is why the youngsters have given up the ideal of a life of struggle 
and are now in pursuit of pleasure.”145 Indeed, war and the circumstances it created had 
rendered many South Vietnamese, including youths, apathetic to politics. Uncertainty 
over the outcome of the war and the future of the nation existed during a time of widely 
accessible forms of entertainment, consumption, and indulgence. The frustration and 
resentment that older generations of Vietnamese felt toward the United States reflected 
the paradox of suffering and pleasure that the American presence created.  
The Vietnamese family, a traditional cornerstone of society, was also disrupted by 
the ways in which American wealth altered relations between children and their parents 
and elders. As one American-educated lawyer asserted, “The poor families come to 
Saigon from the countryside because of the war. The father has few skills, so he becomes 
a day laborer or drives a pedicab. Before he was respected by the children. He knew 
about the farm. He knew about the land. Now he knows nothing.” The necessity for 
peasants to become refugees in the cities thus carried troubling implications for the 
dynamics between children and parents. Indeed, the Confucian virtue of filial piety was 
seriously undermined by the fact that children witnessed their parents struggle to provide 
for them in completely unfamiliar and tenuous circumstances, while the children 
themselves in some cases became breadwinners. “The young boys wash cars for the 
Americans or shine shoes or sell papers or work as pickpockets,” the lawyer explained. 
He continued, “They may earn 500 or 600 piasters a day. Here is a 10-year-old boy 
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earning three times as much as his father. It is unheard of.”146 In the new economy, it was 
not uncommon for money to dissolve the respect that offspring traditionally paid to their 
parents.  
While South Vietnamese critics denounced the “loss” of their women and 
children, they also decried the inversion of other social hierarchies. As Vietnamese 
newspapers illustrated in political cartoons, a new social structure arose from the flood of 
American wealth into South Vietnam. In this social pyramid, bar girls occupied the 
pinnacle, with prostitutes below them, then the pimps and bar owners, and lastly the taxi 
drivers. This depiction of Vietnamese social hierarchy underscored the prevalence of 
occupations that served the needs of affluent American GIs instead of the needs of 
Vietnamese. The benefit of working for Americans was evident in the great disparities of 
occupational income. According to Ho Huu Tuong, a lower-house representative in the 
South Vietnamese National Assembly who was a prominent intellectual earlier in his 
career, a university professor would earn around 18,000 piasters a month, equivalent to 
around $150, while a bar girl would earn 100,000 piasters, equal to about $850.147 As 
journalist Frances FitzGerald noted, a mid-level government bureaucrat with a college 
degree and an army discharge earned between $70 to $100 a month.148 Working for the 
Vietnamese government or Vietnamese employers, then, was tantamount to making less 
money for the same work. During the war, Vietnamese garbage collectors, for example, 
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left their jobs to work for the American military or U.S. corporations in Vietnam.149 Even 
vital everyday services were affected by the introduction of Americans into Vietnam. 
Beginning in 1965, new economic pressures in South Vietnam forced Vietnamese 
to reevaluate their national identities as it related to the emerging business of catering to 
American GIs. As the number of Americans increased during the military buildup, the 
rise of a service-sector in South Vietnam’s wartime labor economy stimulated passionate 
debates about what constituted a Vietnamese national identity. Given the disruptive 
impact of Americans on South Vietnamese class, gender, and generational relations, 
Vietnamese citizens expressed their criticisms of how Americans and their wealth had 
changed the interactions among Vietnamese. In the realm of class and labor relations, 
debates over the proper roles and behaviors of one occupation—taxi drivers—provide 
insight into how South Vietnamese citizens articulated their national identities in the 
company of an ever-increasing population of American soldiers and civilians. As we will 
see, the inability to get a cab was indicative of new social tensions, and Vietnamese who 
were brushed off by their own people invoked notions of the nation in order to seek 
government redress of an everyday, practical problem. Vietnamese responses to the taxi 
problem offer a window into larger anxieties within South Vietnamese society over the 
fear of losing one’s national and cultural identity. 
TAXI DRIVERS: A DEBATE ABOUT SOUTH VIETNAMESE NATIONAL IDENTITY 
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On August 14, 1965, the Saigon Daily News, the most widely circulated English-
language newspaper in South Vietnam, published a political cartoon accompanied by the 
caption, “Big Problem for Saigon” [Figure 1]. The cartoon depicts a Vietnamese taxi 
driver opening the back door of his car and gesturing an American man to get inside. The 
American is identified in the drawing by his stereotypically tall stature, large nose, large 
feet, and sport shirt. Meanwhile, a Vietnamese family consisting of a mother and her five 
children stood waiting in the rain. One child is crying, as the mother looks perplexed at 
the Vietnamese driver who zoomed past her to ferry the lone American. The taxicab, 
engine still running, displayed an “occupied” sign prominently on the windshield, though 
no passenger was inside.  
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Figure 1. “ Big Problem for Saigon” 150  
During the month of August 1965, outrage over the actions of taxi drivers 
dominated the internal editorial pages of Vietnamese newspapers across the country. In 
the Saigon Post, an editorial titled, “The Way It Goes,” described the difficulty of 
flagging down a taxi in Saigon.151 Penned by “Charlie Brown,” an alias that U.S. officials 
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believed represented South Vietnamese ambassador to the United States Bùi Diễm, the 
editorial explains that the “Not for Hire” stickers that authorities required taxicabs to use 
are the “most convenient means to make a laughing stock out of city ordinances.” The 
editorial claimed that cab drivers had the convenience of turning down the visor flap 
displaying the “Not for Hire” sticker, “for as long as there is no fat-pocketed customer in 
sight.” When Americans with the “green backs” come into sight, however, the drivers 
could push the flap up and stop to pick them up. That explains why, the editorial 
continued, on rainy afternoons Vietnamese could wait on street corners for as long as 
three hours and “watch exasperatedly as fleets of cabs—all bearing the ‘Not for Hire’ 
stickers—cruise by.”152 The editorial implied that cab drivers preferred American clients 
because Americans at the time paid with their green dollars, and Vietnamese drivers 
would rather be compensated in a foreign currency.  
Though editorials like this abounded in Vietnamese newspapers reflecting the 
irritation of those in need of transportation, several editorials also attempted to convey the 
taxi drivers’ side of the story, but with noticeably little sympathy. An editorial in Tiếng 
Vang (Echo) captured the response of one taxi driver when he was confronted with the 
accusation that those in his occupation select to drive foreigners and not Vietnamese.153 
Titled “Confidence of a Taxi-Driver,” this editorial, written from the perspective of a 
Vietnamese taxi passenger, chronicled one man’s experience interacting with a cab 
driver. “It is very hard at this time to get a taxi. We felt a real relief when, by chance, we 
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got one,” the passenger said to the driver. He confided, “One wastes too much time to 
find a cab.” The taxi driver responded “with no less confidence,” as the passenger put it: 
“We are in no better situation than you. There are not enough taxis in town to serve an 
ever-increasing number of patrons. Traffic is so heavy that circulation is slowed down.” 
The driver added that “we do not earn more than usual and we are denounced as giving 
preference to foreigners.” “How can they denounce us with such nonsense,” the driver 
continued, “We have no time to choose patrons.” Suggesting that it is only a minority of 
cab drivers who choose to serve foreigners over Vietnamese, he stated, “Perhaps it is the 
preference of certain of our colleagues working at night who want to earn tips by driving 
foreigners to find girls. The majority of us take any patrons and do not think [to] make 
more money with foreigners.”154 As the headline “Confidence of a Taxi Driver” 
indicated, this editorial appeared to question the statements proffered by a seemingly 
defensive taxi driver, who gave multiple reasons denying that those in his industry 
discriminated against other Vietnamese for profit before conceding that perhaps it is just 
a small minority of drivers who do so.  
Newspapers also reported the other reasons given by taxi drivers to justify what 
most Vietnamese considered unfair treatment. An editorial titled “Xenophile Taxi 
Drivers” printed in Le Viet Nam Nouveau, a French-language newspaper published in 
Saigon, detailed the arguments taxi drivers put forward to vindicate their profession. 
Repeating the claim that only a few cab drivers engaged in discriminatory practices that 
tarnished the occupation’s reputation, drivers mentioned in the editorial contended that 
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“out of some 10,000 chauffeurs only a few score are particularly interested in American 
patrons, the remainder being willing to take any patrons.” Moreover, the drivers claimed 
that they sometimes had to refuse to carry a patron for reasons including: obligation to 
pass the taxi to a colleague who will drive it for the rest of the day, car maintenance 
problems, a lunch break either at home or at a restaurant, and the nearing of curfew. 
Additionally, the taxi drivers asserted that the requirement to use “Not for Hire” stickers 
served to protect drivers against complaints.155 The author of the editorial, however, 
ultimately sided with the majority of Vietnamese citizens who were up in arms over the 
shortage of rides. Branding problematic taxi drivers as xenophiles, the editorial echoed a 
suggestion presented by the Vietnamese-language daily, Quyết Tiến, to urge authorities to 
allow other vehicles like tri-Lambrettas (three-wheeled motorbikes) to serve patrons 
refused by xenophile chauffeurs.156 While taxi drivers offered many reasons why they 
could not transport Vietnamese clients, the overwhelming consensus amongst those 
grumbling about rides was that taxi drivers ignored Vietnamese patrons because they 
favored foreign passengers with deep pockets.   
While the scarcity of taxi rides in cities like Saigon prompted drivers to repudiate 
charges of favoring foreigners, other transportation providers admitted that economic 
proceeds factored into their consideration of clients. The comments of one cyclo 
(pedicab) driver in Danang interviewed by Quyết Tiến on August 5, 1965 sheds light on 
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how some drivers felt about the controversy over transportation.157 In a special report 
titled “Danang and the Dollar,” the Vietnamese reporter wrote that a cyclo ride traveling 
500 meters cost him thirty piasters while the regular fare before American troops arrived 
in Danang in March that year cost only five piasters. The reporter recounted, “The cyclo 
driver told me he did not ‘look down’ upon Vietnamese patrons but would ask the 
customer not to pay too low a price compared with that given by Americans. We are very 
united in setting a standard fare.” Moreover, the reporter quotes the cyclo driver saying, 
“If a patron thinks my fare is too high, he could not bargain with any other cyclo.”158 As 
this cyclo driver indicated, easy access to higher cyclo fares enabled drivers to form a 
local cartel, and Vietnamese who could not afford higher fares would be priced out of this 
form of transportation. In the context of wartime inflation and stagnant wages, however, 
many Vietnamese could not keep pace with mounting prices.   
 The bias in favor of wealthy Americans among taxi drivers raised concerns for 
many Vietnamese citizens worried about losing access to resources and services. The 
availability of stable American dollars encouraged service workers to be partial to foreign 
clients. An August 3, 1965, editorial in the newspaper Tiếng Việt (Vietnamese Voice) 
titled “The Dollar and the Law of Supply and Demand” linked the rise of American 
dollars to taxi drivers who privileged profits over their professional and national 
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identities.159 Focusing on the issue of “the dollar and its relation to the economic and 
social life of our people,” the editorial mentioned that the “vernacular press has 
complained almost daily about the fact that certain taxi-drivers brushed off local patrons 
in order to take foreigners.” Furthermore, the editorial characterized taxi drivers as 
wanting to “pocket dollars and [relegating] to second place their professional obligations 
and their national feeling.” The editorial argued that these frustrations “would affect more 
or less all of us if the government does not take appropriate measures and if we let 
ourselves be enticed by easy gains.”160  
 The criticism of being easily tempted by financial gains, particularly in a foreign 
currency, in this editorial suggests that seeking excess earnings would not be compatible 
with demonstrating nationalist sentiments. As the editorial made clear, taxi drivers who 
rebuffed their fellow citizens to give Americans rides valued the American dollar more 
than the Vietnamese piaster, revealing a lack of pride or confidence in one’s national 
currency. Moreover, the editorial argued that these cab drivers prioritized monetary 
rewards above their duties to their profession and to their nation, thus pitting what might 
be considered economic sensibility to make money, especially in a stable currency, 
against nationalism. Implicit in this critique of taxi drivers is thus a belief that American 
affluence had created a society in which working for foreigners hindered a Vietnamese 
citizen’s obligations to his nation. Moreover, the editorial suggests that if Vietnamese had 
prioritized their patriotism, then they would not treat their fellow citizens unfairly. 
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Demonstrating loyalty to the Vietnamese nation would thus require cab drivers to resist 
the temptation of financial benefits.  
 Frustration directed toward taxi drivers also often invoked the shared skin-color 
of Vietnamese to distinguish themselves from cab drivers who ignore their fellow 
citizens. In an editorial titled “Put Long Noses on Segregated Drivers,” the newspaper 
Xây Dựng conceded, “In these days yellow-skinned people cannot refrain from cursing 
certain cab drivers who, roaming the street in empty cars, refuse to take their fellow-
countrymen but stop to let in foreign patrons.”161 It noted that the vociferous complaints 
resulted in authorities ordering cab drivers to place “off-duty” signs on their cars, but this 
had the unintentional effect of helping drivers continue to ignore local patrons since they 
did not have to use their hands to dismiss undesirable passengers. Moreover, the drivers’ 
union sent an open letter urging them to stop their “racial discrimination” practice. The 
editorial stated, however, that if “this appeal does not work either, we propose that 
Vietnamese put plastic noses on their segregationist drivers to make themselves (sic) look 
like foreigners.”162 
The urge for so-called segregationist drivers to wear long plastic noses 
represented the desires among some Vietnamese that certain taxi drivers should exclude 
themselves from membership in the Vietnamese race. Since “long nose” was a slang used 
to refer to Americans, the author of the editorial argued that taxi drivers who 
discriminated against their own race may as well become foreigners themselves. Though 
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the idea was obviously facetious, the suggestion nonetheless points to the heated debates 
over identity that arose when affluent American lifestyles disrupted transportation in 
South Vietnam.  
Besides invoking racial characteristics, newspapers also appealed to Vietnam’s 
long history of resisting foreign invaders to stigmatize “those who hanker after foreigners 
for fame or influence.” An editorial titled “Stop Hankering After Foreigners” in Đất Tổ 
(The Fatherland), though heavily censored, made the point clear that the words and deeds 
of those attracted to foreigners “may harm the honor of our nation.”163 The editorial 
admitted that some in the press have defended the actions of “our dear taxi drivers” 
because of their poor living conditions, but it also maintained that these taxi drivers “do 
not care for Vietnamese patrons.” Similar to many other opinion pieces, this editorial 
acknowledged that those who “hanker after foreigners” constituted a small minority of 
the Vietnamese population. As the editorial conveys, what had made Vietnam unique is 
its record of successfully ousting foreign intruders. The editorial also critiqued the 
motives behind the American buildup in South Vietnam: “Any decision or proposal of 
any foreign power should take into consideration the real situation of Viet-Nam and be 
based on the long and heroic struggle of our people.” Furthermore, the editorial asserted, 
“Our people have become mature, they can make decisions on domestic affairs and can 
chart the future course of the nation. Those who hanker after foreigners should shut 
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up.”164 According to the author, while most Vietnamese who pride themselves on the 
successes of Vietnam’s history with foreign nations have a role in constructing their 
nation, those attracted to foreigners deserve no role. In these criticisms, use of the term 
“hanker” reveals that service work was often described in sexual terms and likened to 
prostitution, when some kinds of service work for the Americans—translation for 
example—were clearly skilled jobs that were not degrading by nature.  
The Đất Tổ editorial also drew comparisons between American and Vietnamese 
civilization to indicate the overall superiority of Vietnamese people. It delineated a sharp 
distinction between markers of American society that should be admired and those that 
should be rejected. The editorial stated that although “the history of American civilization 
is brief, there are many things which one can learn from the [United States] such as 
industry, science, medicine, etc.” However, people “who chew chewing gum, who twist, 
who wear open dresses are not necessarily civilized people.”165 In praising the scientific 
and technological advancements of the United States but denigrating American youth 
culture and sexual openness, the author expressed ambivalence toward the United States 
and its presence in South Vietnam that was prevalent in society. Even more, the author 
attempts to compare those who “hanker after foreigners” to young women deemed 
uncivilized, invoking a metaphor of sexual dishonor when a feminized and weak country 
is invaded by a masculine and powerful foreign power.     
In the end, however, the editorial takes the stance that those who “hanker after 
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foreigners” should cease their behaviors. It asserted that the Vietnamese race had a long 
and proven history of prevailing against foreigners: “Our people had a long record of 
resistance against the Chinese aggressors, drove off the French (colonialists), and those 
who hanker after foreigners do not control the future of our nation.” In closing, the 
editorial urged that those who “hanker after foreigners” “should return to the Fatherland, 
to the People. Otherwise they will be crushed by the wheel of history.”166 Declaring that 
xenophiles “will be crushed by the wheel of history” suggests that taxi drivers who prefer 
Americans will be considered foreigners themselves, and Vietnamese will defeat those 
who do not belong to the nation. This editorial thus asserts that being Vietnamese was not 
purely defined racially; discrimination against one’s own people was enough to deny 
membership in the group.  
Just three days after the publication of the political cartoon illustrating general 
rage over taxi rides, another political cartoon captured a similar problem of middle class 
Vietnamese being snubbed, but this time in the housing market. Published in the Saigon 
Daily News on August 17, 1965, the cartoon featured several Vietnamese and American 
men looking at houses, and a bilingual sign stating “Nhà cho thuê” and “House for Rent” 
is displayed on one of the properties [Figure 2]. Two Vietnamese men donning neckties 
appear interested in renting properties and are holding papers with a dollar sign ($) on 
them, signifying piaster notes. However, the real estate agent, who attempts to make eye 
contact with other renters, ignores them. The Americans, again distinguished by their 
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dapper dress, large noses, and large feet, are holding pieces of paper stamped with the 
word, “dollar.” The caption states, “House owners’ paradise.”  
Figure 2. “House owners’ paradise”167 
As the cartoon illustrates, the arrival of relatively well-to-do Americans in South 
Vietnam created a bonanza for certain classes of Vietnamese, including those who were 
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house owners, but also caused much frustration for the majority of Vietnamese who could 
not afford to outbid Americans. As portrayed in the drawing, even upper-middle class 
Vietnamese were displaced by Americans in their quest to find appropriate housing. 
Indeed, the presence of American soldiers and civilians provoked social tensions among 
Vietnamese people over how to treat their fellow citizens. These fraught relationships 
between those who held the upper hand in the new economy of wartime South Vietnam 
and those who faced increasingly dire financial circumstances manifested themselves in 
newspapers all around the country.  
The “House Owners’ Paradise” cartoon also demonstrates that the allure of 
pocketing extra money from gratifying Americans went beyond the occupation of taxi 
drivers and reached other facets of economic life, producing serious implications for 
Vietnamese of all socioeconomic statuses. An August 3, 1965 Tiếng Việt editorial 
perceived the problem of taxi drivers as emblematic of economic shifts occurring in 
wartime South Vietnam. It explained that some businessmen, threatened with bankruptcy 
and financial crises, neglected their commercial transactions and instead rented their 
business facilities to foreigners to make money. Moreover, residential buildings and 
villas were rented to foreigners for the same financial incentives. As a result, “the local 
upper class which is accustomed to live in villas has to accommodate itself in houses of 
middle-class level, people of the middle-class move to cheaper housing, and rents 
increase steadily.” The effects of successful bids by Americans for all kinds of services 
and amenities thus trickled down from the top to the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder: 
“This chain reaction does not spare the working people, and it results in an acute housing 
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shortage.” Furthermore, the same law of supply and demand applied to the price of basic 
commodities “when hundreds of people want the same item and are ready to pay highest 
price.”168 The editorial conceded that the cost of living in South Vietnam could never be 
stabilized. For an overwhelming majority of Vietnamese, the economic reality of 
inflation combined with the affluence of Americans generated inconvenience and 
discontent in almost all aspects of daily life ranging from housing to transportation to 
food. 
INFLATION, CORRUPTION, AND MORALE WITHIN THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY 
 
While Vietnamese critics lamented the loss of national and cultural identity 
evident in the inflationary service-oriented economy, nowhere was the loss of such 
identity more consequential than within the South Vietnamese Army, the group tasked 
with the critical role of defending South Vietnam militarily. Insufficient salaries within 
the South Vietnamese military contributed to high desertion rates, which hovered around 
30 percent in an average year.169 Additionally, pervasive corruption brought a 
deterioration of not only national pride but also personal integrity. Indeed, morale, or the 
lack of it, within the ARVN had long been a topic of concern for American leaders, and 
the economic deprivation among ARVN soldiers played no small part in its erosion.170 
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One group that suffered most from the inflationary wartime economy was ARVN 
soldiers. Established in 1955, the ARVN was created with the heavy influence of 
American military advisers, who sought to create a modern South Vietnamese army 
based on the U.S. model. However, the American plan to build a large conventional 
army—accepted by Saigon’s leaders as a condition of American economic aid—yielded 
major consequences in the South Vietnamese context. For the first five years of its 
existence, the ARVN comprised mostly volunteers, but after 1960, the RVN drastically 
changed its draft laws. As historian Robert Brigham has written, “What started out in 
1955 as a rather innocuous course of compulsory military service for all able-bodied 
twenty- to twenty-two-year-olds ended in 1975 with one in six South Vietnamese males 
serving in the active military and the full mobilization of all males from sixteen to fifty 
years old.”171 Despite the drafting of young men from all provinces and income levels in 
South Vietnam, such a high rate of military participation in a primarily agricultural 
society meant the conscription of predominantly rural men. The conscription of mostly 
those from the countryside deprived peasant families of the manual labor required for 
agricultural production, which was the main source of their income. The RVN’s draft 
policies were thus directly in conflict with the interests of peasants. 
Once conscripted, inadequate military training led soldiers to question why they 
were asked to fight in the first place. Because the U.S. army was the prototype for the 
ARVN, the military training that soldiers received was based on American military 
doctrine, which emphasized conventional combat methods and heavy use of technology 
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and firepower to fight the enemy. During the course of the war, ARVN tactical training 
programs were forced to respond to shifts in communist strategies, like the growth of the 
NLF insurgency in the early 1960s, changing battlefield circumstances, like the Tet 
Offensive, and developments in U.S. foreign policy, including “Vietnamization” later in 
the war. In addition to confusion about military strategies, training by simply covering 
written material in training manuals without live demonstrations meant that soldiers were 
ill-equipped for the realities of the battlefield.172 Poor military training put soldiers, 
whose families already resented the government’s conscription of their sons, at grave 
risk. 
Besides deficient military training, the lack of political education programs 
further contributed to soldiers’ distrust of the Saigon government. Unlike the communist 
ideological training received by North Vietnamese troops, ARVN soldiers were not given 
political education to strengthen or reinforce their commitment to fight. In fact, one 
former ARVN soldier stated that training leaders were forbidden from conducting too 
much political training because it would have threatened the political careers of those 
jostling for power in Saigon.173 As Brigham put it, “Because the Saigon government 
constantly feared a military coup, nationalism and patriotism played an insignificant role 
in ARVN training.”174 Indeed, the lack of national loyalty among soldiers and officers in 
the ARVN reflected the political instability in Saigon. As one former ARVN 
infantryman, Nguyen van Hieu, asked rhetorically, “How can we put faith in a 
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government that treated its citizens and military so badly?” He continued, “It did not take 
long for us to develop a sense that the army was at odds with Saigon.”175 Poor political 
training therefore exacerbated the ineffectiveness of the ARVN, whose soldiers were 
already ambivalent about their service.176  
Forced to defend their nation with negligible military and political instruction, 
ARVN soldiers and their families, which comprised 22 percent of the South Vietnamese 
population by 1968, were further marginalized by low salaries that never kept pace with 
inflation.177 Like government civil servants, members of the ARVN suffered from fixed 
wages throughout the war.178 The average soldiers’ real income in 1969, for example, 
was less than a third of its 1963 level. In 1969, two-thirds of soldiers spent their earnings 
by the twentieth of each month, and less than a fifth could make it to the end of the month 
with their pay.179 South Vietnamese leaders, Kolko has argued, deliberately allowed the 
average ARVN soldier to “slide down the economic ladder in order to keep him from 
draining the RVN budget.”180 Military expenditures were already straining the economy; 
if military salaries rose alongside inflation from 1963 to 1969, the proportion of South 
Vietnam’s gross domestic product allocated for military spending would have been at 
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least 50 percent higher.181 Given the government’s inability to raise revenues and refusal 
to compensate soldiers fairly, enlistment was a financial disaster for the soldier and his 
family. It was no wonder that many viewed service in the army as a “dead end.”182 
One of the largest sources of resentment among soldiers was knowing that they 
had to fight for their country’s survival on impoverished wages, while Vietnamese who 
worked for the Americans lived prosperously. Kiem Do, who served as a naval officer, 
recalled the mixed blessings of the American troop presence. In his memoir co-written 
with Julie Kane, Do asserted that the American presence was necessary for South 
Vietnam to win the war, but their presence created enormous economic disparities. 
“Suddenly anyone who could perform a service for [the] Americans was getting rich—
maids, chauffeurs, cooks, baby-sitters, laundresses, bellhops, shoeshine boys,” he 
remarked.183 Meanwhile, middle-class professionals including Do and other naval 
officers “found themselves poor and getting poorer on account of dollar-fueled inflation.” 
Do constantly feared his family and children would run out of food.  
Like Do, Pham Van Hoa, another former military serviceman, observed the 
economic inequalities between those like him forced to defend South Vietnam, those who 
worked for the Americans, and his American military counterparts. Hoa recalled, “My 
monthly wage was half of those who drove a Lambretta tricycle in downtown Saigon. An 
American will spend that amount in Vietnamese piasters in one night at the Continental 
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Palace Hotel on drinks and girls.”184 From Hoa’s point of view, the disparity in 
compensation between military service and service sector work for the Americans 
demonstrated the low value his government placed on him. Comparing his earnings to 
what his American counterpart spends, Hoa implies that his worth within the ARVN is 
the equivalent of drinks and bar girls to an American soldier. For military servicemen like 
Do and Hoa, the American presence and the circumstances it created seemed to devalue 
their military contributions. 
Low and stagnant wages were demoralizing, but the options available to soldiers 
to increase their incomes added to the grim and discouraging nature of their service. 
Faced with insufficient salaries, soldiers often had to seek additional jobs or resort to 
corrupt practices, both of which were harmful to their morale. According to Lieutenant 
General Dong Van Khuyen:  
Low pay compounded by inflation put the average serviceman in a pathetic 
predicament, forcing him to struggle with himself between moral uprightness 
(which meant poverty and a life of penury for his wife and children) and 
corruption (which jeopardized combat effectiveness and perhaps the survival of 
the nation.) Because of their chosen probity, a number of officers had to live off 
their parent’s incomes, moonlight during off-duty hours in such jobs as carrying 
passengers on Honda mopeds, reduce their material needs to a minimum, and be 
content with a life of frugality and destitution.185  
 
Khuyen’s statement suggested that the South Vietnamese government was actively 
eroding morale by putting soldiers in a place where they should choose the moral high 
road, which meant greater hardship for themselves and their families. High-ranked 
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generals faced these kinds of internal conflicts as well. Rufus Phillips III, who was a 
senior American civilian official in South Vietnam, recalled a story in which an army 
general, Le Van Kim, was approached by one of his captains if he should become corrupt 
or work a second job to supplement his meager income. Understandably, the general 
could only give permission for his captain to acquire a second job. Phillips added, “The 
army, Kim feared, was morally disintegrating under the strain of economic, social, and 
political pressures.”186 High-ranking officers and generals were quite aware of the low 
esprit de corps among all levels of service. 
Soldiers who chose the path of morality by seeking additional work found 
themselves working for their American counterparts. In fact, by 1968, 23 percent of the 
ARVN earned supplemental income outside of military service.187 Phillips recalled a 
conversation with Colonel Hoang Van Lac, who “gave me an earful about the side effects 
of the large-scale American troop intervention.” Paraphrasing the colonel’s statements, 
Phillips wrote, “To make ends meet, officers were doffing their uniforms in the evening 
and using their personal motor scooters as taxis for GIs looking for a good time in city 
bars. This was degrading to Vietnamese dignity.”188 South Vietnamese servicemen were 
partners fighting alongside U.S. troops, and the economic necessity of having to 
chauffeur Americans to bars and nightclubs was naturally unpleasant for ARVN soldiers. 
In their roles driving American GIs to entertainment venues, ARVN soldiers were also 
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enabling American men to fraternize with Vietnamese women. As their own families 
suffered from financial hardship, ARVN soldiers also had to come to grips with the 
shame of what their families had to do to survive. As several generals later remarked, 
many who served in the military had to cope with the reality of “wives turning into bar 
girls and daughters into prostitutes.”189 As these stories demonstrate, soldiers and their 
families who sought part-time work to augment their incomes often found themselves in 
occupations serving Americans that they may have found degrading. 
Corruption was a path taken by many members of all levels of the South 
Vietnamese military. The ubiquity of corruption was commonly known among the South 
Vietnamese population and outside observers alike. Within the ARVN, there were 
numerous ways to abuse one’s public office for private gain, from demanding payoffs for 
draft deferments or favorable assignments to stealing soldiers’ food and clothing 
allowances to siphoning funds appropriated for families of deceased soldiers.190 
Corruption at the high levels often involved robbing lower-level officers. One of the most 
common sources of corruption involved higher-ranked officers pocketing the wages and 
allowances of so-called ghost soldiers, which included deceased soldiers, deserters, and 
those who held civilian jobs.191 At the low levels, petty looting and pillaging by combat 
soldiers in the countryside, which American policymakers understood as an endemic 
problem, occurred out of financial desperation. That ARVN soldiers, most of whom came 
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from rural origins, would rob from other families in the countryside revealed that the war 
and its circumstances had forced them to exploit their own neighbors, who were already 
suffering from the war, for survival.  
While most soldiers and officers who become corrupt did so to make ends meet, a 
significant minority of high-ranking ARVN generals grew rich from the war, often with 
the connivance of their wives. As Van Don Tran, a former South Vietnamese military 
leader, noted presciently, 
One thing that deserves close scrutiny by historians who want to seek out the 
roots of South Vietnam’s social and political problems: the incredible ‘clout’ 
exerted on our powerful leaders by their wives. There were a thousand ways, both 
legal and illegal, of making money in war-torn Vietnam. And the wives of our 
leaders mastered all of them. A survey conducted by an opposition group in 
Saigon weeks before the 1975 collapse estimated that between 1954 and 1975 
these mighty wives pocketed an equivalent of $500 million. There is an old saying 
in our country calling the wives “the generals of the internal affairs” (Noi 
Tuong).192 
 
While the assertion that wives of political and military leaders stole $500 million cannot 
be proven, evidence of the highest-ranking South Vietnamese officials and their wives 
leaving South Vietnam before and during the fall of Saigon with gold and with money 
safely stowed in overseas bank accounts show that some military leaders made lucrative 
sums of money from corruption. Like importers and businessmen who benefited 
tremendously from windfall profits resulting from the Commercial Import Program, those 
in the ARVN who had access to free-flowing American funds were able to profit 
handsomely from corrupt acts. As two former ARVN officers wrote, “Both men and 
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wives used each other’s clout, with the aid of an entourage of military henchmen, to 
engage in corrupt practices they could get away with within the husband’s authority.” 
Moreover, they commented, “If a wife had been accustomed to luxuries, a comfortable 
house and car, it was difficult for the husband to resist corruption.”193 Indeed, as the 
USAID observed in a background paper titled “Corruption in Vietnam,” while those 
engaged in corruption often spent their money in traditional ways, like providing food, 
shelter, and education for their families, the beneficiaries of corruption after the 
American intervention differed in their expenditures. As the USAID wrote, “Now, a 
public official uses his extra income for all sorts of things that separate his way of life 
from those of most of his countrymen…. He uses his money to imitate the mores and the 
material life of the foreigner, and to the degree that money allows, he tries to live that 
much less a traditional Vietnamese life.”194 The extreme degree of corruption and wealth 
among those at the very top of the South Vietnamese military hierarchy thus further 
diminished morale among the ARVN rank-and-file.  
 For the vast majority of the ARVN, low salaries and widespread corruption were 
seriously damaging to their morale and resolve to fight. Although the ARVN faced 
numerous challenges related to poor military training and inadequate leadership, which 
affected its performance on the battlefield, the financial deprivation of soldiers and their 
families proved most detrimental to their ability to defend South Vietnam. The stresses 
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and pressures that came with low salaries often placed soldiers in the unenviable position 
of having to defend their nation while their families suffered back home. As one enlisted 
ARVN soldier, Nguyen Tang, stated, “My primary role in life is to provide for my family 
and to venerate my ancestors. It was very difficult to leave the village...even if it was 
under threat...to fight. I would rather have died with my family at home than leave them 
and not be able to care for them.”195 The Vietnamese family, as we have seen, was the 
linchpin of traditional society, and military service placed soldiers squarely between the 
conflicting goals of providing for their families and fighting for their nation. In the end, 
many soldiers chose to value their families over military service and came to terms with 
the fact that they did not have strong reasons to fight for South Vietnam. This decline in 
morale among the most marginalized members of the Vietnamese society charged with 
the nation’s military defense was one of the most serious and irreversible effects of the 
American presence.  
CONCLUSION 
 
Fulbright’s lecture, “The Arrogance of Power,” captured the unintended but 
paradoxical effects of the American presence in South Vietnam that were already evident 
one year into the American military buildup. “As a result of the American influx, bar 
girls, prostitutes, pimps, bar owners and taxi drivers have risen to the higher levels of the 
economic pyramid,” Fulbright stated. In addition to his comment that Saigon had become 
an “American brothel,” Fulbright cited specific examples of how the American presence 
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had changed everyday life in South Vietnam, including that Vietnamese had “trouble 
getting taxi cabs because drivers will not stop for them, preferring to pick up American 
soldiers who will pay outrageous fares without complaint.” He also noted that middle-
class Vietnamese families were getting evicted from their homes “because Americans 
have driven up the rent beyond their reach.” As we have seen, these quotidian difficulties 
of flagging down a cab or finding a home to rent were indicative of larger shifts within 
South Vietnamese society—most notably the widening of socio-economic inequality— 
that resulted almost immediately after the arrival of American troops.  
These radical transformations brought about by the American presence caused 
citizens to question what it meant to be South Vietnamese during the war. Despite a 
façade of economic prosperity due to imported consumer goods, the sudden arrival of 
great numbers of American GIs exacerbated the already fragile South Vietnamese 
economy by creating an artificial service economy that was vulnerable to the eventual 
withdrawal of Americans from the country. This new economy altered the incentives of 
labor by privileging employment for the Americans over employment in traditionally 
respected occupations that served South Vietnamese interests. As a result of wartime 
inflation, which was aggravated by the American presence, many South Vietnamese took 
up service jobs that challenged traditional gender, generational, and class dynamics. As 
Ton That Thien commented, “Through the government, the contractors, the landlords, the 
prostitutes and bar-hostesses, the suppliers of services of all kinds, and 150,000 
employees of American agencies, money has flowed into Vietnam, dissolving loyalties 
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and moralities.”196 Meanwhile, those middle-class professionals who comprised the 
country’s labor force in the civil service saw their social and economic statuses diminish. 
Despite being anti-communist, they grew increasingly alienated from the American 
presence and from their own government. Indeed, Vietnamese citizens whose jobs were 
crucial to the South Vietnamese state in enforcing law and order and maintaining the 
functions of the state were also the most marginalized. The greatest victims of wartime 
inflation and the new economy were the ARVN rank-and-file and their families, who 
paid the most costs for defending their country while receiving the least for their service. 
The influx of American soldiers and dollars thus created many cleavages within South 
Vietnamese society that ultimately undermined national morale. 
 While policymakers like Fulbright listened to Vietnamese critiques of American 
troop intervention and worried about the overwhelming impact of the American presence 
on South Vietnam, some American officials on the ground in Saigon often viewed 
Vietnamese anti-Americanism with contempt and condescension. In response to growing 
criticisms of the American presence, one American official stated, “It’s easy to blame 
everything wrong here on the Americans—the Vietnamese love doing it. But, look, this 
society was damned rotten when we got here and what we’re getting now is an 
exaggeration of the rottenness, the corruption, the national hangups.”197 By dismissing 
South Vietnam as “damned rotten,” this anonymous official attempted to absolve the 
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United States of any responsibility for the various transformations in South Vietnam, 
ignoring the disruptive role of American money and personnel.  
The belief that South Vietnamese were responsible for the major social, cultural, 
and economic dislocations they experienced was echoed even within the American 
embassy in Saigon. In early 1967, Deputy Ambassador to South Vietnam, William J. 
Porter, cabled his colleagues in Washington that there was growing “fear that [the] 
American presence [was] destroying Vietnamese social and cultural values: bars, cars, 
girls, [and] dollars.” Porter, however, asserted that the “growth of [a] materialistic, selfish 
outlook tends [to] be blamed on [the] American presence rather than weakness in 
Vietnamese character or [the] natural result of war.”198 Here, Porter suggests that 
Vietnamese critics have misplaced the blame for South Vietnamese greed and corruption 
on the United States, when it was, in fact, the fault of Vietnamese themselves, or, at the 
very least, an independent outcome produced by war. Porter’s superior, Henry Cabot 
Lodge, held the same conviction that Vietnamese engaged in corrupt and immoral 
practices out of free will. In a conversation with South Vietnamese president, Nguyen 
Van Thieu, who stressed the need to consider whether U.S. troops would “do damage 
either as regards the economy, or morals, or deaths” wherever they were stationed, Lodge 
maintained that “as far as immorality is concerned, this would not happen without the 
Vietnamese girls who don’t have to behave in this way if they do not want to.”199 The 
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underlying premise behind both Porter’s and Lodge’s statements was their mistaken 
belief that the American intervention in South Vietnam had no effects whatsoever on how 
South Vietnamese had to live their lives.  
Even as some of the highest-ranking American civilian officials refused to believe 
that the United States was responsible for the radical social, economic, and cultural 
transformations in South Vietnam, American policymakers agreed that some of the 
effects of the American presence, such as soldier spending, must be mitigated to achieve 
economic stability in South Vietnam. Fulbright himself was aware that the South 
Vietnamese who were hurt the most financially by the American military buildup and 
concomitant inflation were also those who mattered the most to the state. In his speech, 
he observed that “Vietnamese civil servants, junior army officers and enlisted men are 
unable to support their families because of the inflation generated by American spending 
and the purchasing power of the G.I.s.” Not only were there cultural implications for 
soldiers’ spending habits, but there were also severe economic consequences if GIs’ 
spending continued unabated. By 1966, U.S. policymakers, grasping the connections 
between the financial struggles of South Vietnamese citizens and the inflationary impact 
of the expanding American troop presence in South Vietnam, began to assess the role of 
GI consumption and its effects on the South Vietnamese economy and society. It is their 
challenge to curtail GI spending without detracting from soldier morale to which we now 
turn.  
 99 
Chapter Two: Inflation, GI Consumerism, and the Piaster Reduction 
Program, 1966-1968 
  
 On February 4, 1967, the Cavalair, an authorized Army publication of the First 
Cavalry Division, printed an editorial in Saigon titled, “The War Cannot Be Won 
Without Stable Economy.”200 The editorial cited official reports that “a strong economy, 
free of inflation, is necessary for the successful end of the war here.” Soldiers’ excess 
spending of piasters, the Vietnamese currency, however, can “undo all efforts to stabilize 
the economy.”201 Conveying the seriousness of inflation, the editorial asserted that the 
main problem was increased spending by American troops, which put more money in 
circulation, while the amount of goods and services remained the same. It explained that 
the law of supply and demand then causes prices to rise, because people are willing to 
pay more for available items. When the cost of basic essentials becomes prohibitive for 
Vietnamese families, the editorial maintained, communists will discover “economic want 
and social distress excellent breeding grounds for their influence.” The editorial stated 
that if soldiers’ piaster spending continued to grow, approximately $160 million will be 
added to the Vietnamese economy in 1967. Moreover, “this large amount of purchasing 
power can and will put great stresses on the local economy and will encourage 
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profiteering, speculating and hoarding.” The editorial concluded that “each individual’s 
self-control of unnecessary piaster spending is as important in winning this war as the 
combat effort.”202  
 Almost as soon as large numbers of American combat troops arrived to South 
Vietnam in 1965, U.S. officials began to urge soldiers to monitor and limit their 
consumption habits, partly for their own benefit but also for that of the nation they were 
trying to build in South Vietnam. Indeed, the U.S. military acknowledged that profligate 
spending in the local economy had severe consequences for American-South Vietnamese 
relations and the war effort in general. South Vietnam experienced soaring inflation, 
which threatened the nation’s ability to survive without continued American aid. 
Soldiers’ spending habits, American policymakers believed, only aggravated the 
situation.  
 Given the unpopularity of American escalation and the subsequent military draft, 
U.S. officials sought to boost soldiers’ morale primarily through providing military 
personnel with unparalleled access to high standards of living and large salaries. 
However, the comforts and abundances available to soldiers also disrupted the economy 
and society in South Vietnam. Daily economic interactions between American soldiers 
and local citizens unsettled American policymakers, who grew progressively concerned 
with Vietnamese inflation. From black markets to bars and taxi cabs, spaces where 
Americans and Vietnamese encountered each other almost always involved the exchange 
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of money for goods and services. As these transactions began to have larger implications 
for the stability of the South Vietnamese economy and government, the military sought 
ways to shape commercial interactions between GIs and locals and to limit soldier 
expenditures.  
 Analyzing a variety of publications including unit newspapers and official fact 
sheets, this chapter argues that the U.S. military appealed to soldiers’ ideals of morality, 
self-control, and sacrifice in attempting to construct a barrier between GI consumerism 
and the South Vietnamese economy. More specifically, military authorities relayed to GIs 
that curtailing piaster spending was in the best interest of the individual soldier, the South 
Vietnamese economy and nation, the United States’ global financial standing, and the 
war effort in Vietnam. Sometimes disguised in the form of entertainment, newspaper 
editorials, poems, and fictional pieces highlighted the financial misfortunes of soldiers 
who spent too much money on frivolous goods and services and praised those who 
exercised restraint and frugality. These publications also tried to appeal to soldiers’ 
humanitarian concern for South Vietnam and its citizens, who must live with the 
inflationary consequences of GI spending. For the United States, too, as the military often 
pointed out, soldiers’ expenditures played an important role in exacerbating the nation’s 
precarious balance of payments problem. Finally, these writings equated reckless 
spending with empowering the Vietcong’s efforts in the war. As some of the money and 
goods from black market and other economic exchanges fell into Vietcong hands, the 
military promoted the view that soldiers’ expenditures could directly contribute to the 
communist cause. Propounding its vision of what was best for all allied individuals and 
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nations involved in the war, the military targeted its writings to soldiers to curb inflation 
in South Vietnam.  
 In relying on soldiers’ self-control to heed the military’s financial advice, 
American efforts to discourage extravagant spending and rein in the harmful effects of GI 
expenditures on the local economy, I argue, turned out to be half-hearted. Military 
authorities were caught between what appeared to be conflicting goals: to maintain 
soldier morale, which was costly, and to reduce military piaster expenditures at the same 
time. As the efforts that the military undertook to stem inflation demonstrate, it aimed to 
cut soldiers’ personal spending without detracting from the consumerism required to 
boost their morale. Thus, the military did not undertake drastic measures such as 
lowering soldier’s salaries, placing strict spending quotas, or punishing soldiers for 
excessive spending, because these actions could diminish morale on and off the bases. 
Instead, it adopted an information campaign urging self-discipline to persuade soldiers 
not to spend too many piasters for their own good, for the South Vietnamese, for the 
United States, and for the sake of the war. The military sent mixed and contradictory 
messages to soldiers, however, often undermining the goal of piaster reduction. On the 
one hand, military authorities encouraged consumption and framed military service in 
terms of material gains, but on the other, they urged frugality and advised soldiers to 
delay the purchase of expensive goods and leisure experiences until they returned home. 
Furthermore, military authorities employed seemingly flippant and silly approaches, such 
as limericks and fictional stories, to convey the seriousness of GI spending. These 
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ambivalent strategies to limit soldiers’ spending habits achieved minimal success in the 
face of a military base culture that fostered and promoted consumerism. 
 While historians of the Vietnam War have acknowledged that the American 
presence interfered profoundly with the South Vietnamese economy, this chapter 
explores the overlooked process by which American officials endeavored to minimize the 
purported harmful effects of GI consumerism by reducing military piaster spending.203 
An in-depth analysis of the information campaign that military authorities employed 
sheds light on how American military officials interpreted the effects of GI spending on 
the South Vietnamese economy and how they aimed to influence soldiers’ behaviors. 
Since American military personnel in Vietnam also functioned as foot soldiers of 
American diplomacy, examination of the information campaign raises important 
questions about why U.S. military leaders relied primarily on soldiers’ self-restraint in 
carrying out urgent policies. If soldiers’ spending yielded serious consequences for the 
political and economic stability of South Vietnam, why, then, did American officials 
attempt to address inflation by requesting soldiers to cut back their piaster purchases on a 
purely voluntary basis?  
 This chapter begins with a discussion of the military’s treatment of soldiers and 
the problem of morale in Vietnam. Next, it explores American officials’ perceptions of 
military expenditures as a primary cause of inflation in South Vietnam. The majority of 
this chapter will then focus on different ways in which military authorities attempted to 
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mitigate the side effects of soldiers’ presence in Vietnam. More specifically, it surveys 
the various messages that military publications delivered to soldiers to persuade them to 
spend less of their money in the local economy. Finally, the chapter ends with an analysis 
of the rationales behind the military’s decision to rely on soldiers’ voluntary compliance 
to curb expenditures and foreshadows the futility of relying on soldiers’ virtue in larger 
problems plaguing Washington and Saigon.  
GI CONSUMERISM AND MORALE IN SOUTH VIETNAM 
 
 Deployment of large numbers of U.S. combat troops beginning in March 1965 led 
American officials to implement a variety of morale-building programs that recreated as 
many American comforts as possible in Southeast Asia.204 These programs brought the 
consumer culture prevalent in American postwar life to the new war zone.205 As historian 
Meredith Lair has argued, the U.S. military sought to foster morale among its troops by 
providing soldiers with a wealth of leisure experiences, recreational activities, and 
consumer and luxury goods.206 In exchange for soldiers’ compliance in the war, the U.S. 
military not only built lavish bases with amenities and facilities like movie theaters, 
bowling alley, and basketball courts, but it also coordinated R&R (rest and recuperation 
or rest and relaxation) trips to exotic vacation spots like Manila, Bangkok, and Taiwan. 
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Additionally, the military furnished soldiers with countless opportunities to shop for 
goods ranging from cars and stereos to televisions and watches, and compensated soldiers 
relatively generously to enable them to purchase almost anything they wanted at 
discounted rates.207 The consumption of goods, leisure, and comfort accompanied 
soldiers’ transition from relative affluence in the United States to a land of poverty in 
Vietnam.208  
 Unlike soldiers in World War II or the Korean War, GIs in Vietnam, for the first 
time in American military history, were able to satisfy their consumer desires at stores 
operated by the United States. Although the military instituted the Post Exchange 
(P.X.)209 system of retail for soldiers at home and abroad in the late nineteenth century, 
by the time soldiers deployed to Vietnam, the P.X. had evolved into a global, multi-
million dollar retail chain.210 The military played a crucial role in relaying to soldiers, 
many of whom came from working class backgrounds, that their service in Vietnam also 
came with the perks of acquiring the consumer goods associated with middle class 
lifestyles. Besides P.X. outlet stores, mail-order catalogs enabled soldiers to shop when 
they could not get to a store or if a particular brand of item was unavailable in the P.X. 
                                                
207 Ibid., 176. 
208 There were other kinds of morale-building programs as well. The Armed Forces Vietnam Network 
(AFVN), which provided American radio and television programming, gave GIs the opportunity to listen to 
familiar music from home, including rock, jazz, and pop, and watch popular television shows like 
“Combat” and “Mission Impossible.” Meanwhile, USO (United Service Organizations) shows produced 
over 5,000 entertainment programs featuring comedians like Bob Hope, Hollywood legends like John 
Wayne, and Playboy playmates of the month. 
209 Each branch of military service employed different terms for the exchanges. The air force, for example, 
uses “BX” to signify “base exchange.” This chapter will use the term “P.X.” to represent all military 
exchanges in Vietnam to minimize confusion.  
210 A comprehensive history of the P.X. system has not been written, but for information on the evolution 
of the P.X. before Vietnam, see James J. Cooke, Chewing Gum, Candy Bars, and Beer: The Army PX in 
World War II (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2009); Lair, Armed with Abundance, 150. 
 106 
Soldiers could also send merchandise back to the States without paying customs duties, 
provided they purchase the items through an American institution. From ordering brand-
new cars in catalogues to shopping for cameras and high-end liquor in person, American 
soldiers in Vietnam could shop as if they resided in the United States. More than that, 
they could purchase the same goods from America at even cheaper prices. For example, 
buying a Chrysler, Ford, or General Motors car from Vietnam saved soldiers 11 to 18 
percent off the stateside sticker price.211 It was clear to soldiers that military leaders 
enthusiastically endorsed consumerism. 
 The handsome salaries soldiers received made shopping for consumer and luxury 
goods possible. Indeed, most American GIs were compensated comfortably, at least by 
the standards of other wars in American history, in South Vietnam. Depending on their 
rank within the army, soldiers earned between $102.30 (as an army recruit) and $1607.70 
(as a commissioned officer) as part of their monthly compensation.212 Additionally, many 
soldiers received a “family separation allowance” of $65 per month and free housing, 
meals, transportation, and medical care courtesy of the military.213 Paying little federal 
income tax, or even none at all, soldiers had large discretionary incomes to spend on 
goods, services, and leisure experiences.214  
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 Although the military aimed to increase soldier morale by supplying GIs with 
comfort and convenience in Vietnam, morale throughout the war nevertheless remained 
low because soldiers wanted to return home. Like the optimism that American officials 
often exuded with regard to the war’s progress, military officials tended to exaggerate the 
level of soldier morale in Vietnam not only to the American public, but also amongst 
themselves. The MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) Command History of 
1967 asserted that morale among soldiers was “extremely high”; “One basic reason lies 
in the soldier’s awareness that the command is thinking of him as a human being with 
human needs and feelings. Hot food and cold drinks and ice cream are brought to him in 
the field.”215 Through providing various ways for soldiers to consume, the military 
impressed upon soldiers that they would be well taken-care of in Vietnam and that they 
could return to the United States with the material goods that distinguished middle class 
prosperity. However, the replica of American consumer affluence in Vietnam was not 
enough to convince most soldiers that the war was worth fighting for. Although fragging 
and mutiny were the most egregious examples of dissent against the war, more subtly, 
GIs often complained about their circumstances in Vietnam.216 When they returned to the 
United States, many even actively protested the war.217  
                                                
215 MACV Command History: 1967, 897. Box 5, MACV Command Histories, RG 472, NACP. 
216 Although low morale afflicted the American military throughout the war, the trend toward lower morale 
accelerated after the Tet Offensive in 1968. Lair, Armed with Abundance, 96–100.  
217 The most visible group of veterans who protested the war after they returned home was Vietnam 
Veterans Against the War, which was formed by six veterans in 1967. Membership in the group swelled to 
over 30,000 during the war. “VVAW: Who we are, where we come from,” accessed 15 March 2014, 
http://www.vvaw.org/about.  
 108 
 The efforts that American officials exerted to raise morale not only failed to 
enhance soldiers’ views of their roles in the war but also created tensions between GIs 
and locals. American leaders believed that soldiers’ buying habits and other interactions 
with Vietnamese in the capital city had become such a serious problem that American 
military authorities ventured to establish physical barriers to separate Americans from 
Vietnamese as much as possible. By 1966, approximately 10,000 American military 
personnel lived in eighty billets in Saigon and several thousand more stayed in military 
installations in the area.218 By the following year, the number of American military 
personnel in Saigon peaked at around 39,000.219 As Lair argued, the highly visible 
American presence caused several problems for military leaders. First, the military paid 
hundreds of thousands of dollars each year in renting hotels and apartment complexes to 
accommodate American soldiers. Second, non-combat soldiers often sought 
entertainment and various services when they were off-duty, patronizing bars, 
bathhouses, and massage parlors. Not only did their participation in the local economy 
contribute to local inflation, but also their dalliances with Vietnamese women, especially 
prostitutes, raised profound social and cultural concerns among locals. The behaviors of 
inebriated GIs also sullied the reputation of Americans. Moreover, American soldiers 
were sometimes targets of terrorist attacks and petty street crime. To ease the daily 
tensions between Americans and Vietnamese, protect the local economy, and ensure 
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security for American soldiers, MACV officials resolved to move as many GIs as 
possible away from the heart of Saigon.220 
 The attempt by American officials to erect an invisible wall between American 
soldiers and local Vietnamese citizens manifested in Project MOOSE, which stood for 
“Move Out of Saigon Expeditiously.” The execution of Project MOOSE began with the 
transfer of the USARV headquarters to Long Binh Post, located about 20 miles north of 
Saigon, from July 1 to July 15 in 1967. As the 1967 Command History recounted, 
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and MACV initiated Project MOOSE to “insure that 
U.S. personnel presented a good image, to prevent overwhelming the Vietnamese, and to 
minimize the adverse effects on the Vietnamese economy.” Although the operation did 
transfer many troops to Long Binh, editorials in the Vietnamese press complained that 
American agencies, installations, and personnel still stayed behind in Saigon. An editorial 
in Cong Chung on October 19, 1967, for example, urged Ambassador Lodge to “move 
the military and civilian agencies out of Saigon as soon as possible or concentrate them 
into certain area[s] so as to prevent daily friction between the Americans and 
Vietnamese.”221 While the relocation of units from Saigon to Long Binh may not have 
been “expeditious,” by early 1968, only about 7,000 American military personnel 
remained in Saigon.222  
 In the process of building soldier morale, therefore, military authorities created 
other obstacles for their mission in South Vietnam. After all, the relative affluence of 
                                                
220 Lair, Armed with Abundance, 32. 
221 MACV Command History: 1967, 901-903. Box 5, MACV Command Histories, RG 472, NACP. 
222 “U.S. Completing Shift of Most Men Out of Saigon,” 22 January 1968, New York Times. 
 110 
soldiers could not be cordoned off from the rest of the country, despite serious efforts to 
do so. The consumer behaviors of Americans spread beyond the boundaries of military 
bases as consumer goods came to facilitate everyday interactions between GIs and locals. 
Moreover, soldier expenditures altered the local economy, since they did not just shop 
exclusively at American-run stores but also compensated Vietnamese merchants and 
providers for a myriad of goods and services that the United States could not supply. 
During the war, American and Vietnamese officials believed strongly that soldiers’ 
consumption habits contributed to widespread inflation in the South Vietnamese 
economy. 
AMERICAN POLICYMAKERS AND THE MILITARY PIASTER REDUCTION PROGRAM 
 
 The problem of inflation haunted American officials as they debated various 
courses of action in the war. The stability of the Saigon regime, policymakers believed, 
depended upon the American ability to manage inflation; thus, the stakes of this 
challenge could not be higher. In the fall of 1965, Robert McNamara warned that a 
“serious threat of inflation” existed in South Vietnam due to “the mixture of US force 
build-up and GVN deficit on the one hand and the tightly stretched Vietnamese economy 
on the other.”223 He underscored the dangerous political and social consequences of a 
weak South Vietnamese economy: “A reasonably stable economy in South Vietnam is 
essential to unite the population behind the Government of Vietnam—indeed to avoid 
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disintegration of the SVN society.”224 According to McNamara, therefore, uncontrolled 
inflation could diminish the political legitimacy of Saigon leaders. His concerns figured 
greatly into policy debates during his tenure as Defense Secretary, as he conveyed the 
urgency of tamping down inflation to both the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
among other influential policymakers.  
 While the Commercial Import Program aimed to combat inflation by introducing 
more goods to absorb excess money, American officials simultaneously strived to reduce 
military piaster expenditures to take money out of the inflationary Vietnamese economy. 
In August 1965, officials prohibited the use of dollars by Americans in the Republic of 
Vietnam to prevent the black marketing of dollars and to prevent the dollar from 
aggravating inflation. They introduced monetary scrip called Military Payment 
Certificates (MPCs), which became the official cash currency of Americans living in the 
country. At an October 1965 meeting with Vietnamese officials on inflation, William 
Westmoreland reported that MACV was “attempting [to] reduce [the] inflationary effect 
of [the] U.S. military by encouraging troops to allot part of [their] pay to home banks and 
by establishing more exchange centers, thereby facilitating [the] exchange of MPC into 
piasters, decreasing [the] appeal of [the] MPC black market.”225 While the creation of 
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more money exchange centers may seem to encourage greater amounts of piaster 
purchases, the rationale behind this suggestion was to make it easier for soldiers to 
exchange piasters legally rather than through illegal means. After policymakers escalated 
the war, officials voiced concerns over the economic impact of different levels of troop 
deployment and the ways that soldiers spent money on the local economy. Officials in the 
State and Defense Departments often relied on economists’ views of the South 
Vietnamese economy in outlining how the United States could best curtail piaster 
spending while maintaining its military commitment to South Vietnam.  
 One of the policies that both civilian and military officials supported and 
implemented early on during the war was the use of MPCs, or Military Payment 
Certificates, widely referred to as “funny money” or “Monopoly money” by troops.226 
Soldiers’ expenditures of American dollars flowed into the Vietnamese economy during 
the first few months of the war, adding a highly-valued foreign currency into the tenuous 
Vietnamese financial system. At the end of August 1965, the military adopted the use of 
military scrip, as it had in other parts of the world after World War II, to control inflation 
by preventing the circulation of American dollars in the Vietnamese economy.227 Upon 
entering South Vietnam, American soldiers had to convert all dollars into MPCs, the 
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official medium of exchange for all cash transactions within American establishments in 
the country.228 Moreover, possession of American dollars was illegal in the Republic of 
Vietnam, and soldiers were compensated in MPCs, which had a one-for-one conversion 
with the dollar.229 Additionally, because of widespread speculation, the military also 
periodically phased out whole series of MPCs, so that soldiers had to convert old MPCs 
into the newer series. For transactions outside of American-run institutions in Vietnam, 
soldiers were supposed to exchange their MPCs for piasters at an official military 
banking facility.230  
 The implementation of MPCs was a relatively small measure to help address 
inflation, though, and in 1966 American officials began a piaster reduction program to 
keep the amount of money in circulation under control. Over the course of 1966, currency 
in circulation increased almost 80 percent, and the cost of living for working class 
families in Vietnam climbed more than 70 percent. The urgency of the financial situation 
led civilian and military leaders to impose ceilings on piaster expenditure by American 
military programs, including contractors’ expenditures, American-financed wages, and 
private spending by U.S. troops. Moreover, American officials discussed new procedures 
to absorb more troop expenditures within American-run facilities and channel GI 
spending toward countries outside of Vietnam. In addition, they argued for wage 
restraints to be “exercised in all sectors of the economy over which the United States has 
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influence or control.”231 The goal of all of these spending ceilings was to reduce the 
amount of American money changed into piasters and spent on the local economy, thus 
slowing inflation.232  
Indeed, the piaster expenditures of the military contributed to growing money 
supply levels. Roy Wehrle, an economist and the economic counselor at the American 
embassy in Saigon, stressed the gravity of increased spending in South Vietnam. In 
October 1966, he argued that American and South Vietnamese spending placed great 
strains on the local economy. According to Wehrle, spending by the South Vietnamese 
government increased from 37 billion piasters to 48 billion to roughly 67 billion from 
1964 to 1966. American spending, on the other hand, including USAID, military 
construction, and operational and maintenance expenditures of military forces, increased 
from two billion piasters to nine billion and then to 34 billion piasters. The “big jump” to 
34 billion piasters was “of course, coincident with bringing American troops into the 
country.” Moreover, he concluded that the “obvious effect” of these piaster expenditures, 
both of the American and South Vietnamese governments, was that the money supply 
skyrocketed sharply from 27 billion to 48 billion from the end of 1964 to the end of 1965. 
At the time he wrote the memo, the money supply stood at 61 billion, and he estimated 
the figure at the end of the year to be around 65 or 68 billion. “This is the monetary 
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problem, the amount of money that is injected into the economy that we have to deal 
with,” he impressed to McNamara.233  
The severe level of inflation in South Vietnam weighed heavily on the Defense 
Secretary, who believed inflation would weaken the morale and effectiveness of the 
South Vietnamese army and civil service to the point that the country could implode. In 
the fall of 1966, McNamara wrote in a memo to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Earle Wheeler, “Runaway inflation can undo what our military operations accomplish.” 
More specifically, McNamara argued: 
The burden of inflation falls most heavily on just those Vietnamese—the ARVN 
and GVN civil servants—upon whose efficient performance our success most 
heavily depends. Unless we rigidly control inflation, the Vietnamese Army 
desertion rate will increase further and effectiveness will decline, thus at least 
partially cancelling the effects of increased U.S. deployments. Further, 
government employees will leave their jobs and civil strife will occur, seriously 
hindering both the military and the pacification efforts and possibly even 
collapsing the GVN.234 
 
McNamara understood that if Vietnamese government employees could not afford the 
rising costs of everyday necessities on their low wages, they would likely leave their 
positions for other kinds of employment that would pay more, namely jobs that involved 
working for the Americans. High desertion rates, whether within the army or the civil 
service, would not only lower morale among those Vietnamese who stayed in their posts, 
but also encourage them to seek other opportunities to leave as well. An army and 
government short on manpower posed major obstacles to the achievement of military and 
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political goals. Thus, for McNamara, the problem of inflation, if left unresolved, could 
end the war with American defeat and a South Vietnam under communist control.  
At the suggestion of Lodge, McNamara directed that a “piaster budget” be 
established for American military activities. Working with McNamara, Lodge decided to 
limit military piaster expenditures to about 42 billion as well as cap the number of troops 
deployed for 1967. The purpose of such a program was to “hold military and contractor 
piaster spending to the minimum level which can be accomplished without serious impact 
on military operations.”235 The Defense Secretary acknowledged that the Ambassador’s 
program of budget constraints for American and South Vietnamese civilian and military 
spending would not by itself “bring complete stability” to South Vietnam; under such 
proposed plans, McNamara conceded that there would still be, in the best case scenario, a 
ten billion piaster inflationary gap. However, he believed that should hold price increases 
in 1967 to 10 percent to 25 percent, as opposed to 75 percent to 90 percent in 1966. 
Furthermore, McNamara argued that the “success of our efforts to hold U.S. military 
expenditures to P42 billion depends, among other things, on U.S. force levels.”236  
McNamara’s advisors perceived the repeated requests for additional troop 
deployment from military leaders, particularly Westmoreland, as incompatible with the 
need to reduce piaster expenditures. In fact, they reasoned that expansion of troops would 
likely raise expenditures without a guarantee of increased military effectiveness. In May 
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1967, Alain Enthoven, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis,237 an 
economist and close advisor of McNamara’s, warned that if “MACV’s additional forces 
are approved, our casualty rate may not rise, but our expenditure rate certainly will, and 
the ominous history of unending escalation will be maintained.” Cautioning about the 
likely possibility of growing South Vietnamese dependence on American resources to 
fight the war, Enthoven worried that approving supplementary troops to Vietnam would 
encourage military leaders to ask for more in the future. He argued that sending extra 
troops to Vietnam would also lessen public support for the war and make nation-building 
even more arduous. Moreover, he asserted that “additional forces are a burden on the 
South Vietnamese economy,” citing that inflation in the first three months of 1967 
amounted to 20% and that prices rose 7%, or 28% yearly. Enthoven observed that “the 
SVN economy is still far from sound, additional forces would mean slower progress, and 
the inflation would still hit hardest on the very civilian and military personnel on whom 
we must rely if pacification is ever to succeed.”238  
McNamara and his advisors thus insisted that military leaders seek economic 
rationales for their piaster budgets. In discussions on troop levels for 1968, McNamara 
asked Wheeler, “Have MACV and the US Mission carefully weighted the economic 
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impact of the additional piaster expenditure? Have they analyzed the alternative uses for 
these piasters, such as raising GVN salaries or providing improved family housing for 
RVNAF families?”239 McNamara grasped that inflation in South Vietnam had a 
disproportionately negative impact on civil servants and members of the Army of South 
Vietnam (ARVN). He realized that while Vietnamese who worked for Americans, 
including taxi drivers, bar girls, and translators, earned lucrative salaries, those employed 
with the South Vietnamese government faced stagnant wages that failed to keep pace 
with rising prices. This economic inequality, McNamara suggested, should be diminished 
with additional piaster spending. An advocate of using economics to understand the 
allocation of resources within the military, the Defense Secretary wanted economic 
analyses of these important questions before he made any decisions. His priority on 
quantitative scrutiny prompted friction between economists in the Defense Department 
and the military generals. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff found their civilian counterparts’ objections to additional 
levels of troop deployment frustrating and even damaging for the U.S. military objective 
in South Vietnam. Wheeler wrote to McNamara:  
The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, while the restoration of economic stability 
in SVN is most important, the achievement of such stability will depend primarily 
on the capabilities of military and paramilitary forces to defeat the enemy [and] to 
provide the secure environment required for political, economic, and social 
development. 
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 Without the numbers of troops that they have settled on, “the intensity and frequency of 
combat operations may therefore be restricted, resulting in a slower rate of progress in 
SVN, some loss of momentum in operations, and possibly a longer war at increasing 
costs in casualties and materiel.”240 While McNamara and his advisors emphasized the 
detrimental economic ramifications of additional troops, Wheeler stressed the potential 
impediments to military victory if the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not acquire the level of 
troops they requested.  
Similarly, Westmoreland objected to the ceiling on piaster expenditures and limits 
on the number of troop deployments imposed by Lodge. In his memoir, Westmoreland 
recounted that the goal to reduce piaster spending “was admirable, but the way Wehrle 
and officials in Washington proposed to accomplish it was not.” Westmoreland recalled 
that Wehrle told him to reduce the number of incoming American soldiers and that he 
should even consider withdrawing some troops. Westmoreland believed that “some of 
Secretary McNamara’s advisers were using the piaster ceiling as a means of controlling 
the American build-up.” He grew increasingly irritated with officials at the Department 
of Defense who sought to restrain his ability to execute the war; “If I was ever to bring 
the war to the point where the South Vietnamese could take over, I had to have more 
American troops.” Illustrating the division between military officials and their civilian 
partners on the role of economics in military policy, Westmoreland asserted, “To let 
economics rather than military necessity dictate American deployments was unrealistic, a 
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classic case of the tail wagging the dog.”241 Like Wheeler, Westmoreland resented 
McNamara and his advisors for imposing quantitative considerations on their military 
decision-making process.  
Despite his exasperation with Defense advisors, however, Westmoreland recalled 
that MACV succeeded in limiting expenditures under Lodge’s policy due to a variety of 
programs that simultaneously lifted soldier morale and directed spending away from the 
local economy. He argued that expanding the PX system, building more recreational and 
entertainment facilities on American bases, banning leaves within South Vietnam, 
facilitating R&R trips outside of Vietnam, and relocating troops and installations out of 
city centers all contributed to reducing piaster expenditure. Additionally, he noted that 
savings programs for troops, including a ten percent interest on savings enacted by 
Congress, reduction of Vietnamese employees on bases, and the completion of 
construction projects underway helped toward curbing piaster spending. Meanwhile, he 
remarked that the ceiling on piaster spending did not affect the size of South Vietnamese 
military forces.242 
However, officials at the Saigon embassy voiced deep skepticism at the 
effectiveness of these various methods of reducing piaster spending, which 
Westmoreland concluded had succeeded, when these plans were first introduced. 
Officials at the State and Defense Departments, relying on economic expertise, took 
seriously the consequences of GI spending on inflation. Stephen Enke, who served as 
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Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1965 to 1966, wrote one of the most influential and 
polarizing studies of the impact of American military expenditures on the South 
Vietnamese economy. Policymakers at the embassy in Saigon and the Defense 
Department found Enke’s budget recommendations fruitful. Charles Cooper, Wehrle’s 
successor, wrote to Robert Komer, President Johnson’s special assistant for Vietnam and, 
beginning in 1967, Chief of Pacification, that “much that is in the Enke report is good” 
and that “his proposals for a piaster budget and a special fiscal agent in Saigon make a lot 
of sense and should be followed up.” Cooper remarked, however, that “of the $VN16.1 
billion savings he calculates… $VN10.7 come from reduced personal expenditures by 
troops [and] almost half of that (or almost 1/3 of the entire savings) will be achieved only 
if a flat limit of $20 per man is imposed on piaster spending. Is this realistic?”243 
 Cooper had stern doubts about Enke’s recommendations and questioned the 
feasibility of Enke’s suggested proposals. Enke suggested several ways in which $5.6 
billion piasters could be saved annually, including “expanded R and R, increased PX 
sales, increased savings incentives, and ending private housing.” Cooper commented that 
“the one bright note is the automatic savings flowing from the deployment of new 
troops.” However, he stated that “one way or another the other items look unattractive.” 
On the expansion of PX sales, Enke suggested that GIs would get an additional $13 per 
month to spend, but Cooper noted that “expanded PX sales don’t have to compete with 
piaster spending.” Indeed, spending more in the PX did not necessarily translate into 
decreased spending in the Vietnamese economy. Cooper observed that the Department of 
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Defense was pessimistic that increases in R&R trips would lead to major savings in 
piaster spending. He also believed that government officials viewed the benefits of the 
ten percent savings accounts too optimistically. Furthermore, Cooper argued that savings 
from ending private housing for about 8,000 GIs would come slowly because military 
leaders needed to find other accommodations.244 
 American officials relied on projections and estimates of per man soldier 
expenditures in calculating their budget plans. Enke’s alternative proposal was to reduce 
troop spending by imposing a $20 limit per man per month on piaster conversions. 
Cooper wrote that “DOD manpower argues that limiting troop spending by simply 
limiting their right to buy piasters is immoral, politically unacceptable, and won’t work 
anyway since it will drive GI’s into the black market.” Given the American propensity to 
champion freedom, individualism, and capitalism, Defense officials categorized the 
purchase of piasters a right, not a privilege. Moreover, in their view, it was 
unconscionable to tell people that they could not spend their own money. Their rejection 
of restricting soldiers’ expenditures thus made sense. Agreeing with the Defense 
Department’s assessment, Cooper maintained, “GI’s might feel better about avoiding 
illegal channels if they are given a gift of $20 in recognition of their service to the 
country than if they were prohibited from changing more than $20 a month.”245 While 
framing spending money as a reward rather than as a maximum limit of purchasing 
power may have been more congenial to GIs, Cooper, however, placed too much 
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confidence in soldiers’ financial behaviors, as the next chapters on the prevalence of 
black markets and currency manipulation will demonstrate. For the reasons outlined by 
the Defense Department, policymakers agreed on setting per man spending targets 
instead of placing limits on how much money they could exchange. In his memoir, 
Westmoreland claimed confidently that he established a goal of $20 in piaster spending 
per man per month and ultimately got the figure down to $10.246 The success of curbing 
per man spending, he contended, and the “arrival of a new economic counselor with more 
flexible approach, Charles Cooper, brought an end to the ceiling before it could 
materially affect the troop build-up.”247  
  Westmoreland’s overly optimistic assessment of the results of soldiers’ piaster 
reduction resonated with American government officials. A review of the piaster 
reduction efforts of MACV affirmed that “troop spending of a personal nature fell 
steadily through the first half of CY [Calendar Year] 1967.” Moreover, the report stated 
that MACV succeeded in holding aggregate soldier expenditures to $6.7 billion piasters, 
even though the number of personnel continued to increase. It asserted that MACV 
accomplished this reduction in piaster spending by continuing its program to curtail the 
per capita spending rate “through personal appeals and by providing a multitude of 
alternatives” such as expansions of the quantity and variety of goods at the PX, more on-
                                                
246 It is unlikely that soldiers spent, on average, $10 each month. Westmoreland did not explain how he 
arrived at that figure, and he most likely did not take into consideration the rampant and widespread 
currency manipulation undertaken by soldiers.  
247 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 248. 
 124 
base recreational facilities, a high interest earning savings plan, and out-of-country 
R&R.248  
 In the context of military officials’ decision to rely on soldiers to carry out the 
legwork of piaster reduction, MACV’s information campaign to curb piaster spending 
served as a means for military leaders to address South Vietnam’s inflation by asking 
soldiers to limit their purchases. The military’s drive to convince soldiers to spend less in 
the local economy can be seen as a strategy to mitigate the side effects of widespread 
consumerism where soldiers were stationed. Since military leaders consciously 
prioritized providing soldiers with generous discretionary incomes and consumer goods, 
the main way to alleviate the consequences of American consumer culture on South 
Vietnamese society was to implore soldiers to keep their comfort, luxuries, and general 
wealth to themselves. Given the consumer ethos fostered by military leaders, how did 
military authorities attempt to persuade soldiers through “personal appeals” that they 
should abide by suggestions to spend less money in the local economy to ease inflation?   
THE MILITARY’S INFORMATION CAMPAIGN TO CURB PIASTER EXPENDITURES 
 
 At the outset, military authorities needed to explain, in a way accessible to the 
average young American soldier, the complex financial problem of inflation. One of the 
methods they employed to describe the economics of inflation in South Vietnam was 
fiction. In a story titled “Don’t Feel Worth a Dong!”, two personified 50 piaster notes 
reminisce with each other about the old days when they were less heavy and inflated. One 
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piaster note says, “I can’t seem to settle down. I’m always getting crammed into 
someone’s wallet or pocket. Last night, a GI used me to buy a beer. Imagine that. He 
gave me away for one stinkin’ bottle of brew.” “Life can be miserable…It’s gettin’ so 
that we ain’t even worth the paper we’re printed on,” said the other note. “I remember the 
days when I could buy a round of drinks for three people. It made me feel good inside, 
like I was accomplishing something,” his friend responds. After discussing the downfall 
of “Big Jim Dong,” the 500 piaster note, the 50 piaster notes commiserate about feeling 
“a little more inflated, a little less useful, and with a little less dignity and self-respect.” 
One of the notes says, “I sure wish those GIs would wise up—I look terrible in a 
girdle.”249  
 While the story did not explicitly tell soldiers to reduce their spending, it 
conveyed to soldiers several important points about their spending behaviors and how 
they contributed to inflation in South Vietnam. The image of a piaster note in a girdle—a 
woman’s girdle—serves to remind soldiers not to throw away their piasters frivolously, 
especially on Vietnamese women, a topic discussed in greater detail later in the chapter. 
Embracing the casual humor and speech patterns of soldiers, this story serves as a 
friendly vehicle to inform soldiers of their spending habits and their role in adding fuel to 
the inflationary economy.   
 In persuading soldiers to curb their spending and help alleviate inflation, military 
officials also stressed all the financial benefits for individual soldiers if they saved more 
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of their money. Military authorities played to the self-interest of soldiers by emphasizing 
that inflation in Vietnam not only increased costs for South Vietnamese but also raised 
prices for American soldiers. Realizing that soldiers tended to pay Vietnamese merchants 
and service providers generously and even excessively, military officials encouraged 
soldiers not to throw away their extra money nonchalantly. A political cartoon in the 
Army Reporter titled “Prevent Inflation” demonstrates this message aptly [Figure 3]. In 
this illustration, an American GI is depicted handing a 200 piaster note to a smiling 
pedicab driver and saying, “That’s okay, keep the change.” The caption reads, “This 40 
‘P’ ride may cost you 200 ‘P’!” As the cartoon shows, while soldiers can afford to be 
magnanimous and overpay for services rendered by Vietnamese, the prices they pay will 
likely become the new standards. Thus, soldiers should only pay fair prices with smaller 
denominations of piaster to avoid having to ask for change.  
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Figure 3. “Prevent Inflation”250   
 Incidents of soldiers overpaying for commodities and services were not unusual, 
however, and the result was often higher prices for soldiers. In a cartoon depicting two 
unhappy soldiers at a bar, one soldier asks the other, “Remember when beer was 35 ‘P’?” 
The caption beneath the cartoon states, “Prices have gone up…because you let them!” 
[Figure 4]. Illustrating the consequences of paying high prices for commodities, this 
cartoon assigns blame to soldiers for causing prices to rise for themselves. Moreover, it 
appeals to people’s natural aversion to paying more for the exact same product or service. 
Yet the cartoon also suggests that soldiers have the ability to prevent further price 
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increases. If soldiers allowed prices to rise, then they must also have the power to stall 
inflation. 
              
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. “Prices have gone up…because you let them!”251 
 Besides exhorting soldiers to not overpay or give away their pocket change, 
military officials impressed upon soldiers that they must be smart with their finances in 
general. For GIs in Vietnam, knowing how much Vietnamese pay for certain 
commodities and services could help prevent soldiers from getting swindled. A political 
cartoon appearing in the August 2, 1967 issue of The Observer, a newspaper produced by 
MACV, embodies the military’s desire for soldiers to be armed with ideas of what 
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reasonable prices are and to drive a hard bargain with Vietnamese dealers. 
Accompanying a picture of a soldier standing next to a taxicab with the driver sticking 
his arm out of the window is a poem that reads,  
The Cabbie said, as I stepped out the door,  
“Hey GI, I need 50 ‘P’ more!” 
I replied, “If you please, 
Is that what you charge Vietnamese? 
Or do you think that I don’t know the score?”252 
 
Implicit in this poem is that American military personnel must say no to Vietnamese 
asking for more money, especially if GIs have already negotiated and agreed to a price 
beforehand.  
 Being savvy with one’s money required some effort, though. Military officials 
also encouraged soldiers to actively haggle with Vietnamese vendors and merchants. On 
December 26, 1966, The Observer published a parable with the headline, “Millionaire 
Visits Vietnam, Says ‘Tea’ Too Expensive.” In this account, El Paso horse trader and 
automobile dealer “Demented Dan” Dukes, the fictional millionaire interviewed in the 
story, gives his impressions of American troops in Vietnam. “Son, I’d tell you, we got 
some of the finest fellows in the world on our side here, but they just don’t understand 
about buying,” he says. “These Vietnam folks get right to chucklin’ when they see an 
American pay the first price the feller asks…You see, Boy—hagglin’ and horse tradin’ 
are [the Vietnamese] way here,” Dukes asserts. He continues that when “a feller keeps 
payin’ these high prices they stay high and get higher.” After stating that Americans do 
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not buy cars at the first quoted price, he implores, “You got to be smart, Son. Why last 
night they were trying to charge me 250 [piasters] for Saigon Tea! Not me! I wouldn’t 
pay them a [piaster] over 200!”253 
 The advice “Demented Dan” Dukes imparts represents the newspaper’s efforts to 
goad soldiers into haggling with Vietnamese vendors if they wanted to avoid being the 
laughingstock of town. As Dukes implies, Vietnamese sellers made large profits by 
overcharging soldiers for their purchases when they do not negotiate prices. Moreover, 
when soldiers pay the first cited and often high price for goods and services, they 
automatically contribute to price inflation. His own experience of paying no more than 
200 piasters for Saigon tea, a flavored non-alcoholic drink that Saigon bar girls 
encouraged GIs to buy them, suggests his shrewdness not to be taken advantage of by 
Vietnamese merchants. Moreover, his refusal to overpay indicates his sense of how much 
a product or service is worth. Employing the Texan cowboy colloquialisms, “son” and 
“boy,” the newspaper characterizes Dukes’ insights as those of a father, suggesting that 
the audience should heed his astute financial advice and spend wisely.  
 Essential to the practice of haggling is having some notion of how much a good or 
service is worth and how much other people are paying for it. To this end, military 
authorities published the story of one sergeant in Long Thanh district, about 25 miles 
northeast of Saigon, who attempted to “put a brake” on inflation with price guidelines. 
Staff Sergeant Levin U. Ashby, the Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge of an eight-
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man civil affairs team attached to the First Brigade, Ninth Infantry Division, researched 
and collated a list of prices to guide soldiers in their local retail adventures. Sergeant 
Ashby and his team created the list after consulting with district officials, and most Long 
Thanh merchants agreed to recognize them. According to the guidelines, soldiers should 
not pay more than 40 piasters for a haircut, between 130 and 250 piasters for a footlocker 
(depending on size), between 60 and 150 piasters for a meter of silk (depending on the 
quality), and 6 piasters for a coat hanger. Sergeant Ashby indicated that the cost of 
common retail items depended on the district, but his team planned to assemble lists of 
prices for each district in which the First Brigade operates. The article also pointed out 
that “if the price guidelines are to prevent effectively further inflation, soldiers 
themselves must refuse to pay higher prices.” Thus, the success of these price 
recommendations depended on the cooperation of soldiers. Those who pay more than the 
established fares, according to Ashby, would be “hurting the Vietnamese economy.”254 
Ashby’s voluntary coordination efforts to limit prices reflected the military’s belief that 
soldiers could exhibit not only self-restraint but also leadership to help fight inflation.  
 It was not enough, though, for military authorities to solely rely on appealing to 
the self-interest of soldiers to get them to spend less money; in fact, most messages in 
military publications invoked the fragility of the South Vietnamese economy in 
attempting to convince soldiers to curb their expenditures. Since large and guaranteed 
discretionary incomes enabled GIs to spend generously in the local economy in the first 
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place, many military personnel understandably did not find it persuasive to pinch their 
piasters for their own financial stability. However, even if saving a few piaster notes here 
and there was not important to soldiers, to American military officials, it was crucial to 
protect the tenuous South Vietnamese economy. As a result, military authorities asked 
soldiers to constrain their spending if they genuinely cared about the local economy and 
population. Soldiers’ moral duty and concern for South Vietnam thus became targets of 
the military’s information campaign to curb inflation. 
 Indeed, American officials concluded that soldiers’ expenditures had grave 
consequences for the local economy and that soldiers needed to comprehend the wider 
ripple effects of their individual spending. In addition to fiction, unit newspapers also 
employed limerick poems, often darkly humorous, to convey to soldiers the seriousness 
of their spending behaviors.255 A poem from the “Piaster Poet,” a series of limerick 
poems published in several unit newspapers in 1967, made the connection between 
soldiers’ spending and its ramifications for South Vietnam:  
 One ‘P’ is worth less than a cent 
 It’s used to buy food and pay rent. 
 When used unwise 
 By sporty GIs 
 A nation’s economy gets bent.256  
 
                                                
255 Soldiers’ production and consumption of limerick poems was a way for them to alleviate the boredom 
of war, on the one hand, and to maintain a cheerful attitude in the face of death and destruction, on the 
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modified 13 September 2013, The Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/world-war-
one/10307703/The-WW1-poetry-they-didnt-let-you-read-Ribald-and-risque-poems-from-the-front.html.  
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At the official exchange rate of one dollar to 118 piasters, effective from September 1965 
to September 1970, one piaster was worth less than a penny. However, as the poem 
indicates, it was not worthless to the Vietnamese; it enabled them to obtain food and 
housing, which soldiers enjoyed free of cost courtesy of the U.S. military. Although the 
brevity of the poem prevents it from explaining how imprudent spending distorts a 
nation’s economy, the message is clear: what soldiers do with their money affects other 
people. 
 The military reminded soldiers that their spending behaviors drove up prices of 
common retail goods for the Vietnamese, diminishing their purchasing power. An 
editorial in the January 27, 1967 issue of The Army Reporter titled “Inflation Hurts” 
reiterated that South Vietnam’s alarming inflation problem was at least partly the fault of 
American GIs. “If we, the American servicemen, continue to spend piasters as we did in 
1966, the Vietnamese inflation problem will become critical,” it asserted. Synthesizing 
the problem of inflation for soldiers, it explained that Americans are spending too much 
money, and “more money is being put into the economy, but the amount of goods and 
services is remaining the same.” The Vietnamese worker, however, was on a fixed 
income and could not afford to purchase goods at escalating prices. With a finite amount 
of goods available, “the ones who have the most money, you and I, are going to get the 
goods.” The editorial gave the example of a pair of shoes costing 300 piasters in 1966, 
but commanding 600 piasters in 1967, putting them out of reach for most Vietnamese 
workers. Taxi rides that used to cost 25 piasters for the average Vietnamese now cost four 
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times as much in the same year.257 An editorial penned by SP4 (Specialist Fourth Class) 
Scott Watson, “It’s Your Money,” admitted that “of course, the cab drivers raise their 
fares and look for the ‘big spenders.’” Moreover, he stated: 
The economic competition caused by U.S. servicemen has brought about inflation 
and has encouraged illegal currency transactions, which in turn have damaged our 
war effort, as well as the Vietnamese economy. Considering that Free World 
Forces spend on the average about $60 million annually, this problem is not one 
to be taken lightly.258  
 
The overall effect of soldier’s spending, according to Watson, was the decline of 
purchasing power for the average Vietnamese citizen to obtain the things he and his 
family needs. These desperate economic times even prompted Vietnamese to turn to 
illegal activities just to care for their families, he surmised. 
 Inflation in South Vietnam not only caused the prices of consumer durables like 
shoes and transportation services likes taxi rides to soar, but also drove up the cost of 
basic necessities like food, asserted military authorities.  An article called “[Effects] on 
Vietnamese Economy Created by Allied Troops” stated that “the arrival of U.S. and other 
Free World ‘Big Spender’ forces in Vietnam has had a crippling effect on the low keyed 
agricultural economy of the Republic of South Vietnam.” Their willingness to pay more 
for almost every kind of good and service, moreover, was “corroding this country’s 
economy.” Just as the Vietnamese contended with American GIs for taxis and 
apartments, they now competed with fellow Vietnamese on fixed incomes for “the 
                                                
257 “Inflation Hurts,” 21 January 1967, The Army Reporter, Box 34, Unit Publication Files, 1967-1971, 
Information Office, Command Information Division, RG 472, NACP. 
258 Scott Watson, “It’s Your Money,” 27 July 1970, Tropic Lightning, Box 11, USARV/US Army Support 
Command, Saigon/Information Officer, RG 472, NACP. 
 135 
necessities of life” including milk, rice, bread and meat.259 In all cases, the seller awards 
the prize to the highest bidder. As this article demonstrates, GI spending in the local 
economy precipitated price wars not only between Vietnamese and Americans but also 
among Vietnamese. The inversion of social hierarchies in the new service-sector urban 
economy pitted well-to-do taxi drivers, bar girls, and bar owners against the 
impoverished skilled and educated workers, such as doctors, teachers, and lawyers. The 
inflationary economy thus produced unrest among the Vietnamese who had to spend 
more and more of their incomes to acquire the most basic of commodities.  
 While military authorities cultivated and sanctioned consumerism on military 
bases with little concern for the ethics of materialism, they injected morality into the 
discussion of inflation and piaster reduction. On January 9, 1967, The Observer published 
an editorial titled, “Face Facts of Life: Cut Piaster Spending.” Opening with an image of 
a father explaining to his son “why he should be careful in his relationships with girls and 
what will happen if he isn’t,” the editorial stated that the “facts of life” boil down to 
“what you should and shouldn’t do if you want to stay out of trouble; if you want to be a 
success.” Sometimes, the editorial continued, “a father doesn’t get around to this ‘facts of 
life’ approach to his son until the young man is ready to leave home and enter the Armed 
Forces.” Sooner or later, however, “we all must face up to the facts of life.” In Vietnam, 
the editorial argued, “we have a piaster control program—not to give you good advice on 
how to succeed or fail with the opposite sex, but rather to give you the economic facts of 
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life.”260 Linking soldiers’ relationships with women to economic realities in Vietnam, the 
editorial implies that the military did not seek to control how soldiers interacted with 
local women but to simply make them aware of the economic ramifications of their 
actions.  
 Employing the expression, “economic facts of life,” the editorial implored 
soldiers to do the right thing and limit their spending to avoid harming the local economy. 
The purpose of the piaster control program, it asserted, was not to prohibit the spending 
of piasters; “You could no more outlaw the spending of piasters than you could outlaw 
sex.” Acknowledging that spending money, much like having sex, was part of human 
nature, the editorial suggested that attempting to prohibit spending was futile. However, 
the editorial warned, if everyone continued “to throw piasters around like they are going 
out of style,” “it could well happen.” Describing the Vietnamese economy as “already 
inflated,” the editorial explained that there are “too many people with too much money” 
but too few things to buy. Furthermore, when “we try to outbid each other, we push the 
prices up—for ourselves and, worst of all, for the Vietnamese who can least afford it.” 
Urging soldiers to face up to the facts of life, the editorial emphasized that Americans 
were only in Vietnam for a year. The Vietnamese, however, lived there permanently, “so 
let’s stop throwing our piasters around and making it tough for people to live who have it 
tough enough already.”261 
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 To stem runaway inflation, the military suggested that a little frugality on the part 
of soldiers went a long way toward helping the South Vietnamese economy. An editorial 
titled “Your $10 Spot Can Equal Half a Billion Piasters” claimed that for most American 
GIs, “$10 is a pretty small amount; less than we might spend in one night on the town; 
less than we might spend for a souvenir to send home.” To the average Vietnamese 
soldier, however, $10 constituted half a month’s salary. The editorial continued, “We can 
make his $10 worth more by not spending our $10. So, why make it tougher for him? 
Remember, he’ll still be here when you leave.”262 Reminding soldiers that they were in 
Vietnam only temporarily, this editorial attempts to appeal to GIs’ humanitarian concern 
for the Vietnamese as a way to convince them to save money. However, the logic of 
increasing the value of other people’s money by not spending your own may not have 
been the most persuasive to soldiers, who were compensated well by the military for their 
service. Given that military base culture during the Vietnam War was largely built around 
a consumption ethos, giving soldiers significant discretionary income encouraged them to 
spend the money. Additionally, soldiers gave away their change and overpaid 
Vietnamese merchants because it was how they understood they could help the 
Vietnamese and make life easier for them. Soldiers could, after all, help Vietnamese 
citizens become more financially secure by simply paying them more, an action that the 
Saigon government failed to accomplish. 
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 However, while soldiers might not have found it essential to haggle with 
Vietnamese merchants, military officials deemed it necessary for the well-being of the 
South Vietnamese economy. A cartoon in the Army Reporter suggested that soldiers 
should pay no more than what a Vietnamese merchant asked, because doing so would be 
detrimental to the Vietnamese economy [Figure 5]. It depicts a Vietnamese man and his 
child, holding a 50 piaster note, selling items at a table on a street, including a box of 
Tide detergent, and on the ground is a box labeled “war supplies.” An American GI, 
holding a 200 piaster note, talks to the father and son duo and argues, “But you told me 
’50’ P would be enough.” The caption states, “Your earnings are high—Don’t hurt the 
Vietnamese.” This cartoon, while acknowledging the presence of black market goods, 
suggests that soldiers should be aware that their comfortable incomes did not mean they 
should give their extraneous cash to Vietnamese. The logic of this cartoon may not have 
been entirely clear to the GIs, though, since soldiers can interpret paying vendors 
generously as helping them.   
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Figure 5. “Your earnings are high—Don’t hurt the Vietnamese” 263  
 Advocating the practice of bargaining for GIs, military newspapers even went so 
far as to claim that haggling would contribute to better relations with the Vietnamese. An 
editorial titled “Understanding the Vietnamese” argued that soldiers could help ease 
inflation and promote understanding between themselves and the Vietnamese community 
by negotiating prices. It stated that bargaining will save money for GIs, but more 
importantly also result in lower prices for the average Vietnamese consumer. Reiterating 
that “many years of extravagant spending by Americans have resulted in skyrocketing 
prices” while the average Vietnamese worker’s wages have stagnated, the editorial 
concluded that if “the majority of Americans would vigorously dicker over prices, and 
not accept an unrealistic price, we would succeed in both lowering prices and fostering 
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goodwill between Vietnamese and Americans.”264 Although this editorial might have 
convinced soldiers that bargaining would allow them to save more of their own money, it 
was less persuasive in arguing that bargaining would improve relations between 
Americans and Vietnamese. After all, GIs’ daily interactions with Vietnamese 
demonstrate that merchants would like to get more money for their goods and services to 
make profits. That certain Vietnamese workers, primarily civil servants, had low incomes 
might indicate that one reasonable solution would be to increase their wages to the level 
of those who work for Americans and could afford to pay inflated prices.  
 Moreover, the fact that military newspapers lampooned the different ways in 
which Vietnamese people tried to earn more piasters confirmed that Vietnamese people 
were pleased when soldiers paid them handsomely. The Vietnamese custom of ranking 
soldiers using number one to label a GI who paid generously and number ten to brand a 
stingy soldier, for example, shows that Vietnamese were delighted when soldiers spent 
lavish sums. American military newspapers often portrayed Vietnamese men and women 
as always needing GIs to spend their piasters. A cartoon in the July 5, 1971 issue of the 
Army Reporter, for example, shows a drugged-out GI, wearing a shirt that says, “Rest in 
Peace,” harassed by many Vietnamese to spend his money [Figure 6]. One man asks if 
he wants to buy a horse, while a Vietnamese child clings to him asking if he wants to buy 
peanuts. Meanwhile, another Vietnamese boy holding a bag that says “Shop Downtown” 
picks the soldier’s pocket for piasters. Another Vietnamese man yells, “You numbah one, 
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GI!” as the GI hands him an MPC note, and a taxi driver asks him, “You want taxi? I 
charge onsly [sic] double which is half price!” Another cartoon portrays an elderly 
Vietnamese woman sitting next to a well with a sign proclaiming, “Momma San’s 
Numbah One Wishy Well,” and another sign that reads, “Makey Wish to Go Home Only 
20 P’s” [Figure 7].  
 Cartoons likes these suggest that soldiers were not completely culpable for 
overspending in the local economy; Vietnamese sought various means, both legitimate 
and duplicitous, to convince soldiers to spend their piasters. Calling soldiers “number 
one,” for example, was a way that Vietnamese tried to flatter generous American GIs and 
encourage them to spend more of their money. American military authorities understood 
that Vietnamese men, women, and children frequently pressured GIs to dispose of their 
cash. It was therefore difficult to convince soldiers that “vigorously dickering” with 
Vietnamese would actually improve Vietnamese-American relations. For GIs who lived 
comparatively privileged lives, squaring their conflicting desires to be liberal with their 
spending in a poor country and to also obey recommendations to be miserly with 
Vietnamese vendors was a challenge.  
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Figure 6. “Dynamic Duo Answer – ‘The Room for Improvement’”265 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. “Momma San’s Numbah One Wishy Well”266 
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 A major topic intertwined with the need for soldiers to conserve piasters was their 
interactions with local women. It was widely known that American GIs who frequented 
bars often spent extravagant sums of money as part of the experience. In Saigon, “tea 
girls” who flirted with GIs often pressured them to buy tea for the ladies and alcohol for 
the soldiers. As depicted widely in the media and known amongst military servicemen, 
Vietnamese women often asked soldiers to purchase them items that only GIs could 
acquire in the PX. Additionally, as discussed in the first chapter, relationships between 
American soldiers and Vietnamese women were often mediated by consumer goods, and 
the sight of an American soldier with a Vietnamese woman usually meant that he spent 
money toward satisfying the retail wishes of his girlfriend.  
 Accounts from soldiers demonstrate that many GIs did, in fact, spend much of 
their incomes on Vietnamese women. Young soldiers often ventured into the city to seek 
out bar girls and prostitutes to alleviate boredom and fulfill their sexual desires. One 
veteran, Douglas Shivers, recalled that “for entertainment purposes when we went to 
Saigon we’d usually go to a bar and try to pick up a girl. A Vietnamese girl, which 
normally called out X number of piasters.” He conceded, “It was a prostitution deal 
obviously. You’d pay them whatever was [the] going rate and you could pick them out 
just like you go to the candy store almost.”267 One veteran confirmed that for American 
soldiers, the cost of securing a prostitute was no problem. Anthony LaRusso observed 
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that “the Americans always overpaid for everything” and had to pay more for a prostitute 
than Vietnamese men did. However, LaRusso also noted that “everything was cheap…we 
were making 100 dollars a month,”268 suggesting that Americans did not mind paying 
more given the poverty of Vietnam. Yet another veteran, Kyle Miyogi, remembered, 
“Most of the hooch maids, of all ages, were available for sex; they cleaned the hooch and 
serviced the guys. We paid them twenty dollars a month for cleaning the hooch and five 
dollars for other activities.”269 “To be truthful,” he admitted, “there was nothing to spend 
money on.”270 Stories like these show that the military had good reason to be concerned 
with how soldiers spent their piasters on Vietnamese women. 
 Military authorities, in trying to convince soldiers to be frugal with their piasters, 
warned American soldiers that their interactions with Vietnamese hosts, particularly 
women, had grave consequences for the South Vietnamese economy. A cartoon captures 
this cultural and economic conflict vividly [Figure 8]. It shows a soldier holding hands 
and walking with an attractive, Western-dressed Vietnamese woman. He says to a fellow 
soldier, “Hi Bill, I’m promoting goodwill!” His colleague, however, responds, “How 
about promoting good economy, too?” The caption reads, “Don’t spend piasters 
needlessly.” At the heart of the cartoon is the question of how soldiers can “promote 
goodwill” with Vietnamese citizens but not damage the local economy in the process. In 
particular, it suggests that dalliances with Vietnamese women were mercenary 
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relationships and therefore not conducive to a strong economy. This cartoon insinuates 
that Vietnamese women caused GIs to spend more of their money than necessary and that 
soldiers should watch their spending as it pertained to gratifying their female 
companions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. “Don’t spend piasters needlessly” 271 
 The image of the gold-digging Vietnamese girlfriend was not unusual; in fact, the 
trope of the calculating Vietnamese woman was a common one in unit newspapers.272 
Several poems in military newspapers explicitly alleged that untrustworthy Vietnamese 
women made off with large amounts of GIs’ money. “The Piaster Poet,” for example, 
                                                
271 “Don’t spend piasters needlessly,” cartoon, The Army Reporter, Box 34, Unit Publication Files, 1967-
1971, Information Office, Command Information Division, RG 472, NACP. 
272 For a discussion of how Americans perceived Vietnamese women, see Stur, Beyond Combat, 17–63. 
 
 146 
maintains that Vietnamese ladies brought about the financial downfall of American 
soldiers. A poem published on March 13, 1967 read: 
 There was a young lady from Phar 
 Who worked in a Saigon bar 
 She brought on inflation 
 Through tea inhalation 
 And her admirers can’t take R&R.273  
 
This poem suggests that the Vietnamese woman’s insistence on getting soldiers to buy 
her tea is the reason why they cannot afford a vacation. Depicting the GIs as victims, this 
limerick pinpoints the blame on the woman; her “tea inhalation” habit had damaging 
effects on the local economy and the personal finances of soldiers. Another poem 
published on April 10, 1967 emphasizes how Vietnamese women conned American GIs:  
A girl who once lived in a shack, 
 Met a P’ spending soldier named Jack. 
 Now she often sends, 
 Her Mercedes Benz, 
 To pack a sack snack to Jack’s shack.274 
 
In this poem, the Vietnamese girl went from rags to riches, all because she took 
advantage of a spendthrift soldier. While she owns a luxury car now, he lives in a poor 
shack. As suggested in these limericks, Vietnamese women were not be trusted, because 
they scammed American soldiers and left them penniless. 
 Military publications also represented Vietnamese women asking soldiers to grant 
them access to consumer goods at the PX. A political cartoon shows a Vietnamese 
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woman in a conical hat asking, “Hey, GI, you go PX and buy for me two soaps” and the 
soldier says, “No can do!” [Figure 9]. Later, another Vietnamese woman says, “GI, you 
go PX and buy for me…” and he says condescendingly, “AW-shut up!” Even later, the 
soldier, believing that his wife sent him a letter, finds a note that begins, “Dear Honey, 
Please go to the PX and buy me…” These series of pictures depict how persistent the 
Vietnamese woman was in manipulating the soldier to purchase items at the PX for her, 
and how equally adamant the soldier was to stand his ground and say no to her. These 
illustrations make evident that only American GIs should enjoy the consumer goods that 
the military provides; the proper way to respond to such retail requests from Vietnamese 
was to decline them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. “Right on…”275 
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 Although military publications characterized Vietnamese people as constant 
solicitors of the GIs’ wealth, they also conveyed that soldiers were, in fact, in control of 
their own money. Military authorities urged soldiers to deflect Vietnamese demands for 
them to spend. In a political cartoon titled “Don’t be a Piaster Disaster,” an American 
soldier, with handfuls of piasters and pockets stuffed with money, is surrounded by 
Vietnamese people asking him to spend [Figure 10]. In this illustration, a Vietnamese 
woman says, “You buy me tea?”; children beg him, “Give me 5P?”; a shoeshine boy 
asks, “You want shine?” The questions, “You buy for me?” and “Hey man you buy?”, 
and the words “give” and “buy” are also at his side. Additionally, large hands are 
reaching out to the soldier toward his cash. With the imperative to not be a “Piaster 
Disaster,” the cartoon also shows that it can be overwhelming when soldiers are literally 
surrounded by local people asking them to buy, spend, and give all the time. The 
challenge, then, would be to resist the mercenary requests of Vietnamese.  
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Figure 10. “Don’t be a Piaster Disaster” 276 
 
 Moreover, military authorities believed that refusing to spend money in the 
Vietnamese economy could be as easy as keeping one’s money in their wallets. In one 
USARV cartoon, a commander is shown yelling at one of his soldiers, “Keep your ‘P’ 
pickin’ hands outta your pockets!” as the soldier, with one hand in his pocket, gives 
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money to a Vietnamese man with his other.277 Instead of directing his anger toward the 
local man for asking for piasters, the commander expresses his displeasure with his own 
soldier who cannot keep his hands from grabbing money out of his pocket. As the cartoon 
implies, soldiers need to exercise self-discipline to refrain from spending so much. 
Similarly, another cartoon shows a GI asking a Vietnamese woman, “How would you 
like a box of Tide?”278 In the context of piaster reduction in the military, this cartoon 
suggests that soldiers should not offer to give away goods they purchased like Tide 
detergent, a much sought-after commodity in Vietnamese black markets. Doing so, it 
implies, would contribute to inflation. 
 However, unit newspapers also conveyed to soldiers that not all spending is bad; 
there were moral and immoral ways to spend their earnings. On April 10, 1967, a “Piaster 
Poet” poem suggested that reckless spending was sinful:  
“It’s funny,” he said with a grin, 
 “There are so many ways one can win 
 R&R’s a good bet, 
 And savings plans yet, 
 But the way some guys spend is a sin.”279 
 
In this poem, a soldier contends that GIs can spend their money respectably through 
official U.S. military leisure and savings programs. However, he expresses moral disdain 
toward those who squander their money on other things. Although this poem sought to 
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cast aspersions on those who spend too much in a way that hurts the economy, the 
military did in fact provide many opportunities for soldiers to shop and accumulate 
consumer goods and gadgets.  
 Acknowledging that soldiers wanted to spend their money on goods, the military 
gave explicit instructions on what to buy and what not to buy. An editorial appearing in 
the 28 November 1966 issue of the Observer titled, “Shopping in the Far East,” admitted 
that “there’s a certain boost to morale and a sense of well-being associated with payday. 
The wallet is comfortably padded and the day somehow looks brighter.” However, 
payday is only a “fleeting moment of happiness” for some military personnel. As the 
editorial stated, “The wallet shrinks as the money goes thither and yon. Sometimes it’s 
gone before the sun goes down.” Moreover, in some cases, “the serviceman isn’t even 
getting a fair shake for his money. He’s just throwing it away.” The Observer 
recommended that soldiers spend their money wisely, especially if they are seeking to 
purchase souvenirs and mementos to send back to the United States. First, they should 
not buy anything made in mainland China, North Korea, or North Vietnam. Second, they 
should not buy Chinese-type goods in any country unless the shopkeeper can provide a 
special certificate of origin acceptable to the U.S. Treasury. At the time, such certificates 
for tourists were only available in Hong Kong. Third, soldiers should not trust the 
vendor’s word that he will be able to import Chinese-type goods to the United States 
without an acceptable certificate of origin. Fourth, purchases of embargoed goods for 
gifts are subject to restrictions, regardless of value. The editorial concluded, “Don’t waste 
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your money. Before you buy, check with your command on the latest regulations 
covering shopping restrictions.”280   
 Other messages from the military used more direct and unequivocal language to 
influence GI expenditures. A poster from the USARV Information Office urged soldiers 
to “Prune Piaster Spending to Help Vietnam’s Economy” [Figure 11]. The poster 
presents a tree with branches labeled: “bars,” “beer,” “broads,” “souvenirs,” “ice,” “nice 
to have,” “private rentals,” “taxis,” “excess tips,” “shoeshines,” “restaurants,” “car 
wash,” and “hotels.” All of these kinds of expenditures listed on the tree branches 
represent the different ways in which soldiers spent money on themselves or others 
frivolously in the local economy. The use of the term “broads” demonstrates the 
military’s view that Vietnamese women were a big reason why soldiers spent more 
money than necessary. At the bottom and right side of the poster is an instruction: “When 
you buy, buy at the lowest fair price.” Conjuring an image of the common expression 
“money doesn’t grow on trees,” this poster shows that wastefulness can grow in many 
different directions. At the center of the poster is the phrase, “Do: Save Money” and “Use 
U.S. Facilities.” Although the main message of the poster was to “prune piaster 
spending,” it did not mean that soldiers should stop spending their money in general. It is 
clear that many of the things that soldiers purchase on the local economy can be acquired 
through the PX, clubs, mess halls, and other U.S. establishments, so soldiers should direct 
their spending toward American venues. The advice both to save money and spend it at 
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American facilities thus reveals an underlying tension in the military’s instruction to 
soldiers.  
 In reducing the use of piasters in the local economy, the military sought various 
ways to limit the amount of piasters that GIs could purchase. A cartoon in the April 29, 
1967 issue of the Army Reporter makes this point explicitly [Figure 12]. It shows two 
soldiers talking to each other at an official currency exchange facility, with one stating 
that “More piasters mean more buying power” while the other adds, “and high prices!” 
The caption reads, “purchase only the piasters you need.” If soldiers only converted a 
minimum amount of MPCs into piasters, then they would not have an extravagant 
amount of piasters to spend.  
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Figure 11. “Prune Piaster Spending to Help Vietnam’s Economy” 281 
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Figure 12. “Purchase only the piasters you need” 282 
 
 The military also encouraged soldiers to move away from shopping on 
Vietnamese streets and instead confine their shopping to PX stores. Poems penned by the 
“Piaster Poet” imparted to soldiers the message that consuming through the PX and the 
mess halls was smart, while buying baubles and food on the local streets was not. On 
April 10, 1967, the “Piaster Poet” wrote: 
Said the happy young sailor from Mass., 
 As he wrapped up his statue of brass. 
 “This’ll wow ‘em at home, 
 I was using my dome, 
 Only ten thousand P’s” 
 (What a dumb guy.)283 
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By insulting the intelligence of a GI who bought a brass statue on the street, this poem 
attempts to create a stigma against street shopping and to discourage others from doing 
so. Another poem from the “Piaster Poet” contrasts the ease of buying knickknacks in 
street stalls with guilt-free shopping at the PX:  
Whether elephants, canes or chow mein, 
 We can all spend our P’s without pain. 
 But to spend sans vex, 
 In the grand old PX, 
 Is the way we’ll end up with some gain.284  
 
Not only would shopping at the PX be unencumbered with distress, but it would also be 
financially beneficial to the soldier. 
 Military authorities published brief, fictional, and often humorous vignettes in fact 
sheets designed to show how spending frugally could led to financial stability and even 
affluence. A MACV fact sheet titled, “Making Your Pay Work for You” featured the 
story of “tight money” Titus Frugalbean, an SP4 who embodied the military’s ideal of GI 
economic sobriety. Unlike his spendthrift comrades, Frugalbean did not buy things like 
“ceramic elephants, six-foot-tall bronze candle holders and genuine VC battle flags, 
hand-made by little old ladies in Saigon” while he served in Vietnam.285 When he 
returned to the United States, he “parted with all the money he had saved,” invested it 
with a stranger in an oil well, and lived a life of luxury. By the end of the narrative, 
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Frugalbean had become so wealthy that “he tours the world in his 350-foot Chris Craft 
yacht. His mere presence makes headlines wherever he goes. When he gets a cold, the 
stock market dips.” Of his experience in Vietnam, Frugalbean eventually feels nostalgic 
most of all for his exemption from income taxes; “I think I’m in the 98 per cent bracket 
now,” he complains. Frugalbean’s transformation from poor soldier in Vietnam to rich 
civilian in America is illustrated in an accompanying cartoon; on the left, he is hunched-
over and attending a fire burning what is likely the emptied contents of a latrine, and on 
the right, he is dressed nicely, holding a martini glass, and standing next to his brand-new 
sports car [Figure 13]. The fact sheet acknowledges Frugalbean’s exceptional status, 
noting that other servicemen saved their money for other, more modest and attainable 
goals, such as a college education or a new house. “The point is,” the story concludes, “if 
you ever want to save money, this is the place to do it.” 286 Even when military authorities 
attempted to dissuade soldiers from spending too much money in Vietnam, they extolled 
luxury consumerism as the ultimate end goal.   
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Figure 13. “Making Your Pay Work for You” 
  
 Positive reviews from shopping at the PX served as endorsements to channel GI 
spending toward facilities managed by the United States and away from Vietnamese 
street stalls. In the February 2, 1968 issue of the Observer, a poem titled “Wise Buys For 
You GI” gave specific advice to soldiers on what and where to shop: 
I was new in country and eager to please. 
 So I bought from street vendors, squandering my “P’s”. 
 As I grew “shorter,” I also grew wise 
 And I found the PX had excellent buys. 
 The brand names I saw were familiar to me 
 And just about all had a good guarantee. 
 In comparing the prices with a Stateside store, 
 I found back-home costs were generally more. 
 So I bought a projector, Hi-Fi and TV. 
 Jewelry for my wife—a wrist watch for me. 
 And, lest I forget, let me make a confession. 
 I bought the kids’ gifts at the PX concession. 
 Then, like lightning, a new idea dawns: 
 I invested my savings in government bonds.287  
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As the poem demonstrates, shopping at the PX offered soldiers brand new goods at low 
prices, while shopping on local streets was a waste of money. However, the poem also 
suggests that soldiers had enough money not only to purchase the items they wanted for 
themselves and their families but also to invest for their futures. Particularly for soldiers 
who were poor, spending and consuming at American-run facilities could make a world 
of difference for their financial circumstances. The “Piaster Poet” illustrated the success 
of a soldier who followed the military’s instructions on how and where to consume:  
A destitute soldier named Pete, 
 Heard piasters could well mean defeat 
 So he ate in the mess, 
 And drank there, I guess, 
 Now he’s fiscally back on his feet.288  
 
This soldier ate and drank at the military’s mess halls not only to demonstrate his 
patriotism but also to improve his personal finances. 
 Understanding that soldiers often used consumer goods to communicate and 
introduce themselves to Vietnamese citizens, the military established a guide on how 
American soldiers can give gifts in a way that would be conducive to stabilizing the local 
economy. Especially during the lunar new year holiday, Tet, gift-gifting was expected in 
Vietnamese society. An editorial titled “Piasters and Tet” stated that “Tet is a time when 
friendliness and good will is in the air—when generosity is shown by the Vietnamese, 
and expected in return.” Moreover, “With pressures which are forced on the Vietnamese 
economy when too many piasters are circulated, how do you match the mood with the 
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money?” The editorial offered two suggestions. First, give the Vietnamese a PX item 
under ten dollars. This, the newspaper added, would enable Vietnamese to have 
something unique that they could not acquire otherwise. Moreover, “most Vietnamese 
appreciate a modest gift of U.S. merchandise.” Second, it urged soldiers to “make your 
gift modest but meaningful.”289  
 Besides urging GIs to spend modestly on thoughtful gifts to Vietnamese, the 
military also stressed to soldiers that sometimes gift-gifting was not the proper way to 
ingratiate oneself with the Vietnamese. An editorial titled “Gifts to Vietnamese can hurt 
relations” in the December 11, 1968 issue of the Cavalair advanced the notion that in 
heaping gifts on Vietnamese, soldiers inadvertently offended their Vietnamese hosts. The 
editorial affirmed that 
gifts to orphans, widows and disabled veterans are deserved and always 
appreciated, but indiscriminate giveaways to everyone in general is considered 
degrading by the Vietnamese and the friendly American GI who wants to be liked 
by everyone often unknowingly does more to hurt relations with the Vietnamese 
than to foster a friendly attitude.  
 
It explained that because soldiers, lacking full understanding of Vietnamese traditions 
and social hierarchies, often give gifts to children exclusively, they ignore and insult 
Vietnamese elders, who are the most respected in Vietnamese society. Thus, “Rather than 
just tossing out candy, gum and C-rations to children as you go through a village or ride 
along the highway, check with your civil affairs office to see what you can do in the way 
                                                
289 “Piasters and Tet,” 6 February 1967, The Observer, MACV Comptroller, Information Office, “The 
Observer,” RG 472, NACP. 
 161 
of constructively aiding the Vietnamese.”290 This editorial urged soldiers to think twice 
before spending money on presents for Vietnamese. While traditional Vietnamese 
Confucian values placed great emphasis on respect for elders, the editorial likely 
misinterpreted how older generations of Vietnamese feel about American gifts. After all, 
unit newspapers depicted Vietnamese of all ages, including the elderly, as eager to 
receive American presents and money.  
 To maintain peaceful relations between Vietnamese and Americans, military 
newspapers implored soldiers to avoid conspicuous consumption. An editorial called “A 
Marked Man” in the January 30, 1967 issue of The Observer stated that Americans 
stationed overseas “represent the American way of life” and their “willingness to 
establish contact with a nation’s people creates a favorable impression and promotes 
good will for our country—the art of diplomacy” [Figure 14]. However, soldiers must 
exhibit thoughtfulness and understanding in their relations with locals. This is important, 
the editorial insisted, because “it is the local population that watches him, judges him, 
and through him the Army and the United States.” Accompanying the editorial was a 
cartoon representing an “ugly” American, who wore a shirt printed with the words, 
“Dinky-Dau,” throwing his piasters into the air. To his left, a Vietnamese military police 
officer stands with a net ready to catch the money. A caption below stated, “The 
Vietnamese call me what?” Drawing attention to himself by throwing money around 
casually, the soldier in the picture is labelled “dinky-dau,” which in Vietnamese wartime 
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slang denoted a crazy person. The editorial and cartoon emphasize that the image of 
America was at stake during the war and that GIs, as agents of American diplomacy, 
must employ caution and respect while interacting with Vietnamese.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. “A Marked Man” 291 
 The display of soldiers’ wealth no doubt caused tensions and misunderstandings 
between Americans and Vietnamese. In a political cartoon titled “Take a Hint, GI!” an 
American soldier with the label “lifer”292 on his fatigues wears a giant grin as he holds 
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handfuls of cash [Figure 15]. The backdrop of the cartoon features primitive-looking 
huts constructed of hay. Meanwhile, an elderly Vietnamese donning a conical hat points 
at him, while other Vietnamese glare at the man disapprovingly and with intimidation. 
The caption of the cartoon, representing one of the nine rules of conduct that soldiers 
must abide by,293 reads, “Avoid separating yourself from the people by a display of 
wealth or privilege.” Suggesting that soldiers should “take a hint,” the cartoon serves to 
illustrate to soldiers that if they merely noticed the social cues that Vietnamese give off, 
they will understand that their ostentatious behaviors are alienating locals. Furthermore, 
soldiers’ display of wealth could upset poor Vietnamese in the countryside.   
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Figure 15. “Take a Hint GI!”294  
 
 The military, mindful of these cultural and economic differences, reminded 
soldiers that flaunting money, even unintentionally, generated resentment among the 
Vietnamese. An editorial called “Actions reflect ugly Americans” in the 29 March 1971 
issue of the Army Reporter conceded “when we came to Vietnam we brought with us our 
own way of life in the form of PXs, clubs, commissaries, vehicles, and housing.” To the 
typical Vietnamese, it continued, “what we have—even while fighting a war—is sheer 
luxury.” Furthermore, it stated that although many soldiers feel deprived of typical 
American conveniences, they should acknowledge they were in a society “not built 
around [American] standards” and that the American way of life sometimes caused GIs 
                                                
294 “Take a Hint GI!”, cartoon, 19 August 1968, Tropic Lightning, Box 30, Unit Publication Files, 1967-
1971, Information Office, Command Information Division, RG 472, NACP. 
 
 165 
to offend the Vietnamese unknowingly. Moreover, while soldiers may complain that 
certain brands of beer are out of stock at the PX, that their accommodations are 
inadequate, or that there should be more hot water, they should understand that 
Vietnamese people live without life’s most basic necessities. The editorial encouraged 
soldiers to “keep a check on the little, everyday things we take so much for granted.” 
Explaining the low incomes of the average Vietnamese worker, the editorial asked, “How 
many times have you taken out your billfold to pay a Vietnamese for a haircut or cyclo 
ride with five $20 bills visible?” It stated that one hundred dollars converted to 27,500 
piasters, which a Vietnamese working for the American government as a day laborer 
would earn after working more than four months. The editorial concluded that, “it’s not 
hard to see how flashing one’s money around could cause resentment.”295  
 Soldiers who failed to keep their money in their pockets and blend in with local 
citizens faced the very likely possibility of getting robbed. A news story in the 
“welcome” edition of the Army Reporter titled “Flash that bread & ask for trouble” 
reported that GIs were violently attacked and robbed, often losing the electronics they 
carried, like a camera slung over their shoulders, and money in their pockets. The 
newspaper advised soldiers to walk in groups and to carry only enough cash that they 
need. Moreover, they should keep their money discreetly in their pockets and not “wave 
it around like the American flag.” Soldiers not following these suggestions could end up 
getting hurt and losing all their money. Because MPCs and PX items attract high resale 
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profits on the local black market, soldiers were prime targets for “the minute number of 
Vietnamese who unfortunately live off this illegal activity.”296 Soldiers should therefore 
not parade their wealth for personal security reasons.  
 The ostentatious wealth of American GIs had consequences for the war effort as 
well. As military newspapers often suggested Vietnamese hostility toward Americans and 
their extravagant spending could lead South Vietnamese citizens to turn to communist 
support. The editorial, “Actions reflect ugly Americans,” conveyed that anti-American 
feelings directed at American GIs could lead to outbreaks of violence where soldiers 
were stationed. If the South Vietnamese government cannot “keep order within its 
communities, including the U.S. soldiers in those communities, the people will look 
elsewhere for order and peace.” The editorial admitted that, “we all know where the most 
readily available promise of order and peace comes from in this country.”297 Furthermore, 
the editorial titled “Inflation Hurts” also linked South Vietnamese antagonism toward 
Americans to communist victories. Indeed, “ill feelings toward the United States by the 
Vietnamese people…[are] a target for communist propaganda that can be used against the 
United States in forming world opinion.” The editorial concluded, “In order to maintain a 
stable Vietnamese economy and to head off inflation, to avoid giving communist 
propagandists ammunition to use against the United States, and to retain a good 
Vietnamese-American relationship, it is necessary for each of us to cut down on piaster 
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spending.”298 As these editorials suggest, excessive piaster spending by American 
military personnel could indirectly benefit communist claims and cause the United States 
to lose the military and political struggle.  
 Oftentimes, military newspapers suggested that a strong and reliable South 
Vietnamese economy was necessary for American victory over communism. Besides 
portraying excessive spending as harmful to South Vietnamese and American financial 
interests, military publications also claimed that spendthrift soldiers essentially 
contributed to the Vietcong cause. Those who spent money buying tea for Saigon bar 
girls were most implicated in this charge. In another poem by the “Piaster Poet,” military 
authorities advanced the notion that Saigon tea girls colluded with Vietcong cadres to 
harm American soldiers:  
There was once a sneaky VC 
 Whom T-girls provided with “P” 
 He’d buy ammunition 
 And blow to perdition 
 those GI’s who spend “P” for tea.299  
 
In this poem, it is unclear whether “tea girls” knowingly or unknowingly collaborated 
with the Vietcong, but the communists’ stealth is noted. Another poem, however, 
suggested that “tea girls” had full knowledge of their actions to conspire with the 
insurgents:  
 One soldier kept buying her tea. 
 Her money she gave the VC. 
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 With the cash that she made, 
 Charlie bought a grenade. 
 The soldier said, “Hon, you slay me.”300  
 
Establishing a clear link between GIs who squandered their money and the strength of the 
Vietcong, these limericks urge soldiers to regard their spending as important as their roles 
in the war effort.  
 In addition to belaboring the high stakes of suppressing the temptations to buy 
and spend, military authorities also underscored that saving one’s money was crucial to 
keep inflation in check in South Vietnam. A USARV Information Office poster called 
“Your Money Tree” declared, “Placing money in savings deposits and buying savings 
bonds are the best anti-inflationary actions any of us can take.” The poster depicts a tree 
with various denominations of American coins on the branches. On the left side is a 
column titled “Savings Overseas,” followed by the words, “Use U.S. Recreation 
Facilities.”  This side of the poster features different ways in which soldiers could save 
their money while in Southeast Asia, such as exchanging currency at an official facility, 
investing in savings bonds, and shopping only in commissaries, post exchanges, clubs, 
and snack bars.301 Besides reiterating the rules about where soldiers should spend and 
acquire currency, the poster encouraged soldiers to consider the great bargains and 
financial security that came with investing their money while in Vietnam.  
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 Indeed, despite the immediate gratification of consumerism on military bases, 
military authorities recommended that soldiers think about their post-Vietnam futures and 
save up financially for the good life afterward. On the right side of the “Your Money 
Tree” poster is a column titled “Savings at Home,” along with the words, “Dollars do 
grow—but only those you save.” Beneath this heading are suggestions on how soldiers 
can save at home, including buying savings bonds “for your future—a car—your family.” 
Moreover, the poster stated that “time passes—today becomes tomorrow—next week—
next month—next year—save.”302 While all of these suggestions make financial sense, it 
may have been difficult for soldiers to save money for their future selves, when it was not 
guaranteed that they would make it out of the war alive and well. Given all of the 
opportunities to indulge and satisfy consumption desires promptly, the truisms proffered 
by military authorities appeared out of place. 
 Nonetheless, military authorities attempted to sell savings programs to soldiers as 
vital to their futures, and what was good for the soldier’s financial well-being appeared to 
benefit the American economy as well. Besides telling soldiers what to purchase for 
themselves and for Vietnamese hosts, military newspapers urged soldiers to invest in 
government bonds. Thus, among the “wise buys” for GIs was American savings bonds. 
As a January 1968 editorial in the Observer titled, “Uncle Needs Us” made clear to 
soldiers, the United States at the time faced precarious balance of payments deficits.303 
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According to the editorial, President Lyndon Johnson called upon American citizens to 
help solve a problem “of vital concern to the economic health and well-being of this 
Nation and the Free World.” “How can servicemen help?”, the editorial asked, the answer 
was “Buy” and “Save” American. It stated that every dollar spent on American-made 
goods and invested in U.S. savings bonds, Freedom Shares, or the Uniformed Service 
Savings Deposit Program would help. The editorial affirmed that those who participated 
in savings programs “get paid for the privilege.” For example, U.S. Savings Bonds paid 
investors 4.15 percent interest; Freedom Shares paid 4.74 percent interest within five 
years; and at overseas stations the Uniformed Services Savings Deposit Program yielded 
10 percent dividends. The editorial insisted that “saving your money in one of these 
programs is not only a service to your country, but is added insurance that you won’t 
return home empty handed.” The editorial quoted Johnson, “The time has now come for 
decisive action designed to bring our balance of payments to—or close to—equilibrium 
in the year ahead. The need is a national and international responsibility of the highest 
priority.”304 Presented as profitable to soldiers and crucial to the nation’s economy, this 
editorial exhorted soldiers to purchase American goods and American bonds.  
 However, the military’s encouragement for soldiers to buy American goods often 
contradicted its warnings of economic troubles on the home front and its message to save 
money. A February 1968 Cavalair editorial titled “Inflation” alluded to the financial 
problems confronting the United States and the world. Citing the president and leading 
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economists, the editorial stated that the United States potentially faced high inflation and 
a further decline of the dollar’s purchasing power. As the U.S. economy approached a 
Gross National Product (GNP) of more than $800 billion annually for the first time, the 
editorial argued, Americans will “experience a period of economic readjustment during 
which the people are going to have to decide what must be done to strengthen the dollar 
of an economy.” The achievement of this GNP milestone is meaningless, however, 
“unless all America acts to halt inflation and to strengthen the dollar.” Since the war in 
Vietnam cost the United States $30 billion a year, the editorial continued, those in 
Vietnam can do their part to boost the American economy. Indeed, the American dollar is 
linked to the Vietnamese piaster, and regardless of which currency soldiers use, piaster or 
dollars, they need to spend wisely and get the “full value for every dime spent.” 
Moreover, “we need to buy only what we need, to save in every way we can and to 
budget carefully in those areas that lend themselves to reckless spending.”305 Although 
the military was responsible for cultivating a culture of consumption through its PX 
system and its salary structure, it also contradicted its own messages by asking soldiers to 
refrain from buying too much.  
 The military’s plea for soldiers to restrain themselves from purchasing gratuitous 
items also ran contrary to what the military presented as the prizes of finishing their 
service in Vietnam: consumer goods and leisure experiences. An article called “[Effects] 
on Vietnamese Economy Created by Allied Troops” stated that, “since the spending of 
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American dollars in Vietnam is hurting the Vietnam economy, Uncle Sam has set up 
programs to help military personnel channel their earnings into areas more profitable for 
the GI and less costly to the Vietnamese.” This article portrayed the investment of money 
into savings accounts as a win-win for both Americans and Vietnamese. A soldier’s hard-
earned money in Vietnam “can work toward purchase of a new car, a tape recorder, a 
camera or an R and R holiday.” Additionally, soldiers could have a “solid bank account.” 
The article claimed that, “using your money sensibly will go [a] long way toward helping 
the Vietnamese too.”306 The point, as demonstrated by this article, is not that soldiers 
should stop themselves from buying any nonessential goods like cameras and cars in 
general, but rather that they should buy them at the PX or have them sent back to the 
States.  
 The editorial penned by SP4 Scott Watson titled “It’s Your Money” also made the 
nuanced distinction that soldiers should not stop consuming in general but that they 
should only purchase through American military channels. Watson contended that “there 
are many ways which a GI can help the Vietnamese economy and fatten his own wallet 
as well.” Moreover, he claimed that “a soldier’s memories of Vietnam could include a 
new car or stereo, camera, six days with his wife or fiancée in Hawaii and a solid bank 
account, simply because he didn’t throw his money away on silk jackets that fall apart at 
the seams and coke and beer at 100 piasters a can.”307 Watson’s suggestion here, like the 
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point made in the story of Frugalbean, is that the American GI can and should procure 
big-ticket items and vacations. Framing the epitome of the war experience in consumer 
terms, it was no wonder that the military’s information campaign to convince soldiers to 
heed the economic imperative to reduce piaster spending was full of contradictions. 
Underlying the military’s recommendation to purchase savings bonds and delay the 
gratification of shopping is the military’s belief that the war would end in the near future 
and that soldiers would return home safely to enjoy the rewards of their service.  
CONCLUSION  
 
 Although soldiers’ spending in South Vietnam may not adequately explain the 
severe inflation in the entire country, including in the countryside, the highly visible 
American presence in urban areas perhaps made soldiers prime scapegoats as U.S. 
policymakers strategized to alleviate inflation. In 1966 alone, soldiers spent over 12 
billion piasters in the South Vietnamese economy.308 While American officials during the 
war believed that soldiers’ expenditures were a major cause of inflation, at least one 
economist studying the wartime South Vietnamese economy has argued that soldiers’ 
spending habits only had a slightly inflationary effect on the local economy and that U.S. 
policymakers wildly exaggerated the alarm over soldiers’ purchases.309 Regardless of 
whether soldiers’ consumption was objectively the primary source of inflation in the 
country, perceptions of GI spending in the local economy mattered greatly in the 
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American and Vietnamese public mind and thus shaped the creation of policies. As the 
first chapter illustrates, increases in the cost of services like taxi rides and commodities 
like housing could be directly traceable to the actions of American GIs, who frequently 
paid more for the same services and goods than Vietnamese could afford, thereby raising 
prices. Furthermore, American officials were concerned about these economic 
dislocations taking place in the South Vietnamese public sphere, as the U.S. Information 
Agency kept track of debates criticizing the American presence in daily Vietnamese 
newspapers. Because Vietnamese perceptions of American soldiers and their actions 
figured into the policy calculations of American officials, curbing soldiers’ spending of 
piasters had great symbolic value, even if their consumption, in hindsight, did not 
predominantly account for the high rates of inflation nationally.  
 If fear of violating South Vietnamese sovereignty led American officials to 
implement an economic aid program with harmful side effects on the South Vietnamese 
economy, then concern over soldier morale prompted policymakers to depend on GIs’ 
voluntary efforts, rather than strict spending limits, to curb their piaster expenditures to 
ease inflation. American policymakers at the time were convinced that troop deployment 
produced inflationary pressures on the South Vietnamese economy, but their efforts to 
contain GI consumerism on military bases ultimately fell short. The constant tug and pull 
between saving and spending exhibited in the military’s information campaign generated 
confusing messages to soldiers, particularly as they lived and breathed in an atmosphere 
that promoted consumption at all times. As American officials deemed suggestions such 
as banning piaster purchases above a certain limit and allocating pay directly to savings 
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accounts politically unacceptable, they compromised on an information campaign based 
on personal appeals that would privilege boosting soldier morale, which was necessary 
for the war effort, over launching an all-out effort to halt spending and inflation in South 
Vietnam, which jeopardized the nation’s stability. Moreover, the military’s reliance on 
lighthearted fiction, limericks, and cartoons may have undermined the serious nature of 
inflation.  
 That military authorities depended upon the voluntary cooperation of soldiers to 
execute their piaster reduction program begs the question: why did policymakers place so 
much faith in soldiers to act and behave virtuously? Two reasons stand out to explain the 
military’s reluctance to implement ironclad policies that would more effectively control 
personal spending. The first is a deep commitment to American values of freedom and 
individualism, especially in the context of the Cold War. As historian Lizabeth Cohen 
argues in A Consumer’s Republic, mass consumption in American society after World II 
promised greater freedom, democracy, and equality, as all citizens exercised the right to 
choose how to spend their earnings.310 Moreover, in the global contest between repressive 
communism and democratic capitalism, U.S. policymakers reasonably chose to preserve 
soldiers’ entitlement to spend as much as they want, wherever and whenever they want, 
as citizens of the Free World. Perhaps heralding the 1970s, a decade characterized by 
declining trust in the government and growing faith in the free market and the private 
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sector,311 the military’s decision to rely on soldier’s voluntary compliance with limiting 
piaster spending suggests a strong belief in the values of individualism. In addition, 
military leaders may have found imposing strict discipline on soldiers forced to 
participate in an unpopular war politically untenable.  
 A second reason for military authorities’ confidence in soldier’s willingness to 
spend less is a naïve trust that soldiers will feel obligated to do so because of everything 
the military did for them. In supplying lavish facilities on military bases, military leaders 
believed that soldiers would stay within the boundaries of bases for entertainment instead 
of frequenting local bars, restaurants, and attractions. The expansion of PX consumer 
goods was also intended to direct GI spending toward American-run retail stores, but, of 
course, soldiers continued to buy locally-made goods and consume services provided by 
Vietnamese labor. Indeed, the U.S. military could not and did not provide everything that 
soldiers wanted, most of all the experience of having their emotional and sexual needs 
fulfilled. Some officials assumed that generous salaries from the military would prevent 
soldiers from engaging in vice and illegal activities like currency manipulation and 
prostitution. They could not have been more wrong.  
 The barrier that American officials attempted to create to separate the 
consumption of soldiers from the South Vietnamese economy never materialized in a 
way conducive to the greater war effort. In fact, despite the physical relocation of many 
American troops out of Saigon, constant interactions between American military 
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personnel and Vietnamese locals took place, many of which undermined law and order 
and caused further tensions between leaders in Washington and Saigon. Indeed, reliance 
on individual soldiers’ self-discipline and self-control to have South Vietnamese, 
American, and even their own purported interests at heart proved problematic for 
American foreign policy in Vietnam. The consequences of which the February 1967 
Cavalair article, “The War Cannot Be Won Without Stable Economy,” warned, including 
speculation, war profiteering, and hoarding, became realities at one of the most common 
spaces of American and South Vietnamese encounters: black markets. 
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Chapter Three: Global Currency Manipulation and the “Billion Dollar 
Racket,” 1968-1969 
“With much soul searching and heavy conscious [sic] and after eighteen months 
as a soldier in Vietnam dealing with the black market money exchanging racket in 
Saigon, I feel duty bound to expose the largest black market activities in that country 
where millions of dollars in U.S. and Vietnamese currency are being passed daily,” an 
anonymous soldier divulged to American officials in a letter dated 3 September 1968. 
After “pin-pointing step by step where you are to go to break this racket,” the author 
confessed, “I am giving you this information so that upon my return to Vietnam I will not 
be tempted again to deal with any black market money transactions.” Moreover, he 
admitted, “I did make a lot of money and I am going to pay my taxes with it to ease my 
conscious [sic].” The author acknowledged that black market activities cost the American 
and South Vietnamese governments millions of dollars.312 
 Although American officials urged soldiers to protect both the South Vietnamese 
and U.S. economies and exercise moral restraint with regard to spending piasters and 
dealing in the black market, as the previous chapter demonstrates, letters like the one 
above penned by soldiers demonstrate that American military servicemen participated 
heavily in the currency black market. The opportunities to get rich quick presented 
themselves in numerous ways in South Vietnam and enticed many American soldiers and 
their allied counterparts. From reselling PX merchandise to Vietnamese vendors at higher 
prices to exchanging MPCs for piasters at a more favorable rate at the local money 
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changer, it was not hard to make a quick buck in Vietnam. As one veteran stated, “There 
were official rules about not trading piasters on the black market, which… was a joke 
because everybody did it on the black market.”313 Participating in the black market was 
common during the war because it was financially sensible; it was the soldier who 
knowingly accepted a worse exchange rate who was unusual.  
 The active contributions to the currency black market by American soldiers and 
civilians had ripple effects all the way back to the United States. After some soldiers and 
civilians returned to the United States, they relayed stories of rampant illegal monetary 
transactions from Vietnam. As we shall see, news of financial illegality in Saigon began 
to top headlines with greater frequency, and members of Congress initiated investigations 
into how such shocking amounts of American funds were channeled into the wrong 
hands. At a time of economic woes in the United States, illegal monetary exchanges in 
Vietnam, which created an unknown number of war profiteers, added to growing 
dissatisfaction with the war. Indeed, black market monetary transactions of Americans 
sent to work and fight in Vietnam contributed not only to South Vietnamese inflation, but 
also to inflation in the United States.314 The loss of millions, if not billions, of dollars due 
to capital flight from Vietnam came at the expense of American taxpayers, with grave 
implications for the American balance-of-payments problem.  
 In addition to harming the American economy, the prevalence of the currency 
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black market had severe consequences for South Vietnam as well as the overall war 
effort.315 First, as American and Vietnamese leaders struggled to keep inflation in South 
Vietnam at reasonable levels, illegal monetary transactions worsened inflation levels by 
depreciating the value of the piaster. Wealthy Vietnamese, Americans, and allied 
individuals took advantage of the discrepancy between the official and black market 
exchange rates in order to export hard currency illegally out of Vietnam, negating any 
efforts to develop Vietnam economically for the long-term. Second, the entrenched 
nature of corruption in South Vietnam had damaging effects on the morale of Americans, 
Vietnamese, and their allies. As testimonies from soldiers and civilians illustrate, the 
pervasiveness of black market activities undermined the faith of Americans and 
Vietnamese in their governments. Third, although the hard evidence is difficult to 
produce given the lack of a paper trail in illegal transactions, many American 
policymakers and soldiers and civilians involved in black market transactions alleged that 
some of the profits ended up in Viet Cong hands. 
 The ubiquity of illegal monetary exchanges contributed to an atmosphere of 
corruption in South Vietnam that weakened the state’s legitimacy. This chapter argues 
that currency manipulation in South Vietnam was actually a form of American corruption 
and that economic, political, and diplomatic circumstances of the war made corrupt 
behaviors far more egregious during the American buildup. The diplomatic failure of 
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American officials to shape South Vietnam’s setting of the official exchange rate allowed 
South Vietnam to overvalue the piaster at the cost of American taxpayers. Combined with 
the structural economic problems produced by the war, such as inflation, the favorable 
exchange rate intensified corruption among South Vietnamese officials to a degree never 
witnessed before. Through currency manipulation, some of the highest-ranked South 
Vietnamese officials were able to abuse their public office to stash away fortunes in 
foreign bank accounts, a fact widely known among the Vietnamese population. The 
corruption of government officials at all levels and the free-for-all economic environment 
of South Vietnam’s urban areas, demonstrated in the second chapter, dissolved loyalty to 
the state.   
Contrary to the belief among some that corruption was beneficial to 
underdeveloped countries, corruption in South Vietnam tore away at the trust necessary 
to build a legitimate government. Several scholars, including social scientists like Samuel 
Huntington and Nathaniel Leff, argued in the 1960s that corruption helped grease the 
wheels for underdeveloped societies to function and that it even encouraged economic 
growth.316 They maintained that in modernizing countries without a strong rule of law, 
corruption allowed people to bypass inefficient laws to accomplish productive tasks. 
Although other scholars have refuted their arguments since then, the view that corruption 
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was advantageous for South Vietnam still persists.317 As I show in this chapter, 
corruption in South Vietnam during the war went beyond simply “greasing the wheel.” 
Currency manipulation and capital flight reflected pessimism in the possibility of an 
independent South Vietnam. Those who funneled their money abroad chose not to invest 
in the long-term economic development of South Vietnam. Although it is arguable that 
uncertainty of the war’s progress caused people to lose their faith in their currency, 
American economic policies produced their own set of incentives that encouraged capital 
flight, contributing to economy’s eventual collapse.  
Examining how corruption was exacerbated during the war is crucial to 
understanding why the United States lost the war in Vietnam. Corruption was often 
claimed to be one of the key factors leading to the downfall of South Vietnam. According 
to a report based on extensive oral and written statements by twenty-seven former high-
ranking South Vietnamese military and civilian leaders on the reasons for South 
Vietnam’s defeat, corruption was a “fundamental ill that was largely responsible for the 
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ultimate collapse of South Vietnam.”318 Indeed, South Vietnamese leaders admitted that 
corruption was degrading the nation, with one official calling corruption “the national 
cancer.”319 On the American side, the USAID, the agency tasked with administering 
economic aid to South Vietnam, concluded in its final report of the aid program, “There 
is little question that corruption…was a critical factor in the deterioration of national 
morale which led ultimately to defeat.”320 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the war’s escalation until early 1968, 
when the Tet Offensive became a major turning point in the war and forced Lyndon 
Johnson and his administration to reevaluate American strategy in Vietnam. The fallout 
of the Tet Offensive and its portrayal in the U.S. media gave further credence to the 
arguments advanced by antiwar Americans, including criticisms focused on the 
corruption of the South Vietnamese government. Then as now, however, discussion of 
South Vietnamese corruption was often in general terms.321 To provide more specificity 
to the problem of corruption, this chapter turns to an examination of currency 
manipulation as an economically destructive example of corruption that had serious 
implications for the stability of the South Vietnamese state. This chapter provides a 
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description of how currency manipulation worked in wartime South Vietnam and the 
diverse set of actors involved in sustaining the enterprise. Although many critics of the 
war cited the corruption of South Vietnam in their arguments for American withdrawal, 
currency manipulation was a form of corruption that involved the participation of a 
significant number of Americans. In fact, without the direct contributions of American 
soldiers and civilians, the magnitude of illegal economic transactions would not have 
existed as it did. This chapter uses congressional hearings to shed light on the reasons 
why currency manipulation operated often with impunity.  
Although senators investigated American corruption in the management of 
military clubs in Vietnam alongside illegal currency manipulation, this chapter focuses 
narrowly on currency manipulation because of its effects on weakening the South 
Vietnamese state. This chapter does not focus on other kinds of corruption within the 
government, military, and the business community. Corruption in government included 
embezzlement by government officials, nepotism in leadership positions, and requiring 
bribes to process everyday paperwork. Within the military, corruption included falsifying 
military records to collect money for “ghost soldiers” who deserted or were killed, and 
bribing for false discharge.322 In the business community, for example, “paper importers” 
took advantage of the American economic aid program by generating false invoices.323 
While these forms of South Vietnamese corruption contributed to undermining the 
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country’s legitimacy, I focus on currency manipulation as an important form of 
corruption because it was often the final mechanism by which government officials and 
wealthy South Vietnamese were able to secure their private gains. Inflationary piasters 
derived from bribery, graft, and embezzlement, as we shall see, were transformed 
illegally into safe and stable American dollars through currency manipulation.  
THE TET OFFENSIVE AND WAR DISILLUSIONMENT 
 
 Although the American war effort continued to expand and the number of 
American troops gradually increased into 1968, a combination of events and trends that 
year would contribute to ending American escalation. In the early hours of Tet, the 
Vietnamese lunar new year, on 30 January 1968, NLF forces launched offensive attacks 
on major urban areas all throughout South Vietnam, including Hue, Da Nang, Qui Nhon, 
Nha Trang, and Saigon. Masterminded by communist leaders in Hanoi, the Tet Offensive 
aimed to inspire uprisings among local populations below the seventeenth parallel in 
order to overthrow the Saigon regime and establish the NLF as the rightful leaders of 
South Vietnam. The onslaught, which occurred during a holiday truce, caught American 
and South Vietnamese military leaders, who did not believe that the communists had the 
capacity to execute such an offensive, by surprise. Within a few days, however, 
American and South Vietnamese forces regained control of most urban territories seized 
by the NLF, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy and crippling the NLF’s political 
and military infrastructure. Hanoi’s goal to spark a revolution in the South failed to 
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materialize.324 
 Although the Tet Offensive was a military victory for the United States and South 
Vietnam, media coverage of the event in the United States rendered the NLF’s campaign 
a strategic defeat for Americans and their allies. Shock waves of the Tet Offensive 
reverberated to the United States, where televised accounts portrayed the assault as 
indicative of a war that would require significantly greater costs than expected. 
Television and newspaper commentators, many of whom had long opposed Vietnam war 
policy, interpreted the Tet Offensive as proof of an unwinnable war. Reports and images 
of the bloody fighting after Tet suggested to American viewers that the Johnson 
administration was delusional to believe victory was imminent in Vietnam. Although the 
Tet Offensive did not sharply turn American public opinion against the war, it 
nonetheless contributed to the gradual decline in support for the conflict that began in 
earnest in 1967.325 
  The Tet Offensive provided an opportune moment for reevaluation of the war 
among Johnson administration officials. Indeed, previous debates between military and 
civilian leaders over increasing or decreasing the number of American troops in Vietnam 
were resurrected in 1968. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, American military 
leaders, particularly Westmoreland, held tightly to the belief that an expansion of the 
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number of American troops would bring victory, while Defense Department officials like 
McNamara voiced great concern about troop escalation. After the Tet attacks began, 
Westmoreland requested an additional 206,000 American troops be deployed to Vietnam. 
Johnson’s new secretary of defense, Clark Clifford, who had commissioned a high-level 
review of Vietnam policy, pushed back against military proposals and recommended a 
more limited immediate deployment of 22,000 troops, along with increased pressure on 
Thieu and Ky to expand the South Vietnamese’s role in fighting. Foreshadowing the 
policy of “Vietnamization” the Nixon administration would implement in 1969, Johnson 
accepted Clifford’s recommendation to send fewer American troops and force South 
Vietnamese leaders to increase their armed forces and take more responsibility for the 
war.326  
 Although Johnson, in private, decided against the military’s drastic proposal in 
favor of Clifford’s modest plan, public revelations of Westmoreland’s request intensified 
dissatisfaction with the war’s progress both in policy circles and in the American public. 
When the New York Times published Westmoreland’s request, both hawks and doves in 
Congress expressed strong disapproval and demanded close congressional involvement in 
any decision-making to further escalate the war. Media critics also questioned why more 
troops were needed and whether such an expansion would even make a difference in the 
conflict. In public opinion polls, although support for the war remained around 45 percent 
until March 1968, approval of Johnson’s handling of the war sank to an all-time low of 
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26 percent during Tet.327 Widespread disillusionment among policymakers and the 
general population alike signaled pessimism about the war’s success and created an 
increasingly antagonistic atmosphere for any possibility of troop escalation.  
 In addition to public discontent with the war, the specter of American and global 
financial instability altered conversations about the future of U.S. post-Tet war strategy in 
Vietnam. By 1968, the financial burdens of waging war weighed heavily on the 
American economy. Costing as much as $3.6 billion per year, the war in Vietnam 
contributed to a deteriorating balance-of-payments deficit and weakened the American 
dollar in the international market.328 By late 1967, America’s costly spending on the war 
and subsequent inflation in the United States stoked fears among foreign banks holding 
dollars that their greenbacks could become worthless. Growing American deficits 
precipitated a drain of gold reserves in the United States, as foreign banks exchanged 
dollars for gold in the event that the United States could not guarantee convertibility 
established under the Bretton Woods monetary system. Periodic runs on gold gradually 
accelerated to the point that the United States lost $372 million in gold on March 14, 
1968.329 The dollar’s stability was so threatened that, at the behest of Washington, the 
London gold market closed. The gold crisis of March 1968, which Time magazine called 
“the largest gold rush in history” that “threatened the Western world,” began a period of 
economic woes that influenced decision-making over important policies, including, 
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ironically, those regarding Vietnam.330 The economic crisis of 1968, though often 
overshadowed by other defining moments of that tumultuous year, played an important 
role in restraining the war’s expansion in Vietnam, as policymakers grew skeptical about 
the sustainability of U.S. troop deployments.331  
 Indeed, the economic consequences of waging war in Vietnam would have a 
boomerang effect on American decision-making on war policy; the gold crisis of 1968, in 
large part the result of Vietnam spending, ended up capping American escalation. 
Westmoreland’s request for more soldiers after Tet, much like his previous requests in 
1967, had economic implications, though this time around, American policymakers 
focused more on the immediate impact of increased numbers of troops on the American 
economy instead of on the South Vietnamese economy. Secretary of the Treasury Henry 
Fowler cautioned that Westmoreland’s recommendations would incur $2.5 billion in 
costs in 1968 and $10 billion in 1969, contributing $500 million to the American balance-
of-payments deficit. Additionally, the massive spending required to fight a war overseas 
while funding various Great Society programs could no longer continue without major 
cutbacks. Westmoreland’s plan, Fowler argued, would require a major tax increase and 
retrenchment of domestic programs.332 Concerns about America’s global economic 
standing thus figured into decisions about its commitment to South Vietnam.  
 The combination of economic, political, and military developments in early 1968 
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prompted Johnson to deliver a landmark televised speech on 31 March in which he 
announced plans for de-escalation of the war. Johnson declared that 13,500 additional 
soldiers would be sent to Vietnam and requested that Congress approve a tax increase to 
finance the deployment. Revealing a shift in policy, the president announced that the 
United States was ready to negotiate toward peace. To that end, he announced the 
cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam, except for the area north of the demilitarized 
zone, and the appointment of W. Averell Harriman as chief negotiator in any peace talks 
that evolved. Perhaps most striking, Johnson stated that he would neither seek nor accept 
his party’s nomination for a second term in office in order to focus all his energies on 
ending the war.333 The president and his closest advisers, however, did not give up their 
goal of preserving an independent, anti-communist South Vietnam. This unyielding 
refusal to let South Vietnam fall to communism would force a standoff between the 
United States and North Vietnam both at the negotiating table and on the battlefield for 
the next few years.  
 Although Johnson reversed the trend toward greater American intervention in 
Vietnam, his plans for de-escalation did not mollify critics of the war; in fact, antiwar 
critics became even more vocal in staging protests to end American involvement. 
Opposition to the war among pacifist and New Left organizations began even before 
American escalation, but the antiwar movement grew after 1965, capturing a diverse 
group of people, including, for example, hippies, students, draftees, and civil rights 
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leaders, who opposed the war for different reason.334 By 1967, prominent individuals 
such as Martin Luther King Jr. and Muhammad Ali expressed their opposition to the war. 
Meanwhile, Vietnam Veterans Against the War emerged as a new antiwar organization. 
By the summer of 1968, two thirds of Americans were in favor of “de-Americanization” 
of the war, which would gradually shift the burden of fighting to the South Vietnamese 
forces and simultaneously reduce American troops proportionately.335 In October 1968, 
one of the largest antiwar demonstrations to date consisted of around 100,000 protesters 
who gathered in the nation’s capitol, half of whom marched to the Pentagon. The 
heightened level of antiwar activism that year entered the presidential campaign process 
as well, as Democratic candidates argued for complete withdrawal of troops from 
Vietnam.  
SOUTH VIETNAMESE CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE 
 
 In this context of military and diplomatic stalemate and economic crisis in 1968, 
the corruption of the South Vietnamese regime became a primary focus of antiwar 
criticism. Those who opposed the war argued that rampant corruption in Vietnam was 
indicative of a hopeless political situation in South Vietnam and that it was simply not 
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worth the costs for the United States to continue supporting an undemocratic and 
unpopular government lacking morally upright leaders. At the root of this line of 
reasoning was a belief that corruption was so entrenched in South Vietnamese society 
that there was nothing the United States could do to make the country and its leaders less 
corrupt. For antiwar critics, the reasonable conclusion, therefore, was that the United 
States should disengage from the conflict.  
 American politicians—the most vocal of whom was perhaps Senator Edward 
Kennedy—cited the corruption of the South Vietnamese regime as a strong reason to 
withdraw from the war. In January 1968, Kennedy claimed that half of the $30 million in 
relief funds intended for refugees produced by the Tet Offensive found its way into the 
pockets of South Vietnamese government officials. In front of an audience at the World 
Affairs Council of Boston, he asserted that in South Vietnam, police accept bribes, 
“officials and their wives run operations in the black market. Aid funds and hospital 
supplies are diverted into private pockets. Army vehicles are used for private purposes, 
supplies disappear and show up in the bootleg stores on the street.”336 Kennedy urged “a 
confrontation between our Government and the Government of South Vietnam on the 
entire question of corruption, inefficiency, waste of American resources and the future of 
the ‘other war’”337 Referring to the “other war” to win the hearts and minds of South 
Vietnamese for building a stable government, Kennedy suggested that the government on 
whose behalf the United States fought did not have the trust of its own citizens.  
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 Antiwar candidates in the Democratic Party, too, spoke about South Vietnamese 
corruption as a sign that the country was not worth defending. At the 1968 Democratic 
National Convention, the scene of violent clashes between police and protesters, Eugene 
McCarthy and George McGovern outlined their antiwar platform. Arguing for limited 
military interventions abroad, they concluded, “We are…resolved to have no more 
Vietnams…We shall…[not] lend our support to corrupt oppressive regimes unwilling to 
work for essential reforms and lacking the consent of the governed.”338 Likewise, Senator 
Robert F. Kennedy often invoked the corruption of South Vietnam as one of his main 
critiques of American involvement. In a lecture at Kansas State University in March 
1968, Kennedy asserted that, despite promises by the Johnson administration to curb 
South Vietnamese corruption, the problem continued, “debilitating South Vietnam and 
crippling our effort to help its people.” Moreover, he claimed, “pervasive corruption of 
the Government of Vietnam…[was] a significant cause of the prolongation of the war 
and the continued American casualties.” South Vietnamese purchased draft deferments 
and refused to fight, while Americans died on their behalf, he maintained. Citing the 
findings of Senate and House investigations, Kennedy stated that South Vietnamese 
officials pocketed American aid funds, smuggled gold and opium into the country, and 
bought and sold government posts.339 These charges of a corrupt Saigon regime 
suggested that the country was not worth American sacrifices of blood and treasure.    
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 Indeed, as the war progressed and stories of corruption in South Vietnam 
multiplied, members of Congress began to investigate certain forms of corruption that 
involved the siphoning of American funds. Since the early days of American escalation in 
Vietnam, congressional leaders played important roles in challenging Johnson’s policies 
in Vietnam.340 Hearings conducted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, led by 
Senator J. William Fulbright from 1966 to 1971, for example, questioned the motives and 
conduct of America’s military policy in Vietnam. Like the Fulbright hearings that gave 
legitimacy to the arguments of antiwar critics outside of government, congressional 
investigations into abuses of economic aid also lent more credibility to opponents of 
American intervention in Vietnam. In 1966, the House Government Operations 
Committee chaired by Representative John E. Moss (D-CA) found that mismanagement 
of American economic aid enabled graft, corruption, and black marketing to flourish in 
South Vietnam and the diversion of supplies to benefit the NLF.341 By 1968, Senator 
Abraham A. Ribicoff (D-CT), after returning from a tour of Southeast Asia, concluded 
that millions of dollars were being “squandered because of inefficiency, dishonesty, 
corruption and foolishness” in Vietnam.342 He urged a broad Congressional investigation 
of American programs in Vietnam.  
In addition to corruption involving the administration of American economic aid, 
the corruption of Americans in Vietnam became the subject of congressional 
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investigations in 1969. Members of congress confirmed that not only South Vietnamese 
but also Americans benefited from illicit practices in Vietnam that harmed the U.S. 
economy. That year, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on 
Government Operations, chaired by Senator John L. McClellan (D-AR), published a 
report based on investigations in the two previous years revealing widespread abuse in 
the Commercial Import Program, including “kickbacks” to American companies.343 By 
August 1969, the U.S. Army began an investigation of illicit practices within official and 
noncommissioned officer clubs in Europe and South Vietnam.344 By late 1969, 
congressional hearings revealed to the American public the far-reaching consequences of 
the currency black market in South Vietnam for the United States: that millions of 
American taxpayer dollars went straight to the bank accounts of Americans, Vietnamese, 
and citizens of other nationalities.  
THE OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE AND CURRENCY MANIPULATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM 
 
 Long before American combat troops arrived in South Vietnam, Vietnamese and 
foreigners alike profited from war through currency manipulation, which was predicated 
upon the existence of an official exchange rate and a black market exchange rate. During 
the French occupation of Indochina, entrepreneurial French and Vietnamese participated 
in the “traffic of the piaster” by using legal and illegal means of converting currency to 
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make enormous profits in what historian Joseph Buttinger has called “the greatest 
financial scandal in the entire history of colonial Indochina.”345 Many French and 
Vietnamese started with a sum of piasters to exchange for francs at the official but highly 
overvalued rate of one piaster to 17 francs. With those francs, they then obtained piasters 
at their real, low market value of 7 of 8 francs by importing goods into Indochina or 
illegally by converting francs into dollars and then purchasing discounted piasters on the 
black market. As Buttinger wrote, these monetary operations went on long enough to 
“produce quite a number of new French and Vietnamese multimillionaires, at the expense 
of the French treasury.”346 The cost of piaster trafficking to France was significant; 
reports estimated losses at 500 million francs daily.347 This had serious consequences for 
the French economy as well as the course of the war, as many French critics alleged that 
dollars sold in Saigon ended up helping the Viet Minh purchase the weapons used against 
the French.348 A little over a decade later, critics of U.S. involvement in Vietnam would 
level similar criticisms against the American government’s contributions to currency 
manipulation.  
 The illegal currency transactions that occurred under the French continued as the 
United States assumed the role of providing financial support to the Republic of Vietnam 
in 1955. In 1955 the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) adopted the 
rate of 35 piasters to one dollar as the basis for its economic aid program to the newly-
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established Republic of Vietnam.349 Indeed, when the United States became South 
Vietnam’s benefactor, the primary goal was to “plug the financial gap” created after the 
French departed, particularly because the new government required a substantial amount 
of funds to sustain a large native security force previously provided by the French.350 
After 1955, a set of different exchange rates evolved for various kinds of transactions 
between Americans and Vietnamese. As was the case during French colonization, 
Vietnamese piasters yielded low value in the international market but were valued 
artificially high by American policymakers, who took concerns of price stability, 
inflation, and living standards into account when determining the foreign exchange 
rate.351 Because the piaster continued to be overvalued, anyone interested in protecting 
his or her wealth thus had great financial incentive to convert piasters into American 
dollars.  
 As the military, political, and economic circumstances of South Vietnam 
unraveled, however, American officials grew concerned about the overvalued official 
exchange rate. Indeed, the discrepancy between an official and a black market exchange 
rate for conversion between American dollars and Vietnamese piasters had plagued 
relations between Washington and Saigon. Because the setting of the exchange rate fell 
within South Vietnamese jurisdiction, American policymakers could not single-handedly 
determine what the piaster was worth on the international market. Instead, American 
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officials consistently pressured Ngo Dinh Diem to devalue the piaster in order to bring 
the wildly profitable exchange rate to a more realistic exchange rate that reflected actual 
demand for the Vietnamese piaster. Members of Congress, too, focused on what they 
called an “inequitable rate of exchange” and argued that devaluation was necessary to 
further prevent millions of American aid dollars from being wasted in South Vietnam. 
Diem, however, repeatedly refused devaluation. In his view, the “very possibility of 
devaluation would create a panic in Viet-Nam.” Moreover, he stated that devaluation was 
“possible only for a country with a very high level of production.” In the case of South 
Vietnam, which relied to a great extent on imported goods, Diem asserted that 
devaluation would raise the prices of imported commodities considerably.352  
 By 1966, members of Congress set out to investigate the American military and 
economic assistance programs in Vietnam and the role of the exchange rate in the 
efficiency of American aid. That year, the House Committee on Government Operations 
authored the first comprehensive report of the American economic aid program in South 
Vietnam. In its report, committee members wrote that, “there are really three wars raging 
in Vietnam. The military war, a political war, and an economic war. Without victory in 
the last, success in the other two would be meaningless.”353 More specifically, they 
contended that the exchange rate for CIP commodities “was unrealistic; was conducive to 
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speculation, windfall profits and corruption; was feeding rather than curbing inflation; 
and was depriving the United States of maximum benefit from its assistance programs.” 
At the time of the congressional investigation, an exchange rate of 60 piasters to one 
dollar was established for imports financed by USAID, 73.5 piasters to one dollar for 
GVN transactions, and 118 piasters to one dollar, the so-called accommodation rate, for 
transactions by American personnel. Investigations into the corruption resulting from the 
inequitable exchange rate led Secretary of State Dean Rusk to acknowledge that some of 
the American aid to Vietnam was “pocketed by corrupt officials of both governments.”354  
 After 1966, South Vietnamese leaders would not devalue the piaster again until 
1970. Nguyen Cao Ky devalued the official exchange rate to 118 piasters to one dollar in 
1966, which was wildly unpopular amongst the South Vietnamese population. American 
officials suspected that Ky suffered politically as a result of the devaluation. Thieu, like 
his predecessors, had strong reasons to resist devaluation of the piaster. Devaluation of 
currency had not just economic ramifications but political consequences as well. First, 
devaluation could worsen inflation, as prices of commodities would increase while wages 
would remain stagnant. For South Vietnam, devaluation also meant receiving less 
American economic and military aid. Since the United States overpaid South Vietnam in 
economic assistance, devaluing the piaster would mean that South Vietnam would 
receive much less aid. Second, devaluation conveyed to citizens that their nation’s 
currency was growing weaker and valued less. A formal devaluation of the piaster, in 
                                                
354 Felix Belaire, Jr., “Concedes Black Market Involves Americans and Vietnamese,” New York Times, 27 
January 1966. 
 200 
addition to the unstable military and political environment, would thus further diminish 
the confidence of South Vietnamese in the country.  
 American officials’ inability to influence the actions and policies of South 
Vietnamese government officials thus partially explains the prevalence of currency 
manipulation during the war. As The Asia Letter, self-described as “an authoritative 
analysis of Asian affairs,” expressed in 1970, “Nothing better illustrates just how little 
influence the United States has over the internal, non-military affairs of South Vietnam 
than that country’s refusal to devalue the piastre.”355 Indeed, the political leverage of 
South Vietnamese government officials over their American counterparts on the issue of 
the exchange rate helped create the financial discrepancy between the official and black 
market rate that enabled many Vietnamese and foreigners to make substantial profits out 
of thin air.   
THE FUNCTIONING OF CURRENCY MANIPULATION 
 
Currency manipulations expanded to even greater scales after American 
escalation. The arrival of American troops to Vietnam added inflationary pressures to the 
South Vietnamese economy, and American officials attempted to attenuate the 
inflationary impact through several methods, including appealing to soldiers to conserve 
their spending of piasters, as discussed in the previous chapter. Even the introduction of 
MPCs did not, however, stop American military personnel and civilian employees from 
bringing greenbacks into the country by traveling through other Southeast Asian 
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countries. Dollar instruments such as travelers’ checks and postal money orders were the 
legal means by which Americans could send money back to the United States. These 
legal currencies also became conduits for illegal monetary transactions, as Americans, 
Vietnamese, and Free World personnel aimed to transfer their wealth from the shaky and 
unstable Vietnamese piaster to the world’s reserve currency. A money order or check 
with no designated recipient name, for example, was highly prized among Vietnamese, 
Americans, and anyone else interested in storing their money in a foreign bank account. 
On the contrary, Vietnamese citizens consistently devalued their own currency on the 
black market in hopes of acquiring American dollars. Besides hard currency, small, 
valuable, and transferable objects that could easily guarantee convertibility to dollars, like 
gold, diamonds, and even fur, were equally desirable among those who sought to 
safeguard their wealth outside of Vietnam. Particularly for wealthy Vietnamese citizens, 
the preference for dollars over piasters reflected a concern for the military situation and 
an unsteady faith in the stability of the South Vietnamese economy. Many upper-class 
Vietnamese and senior government officials converted their wealth into hard currency 
that could be stored safely abroad in foreign bank accounts. 
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Figure 16. “The Currency Black Market Cycle” 356  
 
 A chart titled “The Currency Black Market Cycle” [Figure 16] indicated the 
various ways in which American GIs, Free World forces, American civilians, contractor 
employees, black market moneychangers, communists, and local service employees 
contributed to the currency black market. At the center of the chart, the black market 
moneychanger acts as the central conduit through which different currencies and 
commodities flow. The profits for the participants in this cycle came at the expense of 
American taxpayers. On the left of side of the chart, the black money changer could give 
piasters exchanged at a favorable rate to American soldiers, their Free World 
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counterparts, and civilian contractor employees, who could use those piasters to purchase 
commodities, MPCs, and American dollars to funnel back to the money changer. As 
holders of MPCs, they could also pay Vietnamese vendors of local services, including bar 
girls, cab drivers, and street peddlers in that currency, which many military and civilian 
personnel did despite laws prohibiting them from using MPCs to pay Vietnamese. Local 
collection agents then collected MPCs from Vietnamese vendors and employees and 
exchanged them with the black market moneychanger at a profit. The moneychanger 
could also trade MPCs with American GIs and civilians, who could use them to buy 
goods and dollar instruments to be filtered through the moneychanger again.  
 In addition to benefiting various individuals, the currency black market, as 
understood by American government officials, also appeared to support communists. On 
the right side of the chart, the black market moneychanger supplied commodities and 
American dollars, most likely in the form of dollar instruments, to “local profiteers and 
communists.” The assumption was that communists would be able to purchase goods in 
the black market and resell them for piaster profits. The ability of communists to earn 
American dollars, according to this chart, also suggests they used the money to purchase 
ammunition. Indeed, in 1966 David E. Bell, a foreign aid administrator, stated, “There is 
a black market and the Vietcong is playing it to the hilt.”357 Moreover, as the chart 
implies, the profits generated from currency black marketing could be used to make more 
money as long as American economic aid was forthcoming.  
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Although there were many variations on how individuals and corporations could 
illegally exchange currency for a profit, the basic premise involved taking advantage of 
the black market exchange rate for Vietnamese piasters. For example, instead of 
exchanging dollars or MPCs at the official rate of one dollar to 118 piasters, an American 
soldier or civilian could go to one of the money changers at the book stores on Tu Do 
street in Saigon to acquire between 160-200 piasters per dollar or MPC.358 By October 
1969, one could acquire almost 240 piasters per dollar on the black market.359 On an 
individual scale, exchanging money on the black market appeared like a harmless 
transaction that was a win-win for both parties involved. On a grander scale, however, the 
participation of numerous individuals and organizations in currency fraud facilitated 
widespread capital flight that was destructive for South Vietnam’s already weak 
economy.  
 An expose on black market currency manipulation in the 1 August 1969 issue of 
Life Magazine described how easily someone could make a quick fortune in Vietnam and 
repeat the cycle indefinitely. Testifying in March 1969 before the Senate’s Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, Cornelius Hawkridge, one of the most outspoken critics 
of black market activities, explained how he brought $1,000 into one of the bookstores on 
Tu Do street in Saigon in exchange for $1,600 in MPCs from an Indian money changer. 
He then bought $1,600 worth of traveler’s checks at the Chase Manhattan branch bank 
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and returned to the bookstore, where the moneychanger gave him $2,560 in MPCs for the 
traveler’s checks. He subsequently took the $2,560 in MPCS to the Chase Manhattan 
bank to purchase the equivalent amount in traveler’s checks, handed the checks to the 
moneychanger, and received $4,096 in MPCs. This cycle could potentially last forever, 
but Hawkridge stated, “I was so nervous I thought I was going to collapse, so I just quit 
with a $3,096 profit.”360 
 Hawkridge demonstrated that there were many other ways to double one’s money 
in MPCs, including ordering the purchase of a car and then canceling the order. He 
described that any enterprising American could order a GM or Ford automobile for 
stateside delivery. To use himself as an example, he placed an order for a Buick that cost 
approximately $5,000, although he only spent $2,500 because of the black market. A few 
days later, he notified the GM office in New York that he would like to cancel the order 
and asked the company to deposit the $5,000 in his checking account in the United 
States. As the magazine noted, Hawkridge made a $2,500 profit; plus his original funds 
were safely stored in his bank account.361 Hawkridge admitted to journalist James 
Hamilton-Patterson, “the whole system of Military Payment Certificates was carte 
blanche for the world’s money-changers. It provided a convenient vehicle for 
manipulation and the loser was always the United States; more specifically, the American 
taxpayer….”362 Hawkridge’s perspectives on the implications of currency manipulation 
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for everyday Americans would hit closer to home once reports of currency fraud began to 
gain widespread media attention in the United States.  
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS IN 1969    
 
 Although members of Congress had looked into allegations of fraud and 
misconduct with regard to the black market in South Vietnam before 1969, Congressional 
hearings in November that year revealing that the black market in Vietnam was a “billion 
dollar racket” topped headlines around the nation. As stories of black marketing and 
currency manipulation like Hawkridge’s came back with soldiers and civilians to the 
United States, a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Government Operations 
began investigations into a variety of fraudulent and corrupt activities involving the 
American government in South Vietnam. Picking up after previous investigations and 
hearings about illicit activities in Vietnam,363 the Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations aimed to uncover information about “the use of non-appropriated funds on 
military installations, conflicts of interest in the club systems, illegal traffic in weapons 
and munitions, irregularities in the PX system, and illegal currency manipulation in South 
Vietnam and other areas.”364 The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, authorized 
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under Senate Resolution 26 on 17 February 1969, and by the Government Operations 
Committee on 23 September 1969, to conduct hearings on these topics, was formally 
under the chairmanship of McClellan, but Ribicoff served as acting chair. The 
subcommittee also comprised Henry M. Jackson (D-WA), Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (D-NC), Lee 
Metcalf (D-MT), Karl E. Mundt (R-SD), Jacob K. Javits (R-NY), Charles H. Percy (R-
IL), and Edward J. Gurney (R-FL).365 After eight months of investigations that brought 
committee staff members to South Vietnam, other parts of Southeast Asia, and many 
American cities, the subcommittee began hearings on 30 September 1969. These 
congressional hearings included the testimonies of various government officials, 
economists, and participants in the black market.  
Hearings on currency manipulation in South Vietnam demonstrated to the 
subcommittee and the American public the gravity of the problem. Testifying before the 
subcommittee on 18 November 1969, Robert Parker, chairman of the Irregular Practices 
Committee, stated in his opening statement:  
Black marketeers and illicit money changers have a built a billion dollar racket in 
Vietnam. In Saigon and other cities, they create an atmosphere of illegality and 
fraud, immorality and cynicism. Black marketeers and money manipulators give 
aid and comfort to the enemy. Their activities make the Vietnamese economy 
more unstable and subvert efforts to establish economic stability to Vietnam. 
They undermine what we are trying to achieve in Vietnam.366  
 
Parker was perhaps the highest-ranked American official to publicly acknowledge the 
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severity of the black market problem. As he acknowledged, black marketing tore away at 
morale, disrupted American efforts to fight South Vietnamese inflation, and contributed 
financially and psychologically to the cause of communists. Parker argued that this 
“billion dollar racket” could very well result in a South Vietnamese collapse and 
American defeat.  
 During his testimony, Parker provided a vivid example of how currency 
manipulation involving MPCs operated, which illustrated the diverse number of groups 
and individuals involved.367 The story went as follows: Joe was an American authorized 
to use MPCs; Jimmy, like Joe, could use MPCs but also had contacts with the post office 
and with moneychangers; Susie, a Vietnamese national, accepted MPCs as payment for 
services she provided; Mohamed, an Indian national, bought and sold piasters; Hindu, 
also an Indian national, dealt piasters wholesale; and Hangsengbank was one of the many 
banks located in Hong Kong. The chain of transactions began when Joe paid Susie, who 
could work as a maid, bar girl, prostitute, or any number of other occupations, in MPCs 
for services rendered. Susie, not authorized to use or spend MPCs, willingly took a slight 
discount on her services to receive MPCs. She made up for the loss and more, however, 
by taking her MPCs to Mohamed, who gave her 160 piasters per MPC instead of 118 
piasters at the legal conversion rate. Mohamed, who knew that Jimmy had connections 
with the post office, paid Jimmy 170 piasters per MPC, so that Jimmy could take the 
MPCs and purchase U.S. postal money orders. Mohamed, now possessing money orders, 
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sold them to Hindu, the wholesaler, for 180 piasters, thereby making a 10 piaster per 
MPC profit. Hindu deposited the money orders in Hangsengbank and sought cable 
transfers, which indicated American dollars deposited in a bank outside of Vietnam, from 
anyone who would like to safely stash his or her money in a foreign bank account for 
more than 180 piasters per dollar.368 Although there were many variations on how 
individuals and corporations could illegally exchange currency for a profit, the basic 
premise involved taking advantage of the black market exchange rate for Vietnamese 
piasters. 
All the participants were winners in this story. Joe received his services at a minor 
discount; Susie got more piasters for accepting MPCs; Jimmy made a profit from selling 
those MPCs; Mohamed and Hindu both profited from selling money orders and dollars, 
respectively; and Hangsengbank earned a commission from the bank deposits. Finally, 
the person who wished to convert piasters to a more stable currency had his dollars 
securely stowed in a foreign bank. The losers in this situation, as members of the 
subcommittee surmised, were the Vietnamese government and American taxpayers. The 
Vietnamese government lost hard currency as a result of these currency manipulations, 
while Americans had to send more aid to compensate for diminishing hard currency in 
Vietnam.369 Perhaps the most important figure who made the system work in this 
hypothetical story was Jimmy, who as an authorized American in Vietnam was able to 
exchange MPCs into postal money orders. Without this crucial step converting previous 
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exchanges into American dollars, the export of American dollars to bank accounts 
outside of Vietnam would not have been possible. As the story demonstrates, although 
currency manipulation was not necessary for capital flight, the ability to profit on 
currency exchanges by a multitude of individuals and corporations made the process of 
taking funds out of Vietnam more financially attractive for the person at the end of the 
chain. In other words, the person looking to possess dollars paid less for the export of his 
money, because Hindu was able to make a profit from the exchange. At each step of this 
transaction chain for capital flight, then, the cost of each middleman was borne by the 
American treasury. 
 As the hearings revealed, the roles played by banks around the world, including in 
the United States, in currency manipulation were crucial to the flight of capital away 
from Vietnam. Carmine S. Bellino, an accountant-investigator for the Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, identified thirteen bank accounts in the United States 
and in Hong Kong that held black market funds from Vietnam. These accounts, which 
were only a few of the many that existed around the world, received deposits totaling 
around $375 million in fewer than five years, thus averaging about $75 million in 
deposits each year.370 The most egregious cases of currency manipulation, however, 
involved the Prysumeen Account in the Manufacturers Hanover Trust Bank in New 
York. According to Bellino, the account belonged to a smuggler and black marketeer 
from India named B.S.A Rahman, a trader in precious metals and stones, motion picture 
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producer, and wire and rope manufacturer.371 Born in 1929, Rahman controlled Baker & 
Co. and the Precious Trading Co., and managed a group of Indian nationals involved with 
illegal monetary transactions and the smuggling of gold, diamonds and other valuable 
stones and metals. Since 1957, Rahman and his associates held accounts at Manufacturers 
Hanover Trust Bank. When Rahman’s associates requested to have a secret numbered 
account with the bank in 1963, the bank replied that while they could not approve a 
numbered account, they could approve a coded account. At the suggestion of an assistant 
secretary at the bank, who came up with the code-name Prysumeen, Rahman’s black 
market account was born in 1963.372   
 The amount of dollars deposited and withdrawn from the Prysumeen account was 
staggering, but the destination of dollars was also revealing about the transnational 
reaches of the currency black market in Vietnam. As Bellino testified, during the four 
years from mid-1965 to early 1969 when the Prysumeen account was closed, deposits in 
the account totaled $51 million, with about 45 percent of these funds originating from 
sources in Vietnam or other parts of Asia. During the same time frame, $42 million, or 
about 82 percent, was withdrawn from the account and sent to accounts in the Middle 
East. More specifically, the funds went to the seaport city of Dubai on the Persian Gulf. 
Through accounts like Prysumeen in the United States, large sums of money were 
channeled all over the globe to locations where gold could be purchased legally. As 
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Bellino explained, “the banks in Dubai do business in gold.” Gold smuggling was 
rampant there, with gold hoarders paying around $70 per ounce and even as much as $85 
per ounce, when the official price per ounce of gold established by the U.S. government 
was $35.373 According to Parker’s testimony, Indian moneychangers then smuggled gold 
or diamonds back into Vietnam for perfectly legal sale without any trace whatsoever. He 
noted that since gold and diamonds command high prices, “the moneychanger wins 
again.”374 Although not brought up in the congressional hearings, investigators also found 
that the account involved illegal transactions in art works as well.375 American officials 
believed that gold and other precious gems and commodities were sold at competitive 
prices, generating piasters then used illegally to purchase dollar instruments, such as 
postal money orders or personal checks, with the complicity of Americans, for capital 
flight. The cycle of profit then repeats itself.  
 Given the role that international banks played in providing a safe haven for these 
large-scale transactions, subcommittee members maintained that American banks were 
complicit in the currency black market. Parker stated that “the U.S. banking industry, 
unknowingly, of course, is being used by the money manipulators.” However, Ribicoff 
disagreed with his assessment of the innocence of banks. He asserted, “the extent of these 
transactions are such that it is my personal opinion that these banks knew what was going 
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on.”376 Members of the subcommittee wondered why American officials did not close 
this major avenue of black marketing. Regarding the Prysumeen account, Senator Gurney 
asked Parker, “Without these legitimate accounts and being in the U.S. banks, a lot of this 
black market activity could not have continued; isn’t that correct?” Parker replied that 
American banks made the illegal activities easier, although Swiss banks could have 
theoretically been used as well. Gurney continued, “Now then my question is this: We 
have U.S. Government people, U.S. Embassy people in Vietnam or the foreign aid 
people. Have they made any recommendations about what these banks ought to do about 
these ‘Prysumeen’ accounts?” Parker responded in the negative. When pushed further by 
the senator, Parker explained that “we don’t know what to recommend. At least I don’t 
personally.” Gurney countered, “Well, I can think of something to recommend. Do away 
with the accounts.”377  
 Although the Prysumeen account would be closed in early 1969, savvy 
moneychangers would later open other accounts for their illegal transactions. Banking 
regulations providing privacy for account holders made it challenging for American 
officials to fully investigate the degree to which banks knowingly participated in the 
currency black market. As Bellino discovered when he issued a subpoena for the 
financial records of the Dubai branch of the First National Bank of New York, where 
Prysumeen funds were disbursed, banking officials explained that they could not comply, 
because American legal precedent did not order compliance for a subpoena for records 
                                                
376 Quoted in “U.S. Banks Blamed for Viet Black Market,” The Boston Globe, 19 November 1969. 
377 Fraud and Corruption Hearings, Part 3, 555-556.  
 214 
located in a foreign ranch if the foreign government prohibited the release of documents. 
While senators like Ribicoff believed that banks were aware of the black market 
accounts, at least one bank spokesman stated defensively that the “bank obviously cannot 
know the nature of every deposit into and withdrawal from a checking account.”378 
Although banks and moneychangers provided the structure for currency 
manipulation, a large source of the money that provided the initial capital originated from 
Americans, particularly American businesses. As the American goal to construct a stable 
and noncommunist South Vietnamese state required the labor of American companies 
ranging from construction to transportation to food preparation, hundreds of American 
companies earned government contracts to complete tasks on behalf of the United 
States.379 American companies, which were compensated in dollars in Vietnam, would 
often exchange piasters at the black market rate, instead of at the official rate for 
corporations, one dollar to 84 piasters, because they could get more piasters at the illegal 
rate to pay their subcontractors in Vietnam.380 Bellino identified a list of thirteen 
American firms that dealt in the currency black market while engaged in business with 
the U.S. military or with the USAID in South Vietnam. These firms nearly doubled their 
money by depositing their money, a total of $725,700, in a coded black market bank 
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account in New York. The firms, all of which had headquarters in Saigon, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, or Okinawa, would then receive their profits in Vietnamese piasters, estimated 
to be about $650,000 more from the illegal currency transactions than they would have if 
they converted their money legally. One company, Star Distributing Co., which 
dominated the distribution of the military newspaper, Pacific Stars and Stripes, deposited 
$58,500 in the Prysumeen account and profited, like other firms identified, by receiving 
piasters at the rate of at least 200 piasters per dollar. Other firms named that worked with 
the U.S. government in Vietnam included: American Service Sales, American Industrial 
Service, Degill Corporation, Elleget Enterprises Incorporated, Mrs. Isobel Evans and R 
and R Supply Company, Lad Promotions, Sarl Electronics, Tectonics Asia Incorporated, 
and Worldwide Consultants.381 Parker asserted that once deposits were transferred to the 
Prysumeen account, the bank would notify agents associated with the account, who 
would then pay the American depositor in piasters at the black market rate.382  
The participation of American civilians, however, was a major factor sustaining 
the currency black market, Parker maintained. In addition to the money provided by 
American companies, the money of American civilians employed by U.S. contractors in 
Vietnam supplied the money for illegal transactions. As Parker stated, “There are a 
number of Americans in this category who work hard, play equally hard, gamble for high 
stakes and who see nothing wrong with cashing money wherever they can get the best 
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rate or where they can make a quick profit.”383 Moreover, he added that these civilian 
employees knew that if they get caught exchanging money illegally, the worst case 
scenario would be that they lose their jobs; and if they lost their jobs, they could easily 
find another one. In the end, however, the companies would terminate all employees 
anyway when the tasks and projects in Vietnam were completed. The temporary nature of 
contractor employment, Parker suggested, was a major reason why a large number of 
American civilians participated in the currency black market. He asserted that many 
people recruited to work in Vietnam were not career employees and therefore had lesser 
incentives to exercise virtue in their financial actions.  
The other group of American civilians contributing to the currency black market 
that Parker cited were “category four” Americans, expatriate civilians who lived in South 
Vietnam and were not associated with the military. Parker asserted that these individuals 
“roamed around the globe since the 1940s, following our troops wherever they make 
camp, from France, to Germany to Japan to Korea to Vietnam.”384 Often unemployed, 
these “category four” Americans took advantage of their American citizenship and their 
status as private citizens and therefore immune from American jurisdiction, to engage in 
illicit activities that often accompanied cities where American soldiers were stationed. In 
addition to illegally transferring money using a variety of dollar instruments, Parker gave 
an example of a “category four” American who “actively engaged in intimidation, 
                                                
383 Fraud and Corruption Hearings, Part 3, 539.  
384 Fraud and Corruption Hearings, Part 3, 540.  
 217 
extortion, bad checks and other illicit activities while posing at various times as a CID 
agent, a customs agent, a CIA agent and as an informant for Vietnamese agencies.”385  
On the role played by American civilians, Parker conceded that since there was no 
breach of American laws in most cases of currency manipulation, it was challenging for 
the U.S. government to take any action against them. He lamented, “Regrettably, it is 
very difficult for the Government of Vietnam to effectively cope with these people. 
Because of the role played by the U.S. in the economy of the nation they go out of their 
way to avoid trouble with Americans.” Parker argued that the United States “desperately 
need a system whereby American nationals abroad can be brought to justice—especially 
in Vietnam where the host government is understandably reluctant to file charges against 
our citizens.” In arguing that South Vietnamese authorities were hesitant to punish 
American civilians for justifiable reasons, Parker minimized the role South Vietnamese 
officials played in the black market. He deplored, “For the tragedy is that were it not for 
American and Free World civilians the black market in Vietnam would not exist as it is 
today.”386 He thus pinpoints the blame for the severity of the currency black market on 
American civilians and their allied counterparts. Moreover, Parker argues that the illicit 
behaviors of American civilians “has corrupted many a soldier, officers as well as 
enlisted men, and compromised many a civilian employee of our Government and many 
American contractor employees, too.”387  
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While Parker emphasized the actions of American civilians in the currency black 
market, Bellino’s investigations revealed that Vietnamese customs officials profited 
tremendously as well. Bellino stated that when a raid occurred, “any moneys that are 
found in the establishment are taken and controlled by the customs officials, then later on 
they divide the amount that was received between all of the individuals that were in on 
the raid.”388 Although there are more anecdotes than clear evidence that higher-ranked 
Vietnamese officials reaped the benefits of such occasional raids, Bellino’s finding 
confirms a problem known to American officials about a lack of cooperation to tackle the 
black market from their South Vietnamese allies. Indeed, Vietnamese official often kept 
the currency, especially MPCs, for their own profit when they conducted raids. Repeating 
the American claim about MPCs, Vietnamese officials argued that since MPCs had no 
value in possession of those not authorized to use them, then they should not have to 
return them to the U.S. government. Vietnamese officials also demanded “premiums” 
from the United States in exchange for the MPCs, to which American officials refused to 
pay. A source of diplomatic tension, these unreturned MPCs likely fed back into the cycle 
of illegal monetary transactions.389  
Although Parker acknowledged that the “fundamental problem is economic,” he 
believed that “as far as the mechanics of [the black market] are concerned, increased 
enforcement will help, making it possible for the soldier to have places where he can 
acquire piasters legally.” He suggested that more locations at which soldiers can legally 
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exchange their piasters would decrease the numbers of illegal currency transactions. 
However, Parker did not state the obvious financial logic that encouraged soldiers to 
engage in the black market: even if there were more places to exchange currency legally, 
soldiers and civilians exchanged their money on the black market not because they could 
not exchange them legally, but because it did not make financial sense to knowingly get a 
worse deal converting at the legal rate. 
 Ribicoff and other members of the subcommittee, as well as witnesses, defended 
the decision of GIs to convert their money at better, albeit illegal rates. Ribicoff stated 
that an ordinary GI knew that the black market rate for their MPCs was approximately 
180 or 200 piasters. He stated confidently, “Let us not kid ourselves. He feels, ‘Here I am 
getting 118 and everybody else is getting 180 to 200 and 220 piasters.’ It would be hard 
put to expect this person not to try to get as much as he can for his American dollars or 
military payment certificates.”390 In a later part of the hearing, Ribicoff further asserted, 
“Human nature being what it is, you can’t expect a GI who is risking his life and his limb 
in Vietnam, who has a few extra dollars to spend, to pay at a 240 price base when all he 
gets is 118 when he can go into an Indian moneychanger and get 240.”391 Gabriel T. 
Kerekes, an economist who advised the U.S. government on currency matters after World 
War II and a partner in the New York brokerage firm of Goodbody & Co., testified at the 
hearing and concurred with Ribicoff. Kerekes spoke to three officers upon their return to 
the United States from Vietnam and learned that they all turned to the currency black 
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market. Paraphrasing the soldiers’ response, Kerekes stated that the soldiers said, “We 
had just been out there risking our lives. We got back on a pass and nobody is going to 
take away half of the little money we have in order to subsidize what is going on here.” 
In his own opinion, Kerekes believed it was “completely immoral to demand that the 
American fighting man who is risking his life out there should subsidize this kind of 
operation…or else be in the position of violating the regulations. I think our Government 
is very wrong in demanding that from him.” Kerekes distinguished Vietnam’s legal 
economy from its “extra-legal” economy, a term he preferred to “illegal,” because, as he 
said, “I feel it is a moral connotation that I no longer want to include my soldier friends 
under.”   
When asked by members of the subcommittee about the economic impact of 
currency manipulation, Parker deferred to economists to answer those questions. Senator 
Percy asked Parker why the Saigon government did not adopt a floating exchange rate for 
piasters, “thus ending the black market with one fell swoop?”392 Parker replied that he 
could not answer that question. His inability to provide a sufficient answer was indicative 
of a major reason why currency manipulation became so pervasive: the exchange rate 
was in the jurisdiction of South Vietnamese officials, and the United States could not 
force the Saigon regime to “adopt a floating exchange rate.” Parker, however, did not 
allude to the diplomatic tensions inherent in the exchange rate problem. Similarly, when 
Senator Adlerman asserted that American taxpayers ultimately paid the price of the loss 
in hard currency in Vietnam, Parker stated that this was “where it gets a little fuzzier to 
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me” and concluded that “I just don’t feel competent to deal with rather abstract economic 
matters of that type.”393 Senators also pressed Parker to explain why there was an 
artificial prosperity in consumer goods in Vietnam, when austerity and the lack of 
consumer goods usually accompanied wartime like during World War II and the Korean 
War. Although Parker could not explain why the economic climate in Vietnam was not 
one of austerity, he did acknowledge that the presence of over half a million Americans 
in South Vietnam contributed to the appearance of prosperity. He added that “wherever 
you have that much money coming in and being spent, it is bound to have an effect.” 
Parker’s responses to these questions suggested that the black market was, in essence, a 
manifestation of the tenuous diplomatic relations between the United States and South 
Vietnam.  
Kerekes provided more clarity about the economic causes and consequences of 
the currency black market in South Vietnam. He explained that uncertainties regarding 
the military and political conflict decreased faith in the Vietnamese currency and 
increased demand for foreign currencies like the American dollar. As Vietnamese sought 
to deposit their wealth in foreign havens, a second black market exchange rate developed 
alongside the official exchange rate. Black market currency transactions thus reflected 
capital flight, ineffectiveness of economic aid, and corruption both among locals and 
among American military and civilian personnel. These consequences, he warned, could 
hasten the collapse of South Vietnam and American defeat in the war. The monetary 
situation would also increase the American balance-of-payments deficit. Kerekes argued 
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that every penny of foreign exchange diverted away from Vietnam was “an added 
burden” on the American taxpayer. He stressed the urgency of the situation, stating that 
“economically and financially speaking, [it is] the 59th minute of the 23rd hour.” 
Kerekes and members of the subcommittee identified negligence of the economic 
situation on the part of American officials as a key factor in the financial instability in 
South Vietnam. Kerekes explained that substantial turnover among the staff of American 
government agencies deprived the American government of the financial expertise 
necessary for creating workable foreign exchange policies in Vietnam. However, he 
noted that the U.S. government could still draw upon the experience of those, like 
himself, who had dealt with similar issues of economic policies during the post-World 
War II era. Ribicoff expressed shock that “no attention has been paid to these economic 
problems” by either the American or South Vietnamese governments over the last several 
years. Ribicoff further stated, 
What surprises me is that many of the problems we have internationally involve 
economic problems that have to do with the Treasury, and Treasury policy. Yet I 
have never found a situation where the Treasury hasn’t always allowed itself to be 
completely subordinate to the military and the State Department in exercising its 
responsibility. You could win the war in South Vietnam military, you could win 
the war diplomatically in Paris, but you can lose it just as fast with economic 
collapse and chaos in turn.394 
 
Here, Ribicoff’s statement revealed his mistaken belief that the United States could 
unilaterally decide South Vietnam’s economic plans. Both Kerekes and Ribicoff failed to 
take into account the crucial role that South Vietnamese leaders played in determining 
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their own economic policies. Although they were right to assert that military and even 
diplomatic priorities diverted American focus away from the South Vietnamese 
economy, they did not acknowledge that South Vietnamese officials had consistently 
refused to devalue their currency, resulting in the continuation of currency manipulation.  
Kerekes offered a few reforms that the American and South Vietnamese 
governments could adopt to eliminate avenues of diversion of American dollars. One 
suggestion was the enactment of multiple exchange rates. Kerekes stated that it would be 
impossible to set one exchange rate for Vietnam that would reflect the different values of 
the piaster in and outside of the country. He thus recommended that a dual exchange rate 
be established—the lower rate would subsidize mass consumer goods, and the higher rate 
would be at the black market rate and be used for the purchase of luxury goods. Another 
suggestion was to fix the MPC exchange rate to the black market rate of piasters. Since 
MPCs functioned as an intermediary for those interested in converting their piasters into 
dollars, they were used to facilitate capital flight.  
Discussion of the currency black market in Vietnam also touched upon the 
sensitive issue of American withdrawal of troops. Kerekes told the committee that plans 
for withdrawal of troops could exacerbate capital flight out of Vietnam and cause the 
discrepancy between the official and black market exchange rates to grow further. He 
predicted that the higher incentives for black market dealings “might escalate an already 
difficult economic situation into a chaotic one with incalculable consequences.”395 
Ribicoff stated that “if our Vietnam program goes into effect, we are going to have the 
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burden of propping up the entire Vietnamese economy.”396 However, Senator Edward 
Gurney (R-Fla.) defended the administration’s Vietnamization plans, arguing that if the 
United States withdrew troops abruptly, the economic consequences for Vietnam would 
be more severe. He added, “I don’t think we ought to make unfounded charges here…or 
make statements that the present policy of the present administration is aggravating this 
problem.”397 
Bellino argued that the “Vietnamese Government could really stop [the black 
market] if they wanted to.” He bluntly suggested that Vietnamese officials should deport 
Indian moneychangers.398 Gurney added that one of the most effective procedures to curb 
the currency black market “would be strict law enforcement on the part of the South 
Vietnam Government, and the deportation of third country nationals who are found in 
this business.”399 In a private letter to State Secretary William P. Rogers, Gurney stressed 
the need for American leaders to urge Vietnamese officials to “exercise their 
sovereignty” and deport those participating in the black market of any nationality, 
including Americans. He wrote, 
These illegal currency transactions could not continue if Vietnamese laws and 
regulations could be effectively enforced. Part of the problem appears to be the 
reluctance of SVN police officials to move against private American individuals 
and firms who are in Viet-Nam because of the war. It would seem the opposite is 
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true: we are embarrassed as a nation because our nationals are engaging in this 
traffic and the sooner we can impress the Vietnamese of this fact, the better.400 
 
Gurney’s statement, however, presumed that South Vietnamese officials wanted illegal 
currency transactions to end. As Ky asserted in 1966, many of his predecessors had left 
Vietnam “up to [their] armpits in gold.”401 At least some South Vietnamese officials, 
therefore, had incentives to continue the illegal currency exchanges for their own private 
benefit.  
 Moreover, there were reasons why the United States did not want to publicly 
admit the corruption of Americans in Vietnam. Such an admission could grant Saigon 
more leverage over Washington and also undermine American support for the war. At the 
end of the hearings, Ribicoff accused officials at the Treasury, State, and Defense 
departments of negligence in their duties to curtail the black market in Vietnam. He 
asserted that they “have been careless, lax and indifferent toward the extent of black 
market operations in U.S. dollars.”402 Percy stated, “The ultimate tragedy is that such 
widespread financial corruption undermines the huge American investment of blood and 
treasure in Vietnam.”403 
CONCLUSION  
 
While the congressional hearings uncovered the harmful side effects of 
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widespread currency manipulation on the American war effort, some American officials 
were reasonably skeptical of the subcommittee’s findings. In response to Ribicoff’s 
assertion that currency manipulation amounted to a billion-dollar-per-year business, one 
leading American economic official stated anonymously, “I think that figure is something 
he dreamed up one night.” He continued, “How can you possibly measure something that 
is illegal? The flow of traffic is usually pretty well concealed.”404 In stressing the 
difficulty of tracking the amount of illegal currency transactions, this official attempted to 
dismiss the currency black market problem. Although exact figures involved in currency 
manipulation were impossible to calculate, senate investigators were, in fact, able to 
estimate the monetary value of the global currency black market. Those who voiced 
skepticism about the gravity of the problem were often those who benefited from illegal 
monetary exchanges themselves or were in some way complicit in the process. As such, 
few people openly disputed the Ribicoff subcommittee’s findings to avoid drawing 
attention to themselves for possible investigation. Mostly, however, the American public 
accepted the revelations of currency manipulation without question.  
Congressional investigations into years of financial mismanagement, fraud, and 
corruption in South Vietnam added to a climate of great pessimism among Americans 
about the future course of the war. The November 1969 congressional hearings on 
currency manipulation were broadcasted and reported widely by the American media. 
Television news showed former soldiers recounting in front of congressional leaders how 
they participated in the currency black market. NBC Evening News reported that “rich 
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South Vietnamese [were] trying to squirrel away money…When the Americans leave, 
they leave.” One news correspondent in Saigon even filmed how easily a Vietnamese 
moneychanger, who offered 260,000 piasters for $100, approached him. After explaining 
that illegal money changing was one cause of inflation in South Vietnam, he concluded, 
“illegal money changing is more than a way to meet expenses, it’s a way to get rich.”405 
War profiteering was thus symbolic of the war’s destruction of the morals and morale of 
both Americans and their allies.  
As American policymakers began gradual withdrawal of American troops in 
1969, the problem of inflation continued to hurt the South Vietnamese economy. By 
1969, Nixon’s Vietnamization plan was well underway, with the first round of 25,000 
troops departing South Vietnam that August. The policy, however, would engender its 
own set of financial consequences for South Vietnam, which will be explored in depth in 
the final chapter. As one American economist stated, “The South Vietnamese should 
know by now we are going home, and so is some of our money.”406 Indeed, 
Vietnamization of the military conflict and the beginning of peace talks altered the 
diplomatic relationship between Washington and Saigon, and one of the effects of the 
United States extricating itself from the war was that South Vietnamese leaders had to 
assume more of the responsibility for fighting communists as well as stabilizing their 
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own economy. The very possibility of South Vietnam’s collapse no longer entailed the 
United States sending more soldiers or aid to their ally.  
With their political leverage over their American counterparts diminished, South 
Vietnamese leaders began to sing a different tune with regard to their economy. As 
inflation continued to endanger the economy, South Vietnamese officials, arguably for 
the first time during the war, urged the nation to make the kinds of sacrifices that a war 
required. President Nguyen Van Thieu frequently used the word “austerity” in his 
speeches, while Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky threatened to execute those who opposed 
austerity measures. Similarly, the Minister of Economy, Pham Kim Ngoc, stated that 
“from now on, reasonable priorities for a nation at war must govern.” However, rhetoric 
was generally not accompanied by action. Although officials in the Saigon regime agreed 
that austerity was the only way to close the budgetary gap, they did not have concrete 
plans to trim the budget. Instead, South Vietnamese leaders proposed increasing duties on 
luxury imports, which was not popular among South Vietnamese legislators with “a 
personal fondness of luxuries or a fondness for persons who deal in luxuries.”407  
American officials speculated that South Vietnamese leaders would continue to 
ask the United States for additional economic aid rather than make the sacrifices 
incumbent upon countries at war. One American economist asserted, “When it comes to 
economics, South Vietnam is like a badly spoiled child—somewhat greedy, somewhat 
ungrateful, always hanging on to apron strings and ducking responsibility, always 
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expecting Big Daddy to come to the rescue, no appreciation of what money is worth.”408 
This judgment about the morality of South Vietnamese economic actions failed to 
acknowledge that, like a badly spoiled child, Saigon leaders could behave that way only 
because they were enabled by the United States. For years, American economic aid 
policies financially rewarded South Vietnamese officials and business through import 
subsidies and favorable foreign exchange rates. Moreover, American officials did not 
push back too hard when South Vietnamese leaders refused to devalue the piaster. It was 
no wonder, then, that the wealthy and powerful, including government officials, profited 
handsomely from the American presence of soldiers and dollars. After all, South 
Vietnamese officials, like American soldiers and civilians, reacted rationally to economic 
incentives.  
 Currency manipulation and the instability of the South Vietnamese economy were 
thus deeply intertwined with the diplomatic relations between the United States and 
South Vietnam. What, then, did American officials do about the problem of currency 
manipulation in particular and American contributions to the black market in general? 
The next chapter examines the efforts that both American and South Vietnamese leaders 
undertook to deal with a problem that was largely diplomatic and economic in nature. 
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Chapter Four: American Responses to Corruption in South Vietnam, 
1969-1970 
Congressional testimony on South Vietnamese corruption at the end of 1969 and 
press coverage of the hearings intensified pressure on American leaders to halt the black 
market. On 12 January 1970, President Nixon asked Henry Kissinger to request that U.S. 
ambassador to South Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker undertake “some quiet work” on 
corruption in South Vietnam.409 Consequently, Bunker met with President Thieu on 30 
January to discuss corruption, which he claimed was “now the number one problem” in 
South Vietnam and a “problem of Vietnamese-American relations.” He stated that U.S. 
officials were doing their part to limit American involvement in corruption: “Our mission 
had long had an illegal practices committee to examine reports of black marketing, illegal 
currency operations, pilfering of government supplies, etc.” Moreover, criticisms of 
corruption by members of congress and the press were so trenchant, Bunker told Thieu, 
that President Nixon had to commission a high-level inter-agency committee in 
Washington to address the problem.  
Bunker stressed that it was now up to Thieu to do his part and impressed upon 
him that “unless there is some real progress in the attack on corruption I see serious 
trouble ahead—politically, economically, and in his relations with the U.S.” “Too many 
people were bleeding the economy for their private benefit,” he bemoaned, hurting South 
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Vietnam’s reputation in the United States and abroad. Bunker also asserted that 
corruption was a moral problem, “for it involved the whole question of morale—of the 
military, of the government servants, of the people generally.” Likely referring to the 
inflation that wrecked the South Vietnamese economy, Bunker was aware of the 
economic pressures that soldiers, civil servants, and the general population faced to 
engage in corruption for survival. “A corrupt society,” Bunker maintained, “is a weak 
society. It is a society in which everyone is for himself, no one is for the common good.” 
Bunker thus implied that Thieu had good reason to do all he could to root out corruption, 
given its harmful effects on his citizens, his country’s image, and his partnership with the 
United States. Thieu took notes and agreed with Bunker’s sentiments. The South 
Vietnamese president said that corruption was a great concern of his and intimated that he 
was prepared to implement solutions suggested by both his own staff and American 
leaders. Although Thieu appeared to understand the gravity of the situation, Bunker 
warned his colleagues in Washington not to “expect miracles.” Bunker commented, 
however, that “the most important thing now is to get some momentum going, and to let 
Thieu get the word out to the right people that he means to show results soon.”410 
Although the United States played a major role in expanding the degree and scope 
of corruption in Vietnam, as the previous chapter shows, U.S. officials including Bunker 
often asserted in private that the United States could only do so much to address the 
problem and that South Vietnam needed to step up its efforts. U.S. policymakers arguably 
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could not focus on the real sources of corruption in Vietnam, which could be traced 
directly to the economic conditions created by the war as well as issues of economic 
policy like the exchange rate. Given the control that South Vietnamese leaders wielded 
over economic matters, American officials likely felt hamstrung in their ability to curtail 
corruption. It made sense, then, that officials like Bunker often placed the onus on South 
Vietnamese officials to deal with the problem. Meanwhile, in public, American officials 
pursued anti-corruption measures that demonstrated to Americans that they were taking 
action to rein in the problem.  
Why did the United States ultimately fail to reduce corruption in South Vietnam? 
Policymakers, scholars, and those involved in fighting the war have offered several 
answers. Some have argued that the problem was so ingrained in Vietnam that it was 
impossible to eliminate. Others have claimed that American officials did not impose strict 
anti-corruption measures because any radical actions could bring about the collapse of a 
fragile South Vietnamese state. This perspective presumes that the United States wanted 
to address the problem but could not. Still others have argued that corruption was simply 
not a top priority for American policymakers, who focused primarily on the military 
aspects of the war.  
 This chapter examines the efforts that American officials undertook to curb the 
black market in goods and currency. It argues that attempts to fight the black market 
failed because American and Vietnamese leaders treated corruption as a low-level 
criminal and moral issue instead of approaching it as a symptom of larger economic 
problems. They therefore did not confront the deep-rooted economic policies that gave 
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rise to the black market. Instead of investigating corruption among high-level Vietnamese 
officials or within American organizations involved in the war, moreover, American 
policymakers focused on pursuing low-level participants in the black market to show that 
they were making efforts to address the problem. Ultimately, American policymakers 
pursued ineffective measures because they could not solve the larger economic and 
diplomatic problems. The perfunctory resolutions undertaken by American and 
Vietnamese leaders only exacerbated the state of the South Vietnamese economy. As the 
final chapter will illustrate, misplaced efforts to deal with corruption allowed it to fester, 
drove up black market exchange rates, and aggravated inflation.   
 Issues of economic policy upholding the pragmatism of participating in the black 
market were difficult to resolve, as they were also matters of diplomacy between leaders 
in Saigon and Washington. The setting of the exchange rate was fundamentally the 
jurisdiction of South Vietnam. As an independent and sovereign country, nominally if not 
in reality, South Vietnam determined its own exchange rate for its own currency. 
However, because South Vietnam relied upon American economic assistance for its 
survival, the exchange rate between the piaster and the dollar necessarily required the 
approval of American policymakers. American officials did not have to furnish economic 
aid at an exchange rate that they did not find reasonable, but they ultimately went along 
with the exchange rates established in the past.  
 Having significantly overvalued the piaster in 1955, U.S. officials frequently 
brought up the possibility of devaluation in the years to come. As we have seen, however, 
Ngo Dinh Diem consistently refused to devalue the piaster during his tenure. Diem’s 
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successors followed in his footsteps, fending off constant American pressures to devalue 
the piaster. Thieu, for example, argued that devaluation would only exacerbate inflation 
in his country and kept deflecting calls for devaluation. After the piaster was devalued in 
July 1966, South Vietnamese officials refused to lower the piaster’s value again until 
October 1970.  
 The ability of South Vietnamese officials to resist American pressures to devalue 
during the years when the American presence wrought the most transformations upon the 
Vietnamese economy and when devaluation was perhaps most crucial, attests to the 
diplomatic leverage that South Vietnamese leaders held over American policymakers. 
Although American officials had considered withholding the disbursements of economic 
aid to South Vietnam on several occasions, ultimately American policymakers did not do 
so. Indeed, withholding aid meant depriving the South Vietnamese government of the 
funds necessary to function and for the South Vietnamese army to fight the war. South 
Vietnamese leaders, in refusing to devalue the piaster and permitting currency 
manipulation to facilitate capital flight, insisted on a path toward the ultimate collapse of 
its own economy. Resisting devaluation, while beneficial for the short-term when 
American aid and imports were available, was destructive for the long-term development 
of the South Vietnamese economy. For approximately five years, Saigon leaders held 
their own economy hostage and dared American officials to withhold economic aid. U.S. 
officials had no choice but to acquiesce to South Vietnamese demands if they wanted to 
continue to fight the war in Vietnam. During the years from 1965 to 1969, American 
leaders continued to supply economic aid to South Vietnam at the artificially high 
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exchange rate established by Saigon leaders. It is precisely this diplomatic leverage that 
South Vietnamese leaders held over economic policies, I argue, that American leaders 
could not make public. Inaction in response to corruption in South Vietnam was 
interwoven with the tensions of the U.S.-South Vietnamese relationship. 
 This chapter also discusses the ways in which American and Vietnamese 
policymakers attempted to address the problem of black markets. It will begin with a 
discussion of the Saigon embassy’s Irregular Practices Committee (IPC), a group of 
American officials appointed by Bunker in 1967 to investigate and curb corruption in 
South Vietnam. Next, it examines two anti-corruption measures undertaken in 1969—one 
concurrent with the Senate Committee investigations on corruption and the other 
prompted by the committee hearings. The first campaign was the IPC’s use of newspaper 
advertisements to seek out specific instances of illegal behaviors among American 
military and civilian personnel beginning in May 1969. The second campaign, initiated 
by Thieu after the Senate hearings, was a ten-day black market raid jointly administered 
by American and Vietnamese officials from late November to early December 1969. 
These results of these two operations demonstrate how both American and South 
Vietnamese policymakers failed to address the economic sources of black market 
corruption.  
THE IRREGULAR PRACTICES COMMITTEE 
 
 Although black marketing and currency manipulation occurred from the 
beginning of the American buildup in South Vietnam and even before, U.S. officials in 
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Saigon did not organize a committee devoted to addressing those problems until 1967. In 
a document establishing the Irregular Practices Committee (IPC) in Saigon on 30 August 
1967, Bunker explained his rationale for the group’s creation: 
I have become increasingly concerned by reports of irregular practices involving 
illegal currency dealing, contracts calling for payment in U.S. dollars although 
piaster payment would be less expensive, diversion of Post Exchange into the 
private sector of the Vietnamese economy and illegal activities by PX 
concessionaries. The Government of Vietnam has also expressed an urgent desire 
for additional procedures and regulations aimed at reducing the occurrence of 
these practices.411 
 
As the ambassador suggested, these irregular practices not only violated the law, but also 
cost the United States more money than necessary and introduced goods not intended for 
Vietnamese consumption into the local economy. According to Bunker, these activities 
were also a problem for U.S.-South Vietnamese relations, because Vietnamese authorities 
wanted these activities to be eliminated as well. However, the IPC, comprising American 
diplomats at the embassy as well as leaders from MACV, focused only on curbing black 
market activities of Americans in Vietnam, over whom the U.S. government had 
jurisdiction. The charter of the IPC was to “develop ways and means for preventing the 
involvement of U.S. personnel in any activity contrary to U.S. or GVN laws or 
regulations,” particularly black marketing and currency manipulation. Indeed, the Senate 
committee hearings revealed that American soldiers and civilians were primarily 
responsible for supplying commodities and dollars to the black market. The IPC thus 
chose to focus on American citizens in Vietnam in order to prevent high-demand goods 
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and currencies from entering the shadow economy.   
 As Robert Parker, chair of the IPC and former assistant to the Director of the 
United States Agency for International Development in Vietnam, discussed at the Senate 
committee hearings, the IPC undertook a variety of methods to fight black marketing and 
currency manipulation since the committee’s inception. Parker noted seventeen methods 
the IPC employed to “effect tighter controls” on the black market. These included, for 
example, changing the series of military payment certificates, which rendered old series 
of hoarded MPCs worthless, punishing and disciplining civilians who violated South 
Vietnamese laws, blacklisting local firms engaged in black marketing, increasing 
publicity about the penalties for illicit activities, and establishing mail facilities for the 
reporting of illegal activities.412 As these efforts illustrate, the IPC was primarily 
concerned with deterring Americans from participating in the black market and punishing 
them when they did. On the deterrence front, Parker stated that “[s]pot announcements on 
TV and radio, articles in the unit newspapers, briefings for military and civilian personnel 
and exhortations by commanders and supervisors have all been used to get the world to 
American personnel.” Much like MACV’s campaign to persuade soldiers to spend less in 
the local economy, some of the IPC’s efforts revolved around simply convincing soldiers 
to obey the law and refrain from dealing in the black market. Such measures, like the 
piaster reduction campaign, appealed to soldiers to act virtuously. When such 
exhortations did not work, however, the IPC attempted to penalize those who engaged in 
black market activities. This was more difficult in the case of American civilians who 
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worked as contractor employees in Vietnam, because the worst that could happen to them 
would be that they would have their employment terminated. Military personnel caught 
participating in illicit activities would be subject to military law. 
 Although the IPC was appointed by Bunker to curtail corruption, the committee 
could only address the problem by delegating work to independent agencies responsible 
for remedying corruption. Parker stated in his testimony that the “committee does not 
handle individual cases, nor does it promulgate regulations. It considers ways and means 
of identifying problems and taking action to correct or ameliorate them.” Moreover, he 
explained that the IPC suggested policies and actions and expected individual agencies to 
implement those measures however they saw fit. The IPC often worked closely with 
GVN customs and their American advisors, the Criminal Investigation Division (CID), 
the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Office of Special Investigations, embassy security, 
and the USAID.413   
 Despite the IPC’s goals, however, efforts to root out corruption did not pare down 
the black market significantly. Parker asserted that an “intensive enforcement effort” was 
carried out and that “the level of effort against black market activities [was] very 
substantial.” However, Parker also argued that some “innovations in legal remedies that 
might help curtail the activities of American civilians who operate in the black market 
without fear of punishment are needed.” Since the United States could not court martial 
American civilians in Vietnam for violating the law, American officials decided that they 
could only suspend their privileges and access to American military installations, like the 
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PX. However, the enforcement of this policy relied on the compliance of individual 
agencies and their employees on the ground. One of the IPC’s efforts to deal with 
corruption—establishing a mailbox for the anonymous reporting of illicit activities—
reveals that corruption often spread to those tasked with enforcing laws and regulations, 
making it difficult to fully rectify the problem. People were able to partake in black 
market activities because employees of varying levels often looked the other way and 
actively facilitated corrupt behavior if they could benefit personally. The pervasiveness of 
black marketing certainly affected the morale of those who did not participate 
themselves, as we shall see. An analysis of one of the measures implemented by the IPC 
to identify and punish those involved in black market transactions, the Victor Frizbee 
campaign, reveals a general disregard amongst soldiers and civilians for regulations 
prohibiting black market activities.  
THE VICTOR FRIZBEE CAMPAIGN 
 
Beginning in May 1969, an advertisement in the English-language newspaper 
Saigon Post generated impassioned responses from readers. The ad read: 
Wanted: Information on theft or diversion of US Government property, 
blackmarket activities, and illegal currency transactions involving US military 
personnel, civilian employees, contractors, or contractor employees.  
Such information is vitally needed to preserve and protect US interests. 
Confidences will be respected. Send to: Victor Frizbee, Box 1000, APO 96222 (In 
Country)414 
                                                
414 Advertisement, Saigon Post, undated, Victor Frizbee folder, Box 10, Headquarters, Military Assistance 
Command, Vietnam (MACV), Provost Marshal, Security and Investigation Division, General Records, 
 240 
 
The advertisement prompted dozens of letters from American, Vietnamese, Korean, and 
Filipino citizens who lived and worked in Vietnam, who furnished names of suspects, 
locations where Victor Frizbee could catch violators red-handed, and even specific assets 
and accounts that he could probe for solid evidence of ill-gotten wealth.415 Other 
informants withheld details, however, and asked for a meeting in person or a phone call 
with Frizbee to convey their confidential knowledge. The majority of correspondents 
wrote anonymously for fear of reprisal, often explaining that disclosure of their identities 
could ruin their careers and livelihoods. Even those who sent anonymous letters, though, 
did so with great concern for their safety, as investigations of their claims could easily 
reveal the source of information. Others reacted more brazenly to Frizbee. Indeed, the 
public notice not only elicited letters from those who felt compelled to assist Mr. 
Frizbee’s cause of tackling corruption, but also generated anonymous advertisements and 
letters questioning the identity, whereabouts, and motives of Frizbee. The outpouring of 
reactions triggered by the advertisement, including both trust and suspicions of Frizbee 
alike, attests to the contentious and sensitive nature of black marketing and other illegal 
activities in Vietnam.416  
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The truth about Victor Frizbee, however, was that he did not exist; he was an alias 
created by the IPC. Commissioned by Parker, the advertisement succeeded in collecting 
numerous eyewitness and participant accounts of corruption. American officials 
responded to letters when possible and vetted claims when enough details emerged. 
Officials established a phone line and even assumed the fictitious persona of Victor 
Frizbee to conduct interviews with sources. Investigations of corruption revealed by the 
letters, however, often went nowhere. At times, American officials declined formal 
investigations of those accused of fraud, maintaining that the value of theft involved was 
insignificant or that the validity of allegations could not be confirmed. They frequently 
claimed they could not follow up with their correspondents, despite repeated efforts to 
contact their sources for more information. In many cases, investigations hit a brick wall 
when no one could or would confirm the purported misconduct, leading U.S. officials to 
conclude, perhaps prematurely, that allegations were unfounded. Despite the deluge of 
responses to Frizbee’s public plea for information and the consequent investigations, the 
Victor Frizbee campaign—aimed at reducing black marketing, currency manipulation, 
and theft of American property— yielded minimal impact on corruption during the 
Vietnam War.  
Letters addressed to Victor Frizbee reveal that the campaign’s treatment of 
corruption as a criminal and moral problem had serious effects on the morale of 
Americans in South Vietnam. A letter from Don F. Still on 15 November 1969 began, 
“Dear Mr. Frizbee, I have noticed your ad in the paper for the last few days, and things 
have boiled to a head with me.” Still, a registered nurse with an American construction 
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consortium, stated that he knew people employed by his company who “do not draw a 
dime from their employer… but have green [dollars] sent from home monthly, then 
convert it on the black market.” According to Still, these people were the “biggest 
offenders,” because the money they converted through illegal channels “is what is buying 
the ammunition to kill and shoot our own boys from home, and they don’t give a damn 
for they are profiting from the illegal things they are doing.” Fed up, he finally 
bemoaned, “I am getting to the point that I don’t care, and have seen so much that is so 
illegal and have met so many people that won’t speak up about the things they see, for 
they want to complete their contract, and just get out of here.”417  
After condemning the illegal currency transactions undertaken by civilian 
employees in Vietnam, Don Still proceeded to name two individuals involved in the 
racket: Bruce Beall and Harold Priebe. Still asserted that Beall and Priebe had homes in 
Danang for which they were paying “fabulous prices” and alleged they had dollars sent 
from the United States to Vietnam, which they converted illegally. Moreover, their 
homes, according to Still, were air-conditioned “at no expense to themselves” but 
charged to the OICC (Office in Charge of Construction) or the Navy. “But people don’t 
question these big assholes,” Still decried. He suggested that Frizbee look into their how 
much money they were making from their illegal transactions, how much money they 
drew each month, and how much rent they paid. “I have such a question to the moral[s] 
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of these people, that I don’t trust them one bit,” Still deplored.418  
Ten days later, Victor Frizbee responded to Still. “Your letter brings up several 
points which are well known problem areas in Vietnam, yet are very difficult to eliminate 
because of the difficulty in obtaining exact details and information,” Frizbee stated, 
explaining why he was unable to act on Still’s allegations. Frizbee conceded that without 
“specific instances and names of individuals, I am powerless to start any corrective 
action.” On Beall and Priebe, moreover, Frizbee wanted to know if Still had “any 
personal knowledge of this activity, the amount involved a month and the individuals 
acting as money changers.” Frizbee, however, asserted that the house rent and monthly 
income of Beall and Priebe could be verified, which could “provide a basis for complete 
investigation into their activities.”419 When Still did not respond to this letter, Frizbee 
wrote to him again. On a letter dated 9 December 1969, Frizbee reiterated that without 
detailed information regarding those engaged in illicit activities, “there is very little we 
can do.”420 Like other correspondents who wrote to Mr. Frizbee, Still never sent a second 
letter with additional information.  
Letters received by Frizbee did not always contain specific information that could 
serve as the basis for further investigation, but they gave an idea of the seriousness of 
black marketing and other illegal activities as well as the fear experienced by many of 
those who sent messages. An undated letter from Richard Pellek confided to Frizbee:  
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I know of some serious wrongdoing but I feel it is a matter for U.S. marshals 
because it involves violation of federal laws. To be sure black marketing is 
involved but before I agree to disclose any information I must be certain the 
government authorities will take action. Black marketing depresses me but the 
felony involved disturbs me to the point of keeping me awake.421 
 
As Pellek’s letter suggests, curbing black market activities occurring in South Vietnam 
was sometimes a matter for American law enforcement officials. Since black marketing 
on the ground had serious implications for the U.S. government and American taxpayers, 
Pellek believed U.S. marshals needed to intervene to stop the illegal behaviors of 
Americans. His letter also reveals that the illegal acts committed by fellow Americans 
had greatly affected his morale. At the same time, however, Pellek, like most other letter-
writers, disclosed his reluctance in conveying all the information he knows. Likely for 
fear of endangering his own life, he wanted assurance that the U.S. government would 
punish the wrongdoers before he could be more specific.  
Frizbee’s response to Pellek on 3 June 1969, however, offered no such guarantee 
of redress that would encourage Pellek to come forth with more information. Frizbee 
made plain that “US. Marshals have no jurisdiction in the Republic of Vietnam,” adding, 
“that is not to say, however, that we should ignore violations of our federal laws.” 
Nonetheless, Frizbee claimed that “at this point in time I cannot assure you of what 
actions will be taken of the personnel you have information on.” Asserting that any 
information provided by respondents form the starting point for investigations, Frizbee 
claimed that if “the investigation substantiates your allegations, you can rest assured that 
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some action will be taken.” He reminded Pellek that he could “be of great service to your 
country and the Republic of Vietnam” if he volunteered whatever information he 
possessed.422  
The irony of the Frizbee campaign was that as much as American officials were 
interested in rooting out corruption, they often found many reasons not to investigate 
certain cases. When anonymous letters had no return addresses and were untraceable, for 
example, American officials frequently did not elect to pursue investigations. After all, 
there was no accountability imposed by a particular individual and thus no need to 
promise any corrective action. For instance, unknown letter-writers alerted Frizbee to a 
potential case of corruption involving an American civilian, but officials took no action. 
The authors believed that a civilian by the name of A.A. Newcomb (Buck) was selling 
cases of beer, cigarettes, and stolen tools from RMK-BRJ, where he worked as a master 
mechanic, to the black market in Tuy Hoa. Providing Newcomb’s badge number, the 
authors of the letter claimed that he “sends one of his mechanic[s] to the air force base for 
beer and cigarettes everyday,” “pays off the cashier,” “takes care of the books to cover 
up” his dealings, and “even brags about how much money his Chinese girlfriend [gets] 
for the merchandise.” These accusations suggest that Newcomb’s black marketing 
activities were facilitated by the complicity of other people as well. Furthermore, the 
authors revealed that they were deeply bothered that Newcomb had the audacity to boast 
about the profits his girlfriend made. They concluded, “We think he’s a lousy rat to be 
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called an American.”423 The authors’ choice of words is indicative of the emotional 
response to the Frizbee campaign and the subjective problem of corruption in Vietnam. 
To the authors, Newcomb appeared to make windfall profits from his black market 
activities, while the authors, who likely did not participate in illegal acts, watched a 
dishonest man get away with his corruption.  
Despite the detailed identification information provided in the letter, American 
officials chose not to launch an investigation. The acting commanding officer of the U.S. 
Naval Investigative Service Office, N. Idleberg, wrote to the MACV Office of the 
Provost Marshal that the “monetary value of the alleged thefts is negligible and reliability 
and motivation of source is considered unreliable, therefore no investigation will be 
conducted by this office.” Moreover, he reported that liaison “with RMK-BRJ Security 
Office was effectuated” and that the security director there advised that his office would 
conduct an investigation of the case.424 Idleberg’s statement demonstrates that American 
officials were satisfied that RMK-BRJ would take on the task of investigating its own 
employee, never mind that the construction consortium did not share the same concerns 
about black marketing and its impact on the South Vietnamese economy that the 
American government had. Indeed, the American construction consortium had different 
financial interests, having won government contracts to profit from the construction 
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required for the war.425  
Additionally, Idleberg’s assertion that the value of alleged theft was “negligible” 
contradicts the American government’s goal to cut down on corruption. Even if purported 
instances of theft involved only small amounts, the fact that these illegal transactions 
occurred widely in South Vietnam had serious consequences for morale and the overall 
war effort. The lack of any redress did not mollify the subjective experience of seeing a 
colleague escape punishment for black marketing, but instead may have created the 
impression that the American government condoned and even rewarded illegal behavior. 
Finally, claiming that the source making the accusation was “unreliable” was not a strong 
reason to block an investigation. Due to the nature of the Frizbee campaign, there was no 
way to substantiate the authenticity or motivation of informants, especially if they were 
anonymous. It made no sense, then, that Idleberg cited the anonymity of the letter as a 
reason not to pursue further inquiries. American officials in this case simply decided that 
it was not worth their time to inquire into the illegal activities of a civilian employed with 
the American construction consortium.  
While some responders wrote about fellow Americans engaged in illicit activities, 
many other letter-writers complained about the corruption of their allied counterparts. 
Vietnamese authorities were the focus of some correspondents’ ire. T. G. Sunosky, an 
employee of Pacific Architects and Engineers Communications Division, wrote to 
Frizbee that he could “only offer a name and last known address of an individual, wheeler 
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and dealer.” However, his larger accusation was suggestive of fraudulent activities 
among South Vietnamese law enforcement officers. Sunosky stated that Frizbee should 
pay attention to “the corrupt extortionist National Vietnamese Police animals who are 
misusing and abusing their authority to prey on unprotected civilians (US) and well as 
Vietnamese.”426 The gravity of Sunosky’s accusation and his comparing the South 
Vietnamese national police to animals spoke volumes about his perceptions of corruption 
on the ground, but Frizbee’s response only explained that he could not personally contact 
him at this time, but “would appreciate your sending me a letter with the details of the 
information you have to offer.”427 Frizbee’s brief reply does not acknowledge Sunosky’s 
complaint about the corrupt behaviors of Vietnamese officials, an obviously sensitive 
topic for American policymakers. 
 Some letter-writers did not get responses from Victor Frizbee, often because no 
return address was available, but their letters nonetheless reveal important information on 
who participated in black market activities and the extent of their involvement. “SPS 
Jones,” who had read Mr. Frizbee’s advertisement “for the umpteenth time” and was 
“sufficiently moved” by Frizbee’s loyalty to American citizens, wrote unabashedly, “First 
of all, why are you so insistent on prosecuting the American people, those with whom 
you live?” The informant continued: 
Have you ever gone to the Cholon PX and seen how the Koreans and the Thais 
buy only those items with a high re-sale value?! A friend and I nearly got jumped 
by some Koreans at the PX the other day because the sales girl told us there was 
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one line for Americans and another line for everyone else. Then we attempted to 
form the “American” line, two Koreans came over and told us to get to the end of 
the line. Fat chance!428  
 
Jones asserted that “Americans are only a small part of a larger operation—would it seem 
feasible to try and nail the biggest offenders first?” Attempting to provide Frizbee with 
convincing first-hand evidence, Jones continued, “If you think I’m kidding, go to the 
Cholon PX some day when they have fans, refrigerators, cognac, suitcases, or even 
recording tapes and watch how our allies operate.” Jones surmised that if the Cholon PX 
would be declared off-limits to Koreans, Thais, and Filipinos, as had occurred at the Tan 
Son Nhut PX, “I am sure the black market activity would be curtailed to such an extent 
that the Vietnamese economy could possibly level off.” Finally, the informant stated, 
“Sorry I can’t sign my real name, but then I’m sure that ‘Victor Frizbee’ must be an 
Army-issued name.”429 Jones’ complaints against Korean, Thai, and Filipino civilians 
and soldiers touched upon the delicate subject of relations between Americans and their 
allies. As members of the Free World Military Forces fought alongside American and 
South Vietnamese soldiers and had access to the American-operated PX, the financial 
rationales that motivated American participation in black marketing also encouraged 
allied personnel to partake in the same illegal activities. 
When Victor Frizbee’s replies elicited no further correspondence from the 
original letter-writer, American officials considered other ways that this fictitious 
character could continue conversations with those providing information. Provost 
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Marshal Warren H. Metzner requested an “unlisted telephone be installed in the MACV 
Provost Marshal’s Office on a temporary basis to provide an anonymous point of 
contact.”430 Eugene A. Ginda, the chief of the ES&I division, proposed to utilize 
investigators working in the office of the Provost Marshall in the Military Assistance 
Command to “act as Victor Frizbee when meeting informants who request a meeting.” 
The current plan of operation “requires us to send a letter to the individual requesting 
information. However, we very seldom receive a reply.” Furthermore, Ginda asserted that 
most of the letters received requested a private meeting with Mr. Frizbee to relay more 
information. He explained that “by using our investigators to act as Mr. Frizbee, we can 
receive valuable information on blackmarket activities, money manipulation and other 
illegal activities.” Ginda added, “Of course, some of the information might prove to be 
false, but I believe it would be worth our efforts to sort it out.”431 Ginda’s 
recommendation soon became a reality: Victor Frizbee was now available to meet in 
person.  
 One person interviewed by Victor Frizbee himself was Pat Vinson, a former 
RMK-BRJ employee who sought employment with the construction company Pacific 
Architects and Engineers. After conveying in a letter that he could furnish information 
that could help Frizbee “break up a black market organization” in Saigon and that he had 
knowledge of “check writing and money exchanging at Da Lat and Nha Trang,”432 
Vinson earned a visit from Frizbee at his hotel room. During the interview, Vinson stated 
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that he was assigned as a construction supervisor with RMK-BRJ in Vung Ro Bay, where 
he observed “cargo diverted from the port area by U.S. Army personnel and placed into 
RMK-BRJ buildings for subsequent removal and sale on the black market.” He also 
noted cases of beer and cigarettes appear hidden beneath automotive air and oil filters in 
the company’s repair shop. Additionally, he stated that the Army PX at Tuy Hoa sold 
beer and liquor without marking the ration cards of individuals “if the girls are given a 
small payoff in advance.”433 Although there was no further follow-up investigation of 
Vinson’s claims, his statements suggest that American civilian employees in South 
Vietnam were able to participate in the black market with the assistance of American 
soldiers and Vietnamese civilian employees.  
Other correspondence describing the participation of allied personnel in black 
market activities to Victor Frizbee yielded supplementary investigations by American 
officials. An anonymous letter dated 15 October 1969, asked Frizbee to “[k]indly 
investigate” a Filipino national by the name of Fortunato Reyes of Vietnam Regional 
Exchange (VRE) in Nha Trang for purchasing rationed items and selling them and 
“cheating the exchange” in stock. The informant noted that Reyes “has many 
unregistered appliances at home” and “can manipulate the depot.”434 The investigation 
involved contacting Reyes’ superior at the VRE, which operated the local PX’s, but his 
superior denied any knowledge of losses of goods. American officials then concluded in 
December that year that “there is no proof of Reyes’ involvement in illicit activities” but 
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that “his activities are being closely scrutinized” by his supervisors.435 Although it is 
difficult to substantiate that Reyes was, in fact, innocent of the alleged illegal activities, 
the anticlimactic end to Reyes’ investigation and other investigations initiated under the 
Frizbee campaign may indicate that there was a reluctance to verify corrupt activities, 
particularly if the people asked to confirm the wrongdoing were involved themselves.    
Besides Reyes, the actions of some Filipino civilian employees became the 
subject of several letters. One letter from Kim Il Soong of the Korean Embassy, Juan de 
la Cruz of the Vietnam Regional Exchange central office, and Pedro de la Cruz of the 
Vietnam Regional Exchange in Cam Ranh dated 30 August 1969, accused the American 
government of facilitating black market transactions by Filipino employees. The three 
men wrote to the general manager of the Vietnam Regional Exchange, “The rottenness of 
your administration…is in your tolerating or encouraging blackmarketeering activities in 
this country.” Before terminating the employment of many Filipino employees, they 
asserted, “you allowed them to buy as much as their jeeps and taxis can carry; they 
frequent Cholon PX as many as 4 times in a day.” They cited the example of a man by 
the name of “Dodong” who sold cases of beers by the dozens. “Mr. Frizbee, please plant 
one or two of your men here,” they exhorted. To the general manager of the VRE, they 
implored, “try to confiscate or redeem your invalid PX cards and IDs from your 
terminated employees.” They concluded, “Act now, Gentlemen, or would you rather keep 
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your eyes and ears closed and thus deprive your Uncle Sam of his dollars?”436 The 
request to “plant” an official to catch thieves at the Cholon PX was not an absurd request, 
given Frizbee’s desire to find out which individuals contributed to the black market. 
However, American officials ultimately could not detain or punish allied personnel 
because they were not American citizens. Additionally, any sense of diplomatic tension 
between America and its allies in the war would further harm America’s reputation. As 
the authors of this letter implied, American officials had the choice to address these cases 
of corruption or continue allowing these illicit activities to squander American taxpayer 
funds. To avoid the negative consequences of attempting to curb corruption amongst 
allied forces, U.S. officials had reason to “keep their eyes and ears closed.”   
While many readers of the original advertisement relayed information regarding 
illicit activities to Frizbee, a minority of readers responded with great doubt and suspicion 
about his true identity and motivations. A countervailing ad appeared in the Saigon Daily 
News: “Wanted: Information relating to the actual identity and present whereabouts of 
Victor Frizbee. Contact your nearest Bank of India representative. (In country).”437 It is 
unclear who placed the advertisement, but there is evidence that American officials were 
not behind it. On 1 May 1969, a memorandum from Fred G. Steiner, Chief of the Provost 
Marshal Division, noted that “[p]ossible exploitation of this ad is under consideration.”438 
Steiner’s statement suggests that American leaders were not responsible for placing the 
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advertisement in print; if they were, they would likely have considered the uses of the 
advertisement before deciding to publish it. The notice’s instruction to contact a Bank of 
India representative in Vietnam refers to the powerful Indian moneychangers in Saigon. 
It is likely that this advertisement was intended to help protect moneychangers by 
providing information on Victor Frizbee’s identity.  
Readers of Frizbee’s original advertisement were not only skeptical of his identity 
and method of investigation, but they were also doubtful of his motives. On May 14, 
1969, the Saigon Daily News published a competing advertisement directed to Mr. 
Frizbee. The advertisement read: 
Attention: Victor Frizbee  
Are you aware that: the U.S. Embassy, USAID, OICC, and MAC-V are the major 
offenders of currency regulations. If, indeed, you desire to preserve and protect 
U.S. interests, then investigate their methods of paying certain Vietnamese 
Contractors holding U.S. Dollar banking accounts outside RVN; the Embassy’s 
method of paying the rent on the International House; the U.S. army’s method of 
payment for leasing certain Vietnamese Hotels and Villas, presently being used as 
billets; etc….or, are these agencies considered “above the law”?439 
 
The author of this notice challenged Frizbee’s strategy of uncovering individual 
Americans involved in black marketing activities and instead insisted that he should 
pursue the main perpetrators of currency manipulation—the high-level American 
agencies and organizations involved in executing the war. The author of this 
advertisement suggested that if Frizbee truly cared about American interests, then Frizbee 
would stop those agencies from their negligent methods of payment. The author’s 
                                                
439 Advertisement, Saigon Daily News, 14 May 1969, Box 1000 folder, RG 472, NACP. 
 255 
accusation that these agencies may be “above the law” reflects his belief that American 
officials are purposely ignoring the American government’s large-scale currency 
transactions with Vietnamese entities. Moreover, the author suggests, in a rather 
patronizing tone, that eradicating currency manipulation would require solving the 
problem from the top, not from the bottom, as Frizbee aimed to do.  
 A letter to the editor of a Saigon newspaper echoed the sentiments of this 
advertisement. Signed, “A law-abiding citizen wondering about your activities,” the 
unidentified writer asserted, “Your ‘ad’ is definitely a fallacy as no amount of such 
information will preserve or protect US interests. If anything, you are trying to preserve 
and protect RVN interests which is a larger joke.” The unknown author addressed Mr. 
Frizbee directly in his letter: 
I do hope you realize that [not] only are USAID, OICC, and MACV major 
offenders of currency regulations and blackmarket activities but high ranking 
government and military officials of RVN…are the people sponsoring and getting 
rich off of such activities.  
If you really wanted to preserve and protect US interests you wouldn’t be here 
harassing Americans! You would be in the US clearing….corruption behind the 
above mentioned organizations.  
 
The writer then stated, “No offense is [meant] by the following statement: ‘I think you 
are fighting a losing battle.’” His reasoning was that “while you are chasing the little 
man,” the organizations in South Vietnam and the United States “are just becoming that 
much more stronger and richer.”440  
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 American officials, however, responded to the allegations made in these 
anonymous publications by denying them. Richardson wrote to Saigon that a reply to this 
advertisement was needed “quickly for possible questions by the Ribicoff Committee in 
hearings.”441 A memo from Deputy Ambassador Samuel Berger to the Saigon embassy 
on 24 September 1969, stated briefly, “The allegation is unfounded. Disbursements by 
the Embassy, USAID, OICC, and MACV are constantly and closely monitored.” 
Moreover, Berger asserted that there was no evidence of illegal disbursement of funds. 
Specifically, he maintained that the embassy pays rent to the International House in 
piasters, the Army leases billets in piasters, and U.S. agencies pay piasters to Vietnamese 
firms under contract.442 As this response from Berger demonstrates, and as many who 
wrote in to Frizbee in fact feared, American officials’ investigations furthermore 
demonstrated great reluctance to implicate high-level officials and organizations who 
may have been responsible for the ubiquity of corrupt practices. 
 On 24 August 1969, The Saigon Post published a letter to the editor in which the 
author questioned Frizbee’s motivations. The unknown author asked, “Just how serious is 
his desire to obtain this knowledge? From all outward appearances it would appear that 
he is not very zealous in his efforts.” Claiming that he will point Mr. Frizbee in the right 
direction, the letter-writer stated: 
Mr. Frisbee, if you will just stand in the entrance of the International House 
during business hours and check the ID cards of those that enter I think that you 
might be enlightened. Then Mr. Frisbee if you enter the building and re-check the 
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ID cards of those persons that pay for their meals and purchase slugs for the one 
armed bandits I am sure that you would be very surprised.  
 
The author of the letter stated that the only authorized currency for American military 
personnel in Vietnam was the MPC. However, he asked, “How then can employees of 
RMK-BRJ, PA&E, and other civilian…companies some of whom are obviously not 
authorized this privilege pay for their meals and other services openly and flagrantly with 
no questions asked.” On the topic of MPC conversions, the author exhorted: 
By the way, Victor, August 11, 1969 was…the day the US military decided to 
break the Chinese and Indian banks with their money conversion. Would you 
please explain to us how the Vietnamese money changers on lower Tu Do street 
were offering to exchange US green money for the NEW MPC on Sunday August 
10, 1969??? My My, Victor, is it not possible to check the foreign bank accounts 
of the US military finance officers, just to see what kind of increase occurred?443 
 
The accusatory tone of this letter suggests that the author was dubious of Mr. Frizbee’s 
efforts to address the problem of illegal activities. The author suggests that American 
military finance officers capitalized on their knowledge of the conversion date and access 
to the new series of scrip by offering the new MPCs to Vietnamese money changers in 
exchange for dollars.  
 Foreign businesses operating in South Vietnam also attracted criticisms from 
letter-writers. In an undated letter signed by “A concerned American, who loves his 
country,” the author insisted that Frizbee should “investigate and bring to the American 
public the procedures of all non-American companies presently doing business with our 
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units here in Viet-Nam.” The author used the example of Hong Kong-based businesses 
and claimed that they sold millions of dollars worth of items to the military club systems 
but did not pay American taxes. The author then claimed that the profits go to Hong 
Kong, “thence probably to Switzerland.” He asserted that Frizbee must be aware of this 
procedure, but “why don’t you do something about it. I am tired of lip service…I want 
action. Run these non-US based companies out of Vietnam by simply refusing them 
business with our troops.” Moreover, the author stated that the “Vietnamese police aren’t 
going to do anything. They get their fair share of ‘kick-backs.’”444 
 The participation of non-American corporations in corrupt deals and war 
profiteering spurred other readers to write in to Victor Frizbee. A letter from S.A. 
Livingstone, a pseudonym, dated 13 September 1969 alleged that Han Jin Transportation 
of Seoul, South Korea obtained a stevedoring contract with the American military 
because of connections with American colonels. Livingstone wrote, “The Organization is 
controlled by a former truck driver now a Multi-Millionaire in the person of Cho, Choong 
Hoon, and his American educated brother ‘Charlie’ Cho, a couple of shrewd operators.” 
He lamented, “it is incredible and beyond one’s imagination that the Cho Brothers were 
‘SELECTED’ by direct negotiation without experience to do Stevedoring work” in Qui 
Nhon. He affirmed that their “pay-off runs into fantastic figures plus the usual hot and 
cold running Vietnamese Broads.” Livingstone estimated more specifically that “Han Jin 
has profited more than US$25,000,000.00 during the period of 1966 thru 1969, and they 
are today still operating and milking the US govt. DRY.” Moreover, he stated that “[i]t is 
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criminal to think of the waste.” Livingstone promised to pursue this case through 
Congressional committees “in the event if you should overlook any appropriate action in 
bringing this case of fraud out in the open.” Referencing America’s balance-of-payments 
problems, Livingstone maintained that “[w]e are making beggars Kings at a time when 
we ourselves are going through hardships in the good old USA.” The author trusted that 
his resolve in “stamping out the several ‘carpet baggers’ will assist you and the 
Government in the elimination of their further activities and let an honest individual get a 
chance at the bat!”445 Livingstone’s message directly relates the alleged activities of a 
non-American corporation to the financial problems in the United States and asserts that 
the Korean businessmen were war profiteers. Additionally, his letter intimates that those 
who behaved morally were the ones being cheated.  
 Livingstone sent a second letter with the same date that complemented his earlier 
claims. He wrote, “In riding the gravy train for the past 3 years, they have built 
themselves an Empire at the lavish expense of the US Government to build themselves a 
20 story building in the heart of Seoul,” he asserted. “It is therefore, imperative that the 
Cho Bros of HAN JIN be thoroughly investigated with a fine tooth comb.” He pressed 
Frizbee on why U.S. contractors could not bid for this stevedoring contracting, 
considering that Han Jin had no previous experience in the field: “Does this seem strange 
and lend cause to suspicion of inborn collusion?”446 Victor Frizbee followed up with two 
letters, one of which requested a personal meeting with Livingston, acknowledging that 
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“you obviously are knowledgeable in the area of illicit activities which are detrimental to 
U.S. interests.”447 Frizbee also placed two advertisements in the Saigon Post addressed to 
S.A. Livingstone, but he was never heard from again.448  
It is worth nothing that the overwhelming response to the initial advertisement led 
American authorities to place another advertisement in local papers—this time, one that 
was based on false information. Writing on the behalf of other American officials, 
Warren H. Metzer from the Office of the Provost Marshal commented that responses to 
the original advertisement had been fruitful. He wrote, “We have obtained valuable 
information through the use of this ad, and this information well justifies the expenditures 
for the advertisement.”449 American officials, however, were not only interested in 
collecting the information they sought, but also planned to use the medium of newspapers 
to mislead some readers. The second advertisement stated: 
Wanted: 
Information concerning the widespread circulation of excellent counterfeit US 
federal reserve notes in RVN. Send to: Victor Frizbee Box 1000 APO 96222 (in 
country)450 
 
American officials purposely attempted to deceive newspaper readers into thinking that 
the counterfeiting of American dollars was popular and thus a focus of investigation. As 
one official wrote, “While the basic premise of the ad is untrue, it is felt that a great deal 
of consternation will be experienced among the money changers.” The official explained 
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that at “the present time, the money changers consider personal checks a very high risk, 
and money orders have been cut off by the MACV mailing requirement, leaving 
conversion of ‘green’ as the only reliable low risk form of money manipulation.” Since 
MACV instated a new regulation in October 1969 that required postal money orders to be 
sent to a specific address at the time of purchase, Americans in Vietnam were no longer 
able to purchase money orders with no designated payee.451 However, they were still able 
to use personal checks with no designated payee, though with great risk because of 
improved tracking systems. As a result, officials believed that converting American 
dollars was the dominant and safest method of currency manipulation. The official 
concluded, “This ad should cause a change in the risk factor.”452 The reasoning was that 
the supposed prevalence of counterfeit dollars would deter money changers from 
accepting dollars in general, thereby decreasing the volume of illegal transactions. It is 
likely that this advertisement had little to no effect on illegal currency transactions, as the 
black marketing of currency continued unabated throughout the American presence. 
However, this advertisement suggests that American policymakers ventured to counteract 
currency manipulation by simply placing a fabrication in print.  
The Victor Frizbee campaign continued at least into the summer of 1970, but, 
after congressional investigations brought to light the severe implications of South 
Vietnamese black markets in 1969, the campaign gradually lost steam. Using an alias to 
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encourage individuals to snitch on those engaged in the black market may have had an 
effect on deterring violations, but since many of the investigations often led to no arrests 
or disciplinary action, it is more reasonable to conclude that the Victor Frizbee campaign 
failed to discourage or punish black market transactions. If anything, the campaign may 
have worsened morale among those who wrote to Frizbee but did not see any results from 
their letters. Nevertheless, the Frizbee advertisement continued to elicit letters from 
newspaper readers in Vietnam at least until July 1970.  
While the Frizbee campaign was known to those on the ground in Vietnam, it did 
not produce any visible results to appease all the criticisms of corruption in the United 
States. Although Parker had prepared a document instructing how American officials 
should speak to the press about the Frizbee advertisement, since correspondents had 
inquired about the identity of Victor Frizbee, this anti-corruption campaign generally did 
not make headlines in the United States. However, as the Senate hearings highlighted the 
severe consequences for American taxpayers if the black market continued to thrive, 
members of Congress and news outlets began to pressure American and South 
Vietnamese leaders to produce evidence that they were attacking the black market. For 
American and South Vietnamese policymakers, there was one obvious action to take that 
could immediately placate critics: confiscate the contraband goods and currencies at the 
center of corruption by raiding the black markets. 
BLACK MARKET SWEEPS OF DECEMBER 1969 
 
Black market raids had been employed ever since black markets emerged on the 
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streets of Saigon, but in 1969, both American and South Vietnamese officials began to 
take them more seriously due to new allegations of widespread corruption in South 
Vietnam publicized by Congressional leaders. Since 1966, American officials carried out 
occasional raids of black markets to attempt to clamp down on illegal financial activities. 
For example, in November 1966, Lodge orchestrated a raid of the famous PX Alley black 
market, only to see black market vendors back in business the very next day, selling the 
same goods for higher prices.453 In March 1968, police in Saigon seized PX products 
worth millions of dollars at over 2,000 stalls. The raid displaced many black market 
vendors, but their businesses bounced back almost immediately. In late 1969, on the heels 
of congressional hearings on the black market in Vietnam, American and Vietnamese 
officials implemented a ten-day raid. The New York Times reported that the American 
military participated in the raiding teams, in the words of one informant, to “take charge 
of and to safeguard” any American caught dealing in the black market.454 The first raids 
focused on the black market in Cholon, the sister city of Saigon populated by mostly 
ethnic Chinese. The Cholon black market was situated just a few blocks from the largest 
American PX, which was the likely source of commodities to the black market.455   
 After Senate hearings on black markets and currency manipulation concluded in 
November, President Thieu expressed his concern about those problems and pressed for 
corrective action. In a letter dated 20 November 1969, he ordered a ten-day campaign, to 
take place from 27 November to 7 December, to eliminate contraband foreign currency 
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and American PX goods from the black markets in the greater Saigon metropolitan area. 
The purpose of the campaign was two-fold: first, to confiscate the foreign currencies and 
PX goods openly exchanged and displayed, and second, to have authorities continue to 
conduct investigations after the raids ended to eradicate the black market entirely. To 
carry out the president’s order, the South Vietnamese Minister of the Interior established 
a committee to oversee the campaign. Working closely with the Ministry of Interior, Do 
Kien Nhieu, Saigon’s mayor, convened a meeting of customs agents and American and 
Vietnamese police officials to organize for the raids. He assembled forty teams, each 
comprising three national policemen, one customs agent, and one American military 
policeman (MP). These teams would disperse to various parts of Saigon and nearby Gia 
Dinh province by precincts based on population size. Individual Precinct Chiefs would 
then formulate their own specific plan of attack.  
 The mayor provided general guidance for the teams. He directed teams to search 
for currency violators in the mornings, black market goods in the afternoons, and black 
market goods and currency violators in bars and hotels in the evenings. Vietnamese 
customs officials would take responsibility for confiscating foreign currency, while the 
Vietnamese national police would be in charge of seizing black market merchandise. 
Both groups of officers, however, would have the assistance of an American military 
policeman as well as members of the Saigon Municipal Police Directorate. Mayor Nhieu 
recommended that teams identify certain establishments and private homes to search 
beforehand. He also advised officers to inspect places conducive to illegal monetary 
transactions, including bars, hotels, restaurants, jewelry stores, and foreign business 
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establishments. More specifically, Nhieu singled out taxi drivers, bar girls and owners, 
hotel patrons, and travellers at Tan Son Nhut airport as currency manipulators to target. 
Meanwhile, locations housing black market goods included stores, sidewalk stands, bars, 
and hotels. The mayor ordered teams not only to confiscate contraband but also to 
investigate and arrest anyone caught possessing it. In a letter outlining the campaign’s 
plans, the mayor asserted that all departing passengers and their luggage were subject to 
thorough searches; there would be “no discrimination” of those subject to search, 
including “deputies and senators.”456 On the efforts aimed at PX commodities, the mayor 
stated, “There will be no more street stands selling these PX items after the campaign.”457  
 To this end, Americans achieved several purposes in the campaign. The mayor 
instructed MPs to point out the PX goods and any items belonging to the American 
government. Additionally, they were instructed to “protect the rights and property” of all 
American military personnel and “category I” civilians (employed with American 
government agencies in Vietnam). The mayor also required MPs to attend daily briefings 
before the raids began and to submit summaries of the previous day’s activities as well as 
currencies and goods confiscated. In addition to having one American MP per search 
team, six American officers participated as well. Four of the Americans worked in 
supervisory and coordinating roles in the larger precincts and in the Gia Dinh area. 
Meanwhile, two Americans, including Hervey Keator, the commander of the Saigon 
Provost Marshal’s office, served as liaisons to the Vietnam Central Committee, which, 
                                                
456 Summary of meeting, 26 November 1969. 
457 Ibid. 
 266 
according to American officials, “was assigned overall responsibility for the 
operation.”458  
During the ten-day sweeps, the American-South Vietnamese joint mission 
uncovered a variety of illegal currencies and consumer goods. American MPs reported 
that the raid teams confiscated $427 in American dollars, $1,048.40 MPCs, $1,450 
money orders, and $750 Bank of America traveler’s checks. They also reported a list of 
consumer goods seized, including 546 bottles of hard liquor, 432 cases of beers, 140 
cartons of cigarettes, 33 cases of soda, and 43 boxes of gum. Also, 739 individual 
containers of food were taken, including oil, sugar, noodles, meat, crackers, corn meal, 
salad oil, baby food, M&M candies, applesauce, ham, fruit cocktail, butter, and tea. 
While some of these food items represent essential commodities, goods considered to be 
luxury items in South Vietnam were also found at black markets. MPs reported 
confiscating 20 cameras, 94 rolls of film, 13 tape recorders, 5 television sets, 55 clocks, 6 
radios, 7 tuned amplifiers, 1 movie projector, 1 slide projector, 1 typewriter, and 1 
electric shaver. Other items seized included batteries, ponchos, suntan lotion, flashlights, 
matches, and playing cards. In addition to food and consumer goods, the raids impounded 
292 American government-issued articles, including mosquito nets, knives, belt buckles, 
and machetes.459 
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The list of confiscated currencies and goods published by American MPs differed 
considerably from the list produced by the Vietnam Central Committee that supervised 
the overall campaign. The Central Committee stated that the teams conducting the black 
market sweeps seized $16,783 worth of illegal currencies, including $3,580 green dollars, 
$862 in MPCs, and $9,341 in checks and money orders. Moreover, they estimated that 
8,476 items worth approximately 5,621,450 piasters and 250 taels of gold estimated at 
3,750,000 piasters were seized. Although American MPs did not calculate a ballpark 
figure for the merchandise confiscated, the number they reported for currency seized 
differed significantly from the amount cited by the Central Committee. Hervey Keator of 
the Office of the Provost Marshal stated that several factors explained the difference in 
the two lists. He noted that American MPs could not enter some houses and 
establishments while his Vietnamese counterparts did, though he did not give a reason. 
Moreover, the discrepancy between the two lists resulted from the fact that Vietnamese 
members of the team did not tell the American MPs exactly what was confiscated or the 
amount or value of what was taken.460  
 The inconsistent reports furnished by American MPs and the Vietnamese Central 
Committee alluded to tensions between American MPs and their Vietnamese teammates. 
Gerald Lohmeyer, an American MP who worked for a team in the 1st precinct, criticized 
the work ethic of his Vietnamese partners. He wrote, “The hours they worked and the 
amount of work they would do was one big joke.” Other MPs echoed his opinion. James 
                                                
460 Memo from Keator to Young, Subject: After Action Record/Saigon Blackmarket Confiscation 
Campaign,” 17 December 1969, Box 1, Security Classified General Records, 1969-1970, MACV/Office of 
the Provost Marshal, RG 472, NACP. 
 268 
W. Lathrop, an American MP who worked with another team in the same precinct, felt 
that his Vietnamese partners did not perform their part of the assigned task. He stated, “I 
did not mind working with these people except that this was their operation and they left 
everything for us to do.” Calling it “their operation,” Lathrop implied that black market 
corruption was a Vietnamese problem and that his Vietnamese teammates should have 
more reason than him to do their jobs. Lathrop suggested that any success derived from 
the raids should be directly attributable to American MPs: “If it was not for the MP’s 
doing most of the work they would not have gotten anything accomplished. We pointed a 
lot of things out to them to take but they just looked at us and would not help us out.”461  
 The feeling that Vietnamese officers refused to confiscate illegal goods and 
currencies was shared by American MPs who participated in the ten-day sweeps. 
Lohmeyer asserted, “If we came upon anything important it usually belonged to someone 
high and they did not want to remove the item or items.”462 Lohmeyer’s claim suggests 
that Vietnamese police officers were afraid of possible retaliation if they antagonized 
powerful people by seizing their possessions. Considering that the black market attracted 
many wealthy and influential Vietnamese, it is understandable that officers sometimes 
did not confiscate goods in order to protect themselves. Vietnamese officers also gave the 
opposite reason for allowing black market vendors and consumers to keep their goods. 
An official in the Office of the Provost Marshal noted that some teams confiscated 
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nothing, particularly toward the end of the campaign, because “the National Policemen 
would say they were poor.”463 Although it is unclear whether Vietnamese policemen 
refrained from seizing goods because they pitied the vendors or because they wished to 
avoid retribution, black market raids certainly put Vietnamese officers in the unenviable 
position of confiscating goods and currencies that their follow citizens coveted.  
 On the other hand, MPs observed that Vietnamese national policemen at times 
gladly appropriated black market goods—to keep for themselves, or, more likely, to give 
back to the vendors or owners. Calling the actions of his Vietnamese partners 
“distasteful,” Lohmeyer commented, “I felt that I was shopping for the Vietnamese. We 
would go where they wanted to go and pick up what they wanted to get.”464 Lohmeyer’s 
remark suggests that some Vietnamese officers seized goods for their personal gain. 
Given that black market vendors often paid law enforcement officials to look the other 
way, however, many Vietnamese officers developed mutually beneficial relationships 
with black market sellers. It is thus reasonable to assume that even if Vietnamese police 
confiscated certain goods, they likely returned them afterward because of previous 
arrangements with the vendors. Arthur Witmeyer, an MP from a second precinct team, 
recounted that the Canh Sats, the Vietnamese term for police, ignored small stands and 
markets. He observed that his team raided only large retailers and took only half of the 
goods displayed. In addition to maintaining that his teammates “appeared to be opposed 
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to the whole operation,” he noted that goods taken were mostly PX goods and liquor 
while big-ticket items like tape recorders, televisions, and radios were untouched. 
Witmeyer observed on several occasions that Vietnamese police gave back confiscated 
goods when the American MPs were not present. The Vietnamese military police 
“offered little or no assistance and [were] more of a hindrance,” he added.465 Lathrop also 
noticed that the Vietnamese police gave many PX goods right in front of him. He 
continued, “Then they expect us to catch these people with the goods so they can let them 
go.”466 Lathrop’s comment suggests that Vietnamese officers would rather let the 
American MPs take the blame so they can preserve their reputation with vendors. After 
all, Americans did not have to live with the consequences of alienating black market 
sellers and buyers, but Vietnamese officers did.  Indeed, during the raids, Vietnamese 
vendors and consumers expressed resentment towards the American officers executing 
the sweeps. Richard J. Kohlman, another MP who participated in the raids, noted that 
“[s]ome of the Vietnamese people got pretty hostile and started throwing things at us.”467 
 American MPs also suggest that the officials implemented the black market raids 
in order to create the impression that serious efforts were undertaken to destroy the black 
market, when it appeared that they were simply concerned with getting black market 
goods out of sight temporarily. Michael R. McHugh from a Gia Dinh team noted that the 
Vietnamese police “seemed more concerned with just getting the blackmarket items out 
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of plain sight rather than trying to abolish it altogether.”468 As evidenced by the fact that 
many Vietnamese officers returned confiscated goods almost immediately, the actual 
execution of the raids created a brief impression that action was taken. In fact, news 
coverage of the black market sweeps featured photos of American MPs confiscating 
black market goods, but not when Vietnamese officials handed back those very goods to 
their owners.   
 Overall, American MPs’ assessments of the ten-day black market raids pointed to 
the failure of the campaign, but American officials were more optimistic about the results 
of the raids. McHugh concluded that “it was a wasted ten days,” and Witmeyer 
commented that “the black market in Saigon was hardly affected at all” by the campaign. 
By the end of the 10-day raids in Saigon, American government officials announced that 
a total of $20,047 in American currency and $76,795 worth of PX goods had been 
confiscated, with only a few people detained.469 A cable from Bunker dated 2 December 
1969 summarized a briefing from the South Vietnamese spokesman, who announced that 
the raids “confiscated some 3 million Vietnamese piastres worth of duty-free PX items 
and US $9,739.20 (green) during four-day period November 27 to December 1.” On 5 
December 1969, the New York Times stated that the approximately $9,000 in American 
dollars seized was a “figure that is generally regarded as barely scratching the surface.”470 
Meanwhile, the black market exchange rate continued to soar to 300 piasters to the dollar, 
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while the official exchange rate remained at 118 piasters to the dollar.471 American 
officials conceded that after the ten-day raids ended, black market vendors were back in 
business. Bars in Saigon, for example, were selling PX beer and liquor like before.472 
After the raids, confiscated goods were taken by the Vietnamese customs and held in 
warehouses, but American sources suspected that the goods ended up back in the black 
market.473 One official commented that the “campaign’s success was considerably less 
than the goals established by the Prime Minister,” but “nonetheless a great deal of 
material was confiscated and the campaign represented a start by the Vietnamese in 
combating the problem.”474 The problem with this evaluation, however, was that “a start” 
to fighting the black markets was simply not enough to reverse the damage that had been 
done to the morale of soldiers and civilians on the ground as well as the economies of 
both the United States and South Vietnam.  
 As American MPs had pointed out, black market raids provided visible proof that 
American and Vietnamese officials were taking action to solve the problem. A black 
market in Saigon known as the “Little Black Market” was renowned as an easy target for 
“show” raids used to demonstrate ostensible toughness against the black market. Located 
a short walk from the American embassy, the Little Black market sold goods which were 
sent for American aid programs in Vietnam and for American and South Vietnamese 
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forces.475 According to William Lederer, it was a small black market, compared to the 
larger ones in Saigon, and was often shown to visitors like it was a tourist attraction.476 
The Little Black Market operated openly with tacit acceptance by Americans and 
Vietnamese officials alike, both of whom were aware of the origins of the goods as well 
as the corruption required to facilitate the movement of goods from its legal depositories 
to its illegal status on the street. However, American and Vietnamese officials tolerated 
the Little Market for several reasons. From the American perspective, Tom McAlliffe, an 
American police instructor in Saigon, stated that, “We aren’t too strict about it because in 
the first place we don’t want to antagonize the Koreans or the Filipinos.”477 He also 
claimed that economists asserted that the black market helped to stop inflation. McAlliffe 
thus explained Americans’ acceptance of the black market on the grounds that trying to 
stamp it out would create diplomatic tensions for the United States and its allies and also 
worsen inflation, a perpetual problem that worried officials. His comment thus implied 
that Americans did not want to close the black market for good. 
 Vietnamese officials, too, it could be argued, were not interested in eradicating 
the black market. Like Vietnamese police officers who appeared resistant to executing 
the raids, Lieutenant Vo of the Vietnamese National Police explained that leaders in 
Saigon wanted to deflect external pressures to curb the black market. As Vo told Lederer 
in 1968: 
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The Little Black Market is permitted to continue because it is useful to everyone. 
When the American press-or perhaps a visiting senator—complains about 
corruption we close the Little Black Market for a few days. That’s it. Immediate 
action has been taken. The stalls have been closed. Sometimes the merchandise is 
burned in the street. Photographs are taken. A few people are arrested. The 
Americans are satisfied. Action against corruption has been taken. It takes 
pressure off the US Embassy. It takes pressure off my government. Do you see 
how useful the Little Market is?478 
 
As Vo’s statement reveals, black market raids were staged to mollify American critics of 
Vietnamese corruption. They were performances that temporarily inconvenienced a few 
people and sacrificed some consumer goods, but they enabled the black markets to 
survive. As long as raids offered the opportunity to stage occasional photo opportunities 
for American consumption, they were allowed to flourish. Ultimately, as Vo states, black 
markets were “useful to everyone,” and there were reasons for both the United States and 
South Vietnam to allow them to persist.   
 The visibility of black market raids dovetails with other visible components of 
anti-corruption measures in South Vietnam. American officials favored press releases 
about black market arrests, which would broadcast to the American public the progress 
made to combat corruption. In later years, Vietnamese officials tasked with fighting 
corruption proposed televising an award to a customs investigator who uncovered an 
important black market transaction. Ambassador Berger even suggested to his 
Vietnamese counterparts that the Vietnamese could feature a television program to 
demonstrate the ways in with the Saigon government was tackling black market 
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corruption.479 In reality, however, the use of television as a medium to convey to 
Vietnamese the government’s drive against corruption undermines the government’s 
message. After all, most Vietnamese did not have television sets, and those who did often 
acquired them on the black market.480  
CONCLUSION 
 
 As the Victor Frizbee campaign and the black market raids illustrate, American 
and Vietnamese officials chose to fight corruption in a way that showed both observers 
and participants of black market transactions that policymakers at the top were taking 
actions to remedy the problem. In the Frizbee case, soldiers and civilians on the ground in 
Vietnam received the message that someone who had American interests at heart was 
investigating illegal activities. The black market raids orchestrated by Vietnamese 
officials, on the other hand, demonstrated to American critics of Vietnamese corruption 
that Vietnamese leaders were cracking down on the black market. Both of these 
campaigns aimed at trying to deal with the black market as a criminal problem, never 
addressing the economic rationality that undergirded much of corruption in Vietnam.  
 The ways in which American and Vietnamese officials approached the problem of 
black markets erased the economic principle behind black market behavior while 
focusing on the immorality of black market participation. As letters to Victor Frizbee 
demonstrate, Americans who engaged in illicit activities were characterized as lacking 
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virtue, self-restraint, and concern for American interests, while those who reported the 
black market activities often assumed the position of a moral high ground. Similarly, 
black market raids focused on low-level participants who violated the law and gave into 
temptations to enjoy PX consumer goods. The amount of currency and goods confiscated 
during the raids, for example, demonstrate the supposed greed of those dealing in the 
black market. In dealing with the problem of black markets, officials did not 
acknowledge the economic conditions created by the war, such as inflation and the 
shortage of consumer goods on the legitimate market, and the existence of a highly 
overvalued official exchange rate that provided financial incentives for people to engage 
in black market activities. As long as the official exchange rate remained profitable, 
Americans and Vietnamese kept the black market alive. In the meantime, the misplaced 
efforts by American and Vietnamese officials to deal with the black market in goods and 
currencies only allowed economic problems to worsen.  
 While American and Vietnamese officials in Saigon attacked corruption in 1969 
by mostly chasing individual transgressors and confiscating black market goods and 
currencies, in 1970 a newly assembled group of American officials in Washington began 
focusing on the larger economic circumstances that gave rise to black market corruption. 
As Bunker imparted to Thieu in early 1970, the problem of black markets became such a 
high priority for the Nixon administration that officials created a formal 
interdepartmental Action Task Group (IATG) on Blackmarketing and Currency 
Manipulation. In December 1969, Secretary of State William P. Rogers approved the 
establishment of an Action Task Group jointly coordinated by the Departments of State, 
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Defense, and Treasury to “eliminate opportunities for blackmarketing, currency 
manipulation and for the purpose of exploring the broader aspects of economic conditions 
which spawn blackmarketing and currency manipulation.”481 As Rogers explained, “we 
have long felt the need for a Washington body, somewhat analogous to the mission-wide 
Irregular Practices Committee, that could act expeditiously on the committee’s 
recommendations requiring interagency implementation at the Washington level.”482 The 
collaboration of the Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury reflected Washington’s 
acknowledgement that corruption in South Vietnam was simultaneously an American 
diplomatic, military, and economic concern. 
By 1970, American officials investigating corruption in South Vietnam 
emphasized that economic reforms were necessary to slow the black market. In 
examining the wider economic conditions that facilitated corruption, the IATG 
recommended that South Vietnamese officials implement major economic reforms to 
stem the tide of corruption. After a visit to South Vietnam in March 1970 to assess black 
marketing, currency manipulation and other activities affecting the Vietnamese economy, 
the IATG reported that “the opportunity for blackmarketing in currency is created by the 
desire of Vietnamese…and other person with capital funds in Vietnam to escape the 
threat to the security of their acquisitions by transferring their holdings to hard currencies 
outside Vietnam or to gold, diamonds, or other enduring tangible assets.” They concluded 
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that, “the adoption of austerity measures appropriate to a war-time situation and the strict 
enforcement of necessary controls are mandatory if the economic war in Vietnamese is to 
be won.”483 Moreover, in June 1970, the IATG asserted that the “most significant action 
which could be taken which would make the economic environment less conducive to 
corrupt activities would be an improved rate of exchange.” The IATG’s report claimed 
that the GVN’s official exchange, which was two thirds lower than the world market rate, 
was a major cause of black marketing in currencies and goods. Buyers and sellers of 
goods and services in Vietnam consistently ignored the official 1:118 exchange rate; 
prices of goods were priced at a rate closer to 380 piasters per dollar. They argued that if 
the legal exchange rate were close to the black market rate, then “there would be little 
inducement for individuals to deal in the illegal market.”484  
As the military conflict dominated the agenda of policymakers, the economic 
aspects of the war became increasingly more urgent by late 1969 and early 1970. In early 
1970, officials at the Saigon embassy, including Bunker, believed that economic 
“problems were becoming more serious than the military threat and if left unsolved might 
undo everything that had been achieved.”485 The beginning of Vietnamization had 
substantial effects not only on the battlefield but also on the economy. As the next 
chapter will show, the confluence of the withdrawal of troops, the decline in economic 
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aid, increasing global inflation, and the adoption of austerity measures in South 
Vietnam—for the first time since the beginning of American escalation—harkened the 
ultimate collapse of the South Vietnamese economy. When American leaders decided to 
Vietnamize the war thereby ending American involvement in the conflict, South 
Vietnamese leaders no longer held leverage over their American counterparts. They could 
not use the instability of their government to force American leaders to submit to South 
Vietnamese stipulations on economic policy. Given that the United States was 
withdrawing troops, it was reasonable for South Vietnamese leaders to think that the 
United States could withdraw economic aid as well. Faced with the possibility of losing 
millions of dollars in assistance, President Thieu finally gave in to American pressures to 
devalue the piaster in October 1970. 
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Chapter Five: Vietnamization, American Withdrawal of Troops, and 
the End of War, 1970-1975 
 Since 1965, the United States had built a house of cards in South Vietnam. 
Underwritten by millions of dollars in economic aid and flooded with imported consumer 
goods, South Vietnam appeared on the surface as an economically prosperous country. 
Luxury homes, extravagant nightclubs, and expensive consumer electronics provided 
jarring evidence of an affluent urban society in the midst of war. Generous American 
military spending, including the vast purchasing power of GIs, reinforced this facade of 
relative comfort. Many South Vietnamese residents participated in and even benefited 
from the bonanza of American spending, either through lawful employment or 
corruption. It was undeniable that some individuals, both Americans and Vietnamese, 
profited handsomely from the war.  
The ostensible boom of the American presence, however, masked serious doubts 
about the basic economic viability of South Vietnam. In fact, American and South 
Vietnamese leaders’ responses to fundamental problems in the South Vietnamese 
economy not only failed to resolve those long-term issues but also often exacerbated 
them. In particular, steps taken to address inflation and corruption produced their own set 
of consequences for the economy and society in South Vietnam, consequences that were 
arguably fatal for the country regardless of the outcome of the military or political wars.  
Since South Vietnam’s inception, U.S. policymakers had propped up the Saigon 
government and treated the problem of inflation by inundating South Vietnam with 
massive amounts of economic aid and consumer goods. Though the Commercial Import 
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Program, the United States attempted and succeeded, to a large degree, in using import 
commodities to tamp down inflation and keep it within manageable levels. As a result, 
South Vietnamese were able to enjoy relatively high standards of living without having 
the productive capacities of industrial nations. The availability of imported food and 
commodities naturally discouraged South Vietnamese development of domestic 
production and fostered an increasing economic dependence on the United States. 
Meanwhile, American economic aid also funded South Vietnamese civilian and military 
expenditures, postponing and even obviating the need for a genuine solution to the lack 
of a tax collection infrastructure. Along with benefitting from an exchange rate that 
generously overvalued the piaster, the South Vietnamese government was able to 
function without generating its own sources of revenue or producing any exports.  
The American escalation of war further diminished any urgency to address 
fundamental questions about South Vietnam’s economy, as prosecuting the war took top 
priority. However, the arrival of the American military presence not only amplified the 
problem of inflation, but also introduced new social, cultural, and economic dislocations 
in South Vietnam. The inflationary effects of escalation combined with the creation of a 
new service sector catering to the needs of GIs widened economic inequality, overturned 
traditional social hierarchies, made corruption a necessary part of survival, and severely 
undermined national morale. These radical transformations marginalized crucial 
segments of the South Vietnamese population, most importantly civil servants and 
military servicemen, and raised serious concerns among South Vietnamese about the loss 
of cultural identity. For many South Vietnamese, however, the American presence and 
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the forced urbanization of war created jobs and provided some measure of economic 
stability.  
Although some American policymakers were not concerned about the social and 
cultural impact of the American presence, the U.S. military worried about the economic 
consequences of the war and sought to prevent American wealth within military bases 
from affecting the South Vietnamese economy. Military authorities appealed to soldiers’ 
virtue and morality to protect the South Vietnamese economy, but such campaigns were 
ultimately not enough to convince American soldiers and civilians to spend less if they 
were compensated generously. Moreover, it was difficult to convince individuals to forgo 
the economic rationality of the black market. After all, the United States created a system 
that overvalued the Vietnamese piaster, meaning that soldiers would not get the full 
worth of their dollars if they exchanged currency at legal rates. As the war progressed, 
the black market in currency and goods thrived, so long as American aid was 
forthcoming. Policymakers in Washington and Saigon often placated criticisms of the 
Vietnamese black market with visible efforts to crack down on black market corruption, 
but these measures failed to remove the economic incentive that undergirded the 
pervasiveness of corruption. Indeed, the optimistic narrative proffered by American 
policymakers with regard to the progress of the war downplayed the artificial, vulnerable, 
and unsustainable nature of the South Vietnamese economy.  
The boom of the American presence, however, as everyone knew, would not last 
forever. The house of cards would collapse once American policymakers began a policy 
of de-escalating the war in Vietnam. Inflation, corruption, and the creation of a service-
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sector economy intertwined to produce a deeply unstable situation for South Vietnam—
politically, militarily, economically, socially, and culturally—and the mere beginning of 
American withdrawal would unmask the country’s serious economic flaws. By 1969, 
when President Nixon announced the beginning of American troop withdrawals and the 
replacement of American soldiers with Vietnamese forces, the country’s shaky economic 
foundation could no longer be ignored. Fundamental questions about the economic 
sustainability of South Vietnam, largely neglected in the years of American escalation, 
finally rose to the top of South Vietnam’s priorities when the United States began to 
extricate itself from the war. The presence of American troops to fight a war while 
attempting to construct a nation in South Vietnam proved to exacerbate the country’s 
fragile economic foundations. By the time that American troops left, the South 
Vietnamese were in a much worse economic position than they were in during American 
escalation. 
 This chapter examines the impact of the withdrawal of the American presence on 
South Vietnam and the ways in which American and South Vietnamese policymakers 
responded to the economic consequences of withdrawal. It argues that the crises that 
resulted from the departure of American military personnel revealed the fragility of the 
South Vietnamese state and economy that the American military presence had cultivated 
since 1965. Moreover, it asserts that the consequences of American extrication further 
eroded national legitimacy and morale among important segments of the South 
Vietnamese population, especially civil servants and members of the armed forces. By 
the early 1970s, the confluence of American troop withdrawal, global inflation, the 
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implementation of austerity measures, and the gradual decline of economic aid in South 
Vietnam created the perfect storm for South Vietnam’s eventual collapse.  
 Although historians have tended to focus more on the military and diplomatic 
dimensions of the conflict to the exclusion of the economic aspects of the Vietnam War’s 
ending, this chapter attempts to refocus attention on the urgency of the South Vietnamese 
economic situation as the war wound down. Scholarship on the last stages of the Vietnam 
War has, with good reason, centered on the Paris Peace talks, North Vietnamese military 
intransigence, and the simultaneous American contraction and expansion of war within 
and beyond Vietnam, among other events and trends.486 However, as the very survival of 
South Vietnam, even from the beginning, depended on American economic assistance, 
the gradual withdrawal of the American presence and concomitant reductions in military 
and economic aid had consequential effects on the ultimate existence of the country, and 
thus merit scholarly analysis. This is not to say that American withdrawal directly caused 
the fall of Saigon. In fact, this chapter refutes a major argument offered by many 
revisionist scholars, namely that the withdrawal of American military and economic aid 
was largely responsible for the collapse of South Vietnam.487 In particular, revisionists 
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have argued that if only Congress did not vote to reduce, and later, cut off economic and 
military assistance to South Vietnam, the country would not have fallen to communism. 
This chapter argues strongly against this revisionist argument. It asserts that American 
withdrawal was a necessary remedy to the problems created by the American presence. 
The very suggestion that South Vietnam’s defeat was wholly premised upon the denial of 
American aid, however, reveals important questions about South Vietnam’s economic 
viability that deserve critical examination. This chapter demonstrates that the economic 
problems faced by South Vietnam toward the end of its existence were a result of 
decisions made beforehand. The collapse of South Vietnam was not predetermined but, in 
fact, contingent upon choices that both U.S. and South Vietnamese policymakers made in 
the years leading up to the American withdrawal of troops. 
 This chapter presents the story of how Vietnamese and Americans shaped, 
interpreted, and reacted to the unfolding of events in South Vietnam from 1969 to the 
early 1970s. It begins with an overview of major political and military developments 
during the unwinding of the war. Next, the chapter discusses the state of the South 
Vietnamese economy and the austerity measures implemented in Saigon to tackle the 
twin problems of inflation and corruption. These economic developments alarmed 
policymakers in Washington as they wrestled with the consequences of American 
disengagement. The signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 1973, which mandated the 
complete withdrawal of American troops, marks the halfway point of this story. The 
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second half of the chapter focuses on the economic implications of the American pullout 
from the perspectives of American policymakers and South Vietnamese citizens. While 
American policymakers touted the resiliency of the Vietnamese economy, South 
Vietnamese reactions to the withdrawal of American troops, their lived experiences of 
economic recession, and their perspectives on South Vietnam’s national legitimacy 
proved otherwise. 
THE VIETNAMIZATION OF WAR, 1969-1971  
 
 As American disillusionment with the Vietnam War led to a growing chorus of 
voices calling for the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops, the de-escalation of war and 
the search for peace that begun under the Johnson administration would continue into the 
next decade. After the Tet Offensive, the Johnson administration shifted military 
strategies in further attempts to gain the upper hand in peace negotiations with Hanoi. To 
appease both doves outraged with the number of American casualties and hawks 
demanding further intensification of the war, the Johnson administration adopted the 
strategies of pacification and the beginning of what would later be called 
“Vietnamization.” Under the new leadership of Creighton Abrams, who replaced William 
Westmoreland as commander of MACV in March 1968, the U.S. military began 
implementing plans to win the “hearts and minds” of Vietnamese civilians, thereby 
increasing security in the Vietnamese countryside, and stepping up efforts to expand, 
arm, and train the ARVN. When Richard Nixon took office in January 1969, then, his 
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plan to gradually phase down American involvement in Vietnam was more or less 
already underway.  
Despite hoping to end the war quickly, however, Nixon found that achieving 
“peace with honor” in Vietnam—ending the war with an independent South Vietnam still 
intact—would require more time than he anticipated. Like Johnson, Nixon worried about 
the political repercussions of policy decisions for his own electoral ambitions. He 
rebuffed demands for the unilateral and immediate withdrawal of American troops, which 
he perceived as a failure of American foreign policy. In his view, such a plan would not 
only precipitate the rapid collapse of South Vietnam but also endanger American 
credibility around the world. Working closely with his main foreign policy adviser, 
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, Nixon settled on a mixture of strategies to 
induce Hanoi to negotiate on terms favorable to the United States while quelling 
domestic discontent with American losses in the war. First, they sought to apply pressure 
on the Soviet Union, whose leaders were eager to renew diplomatic relations with the 
United States, to use its influence to coerce North Vietnam into signing a peace 
agreement. Second, they aimed to convince Hanoi’s leaders that Nixon would use any 
military force, including nuclear weapons, to win the war.488 His “madman theory,” 
Nixon believed, could intimidate Hanoi to the point that “Ho Chi Minh himself will be in 
Paris in two days begging for peace.”489  
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In the meantime, as they awaited the results of these strategies, Nixon and 
Kissinger initiated the first stages of incremental U.S. troop withdrawals to satisfy the 
American public. In June 1969, Nixon announced the departure of 25,000 American 
troops from Vietnam, followed by an announcement in September ordering the 
withdrawal of another 35,000. Many antiwar Americans, however, were not content with 
Nixon’s phased withdrawal plan. In nationally orchestrated “Moratorium” 
demonstrations in October, approximately two million Americans protested the slow pace 
of troop pullouts; a month later, 250,000 antiwar protesters marched in Washington, DC. 
In a nationally televised speech on 3 November 1969, President Nixon dismissed the 
criticisms of protesters by asserting that a “silent majority” of Americans supported his 
administration’s policies in Vietnam. In the same speech, Nixon formally announced his 
Vietnamization strategy, the plan to gradually withdraw American troops while 
increasing the training and equipment of South Vietnamese military forces to eventually 
assume all responsibility for fighting the war. Contrasting his aims with those of Johnson, 
Nixon maintained, “In the previous administration, we Americanized the war in Vietnam. 
In this administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace.”490 In line with the 
newly-declared Nixon Doctrine, which stated that the United States would defend allied 
countries with military aid and equipment instead of American troops, the Vietnamization 
strategy indicated a different direction for American foreign policy.491 
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  In addition to making gestures toward peace, Nixon and Kissinger expanded the 
war beyond Vietnam in the hopes that Hanoi would reach its breaking point. During the 
first few months of his presidency, Nixon extended the bombing of the Ho Chi Minh 
Trail begun under the Johnson administration by authorizing Operation Menu, the secret 
B-52 bombing of communist sanctuaries in Cambodia. Despite the risks associated with 
violating the neutrality of Cambodia, Nixon’s expansion of war to Vietnam’s neighbor 
only deepened further, owing to subsequent events. In March 1970, pro-American 
General Lon Nol overthrew Prince Sihanouk’s neutralist government, opening the doors 
for direct American military intervention. To help Lon Nol defeat Vietnamese 
communists and Cambodian communists, called the Khmer Rouge, Nixon went against 
the wishes of his advisers and authorized an invasion of Cambodia with fifty thousand 
South Vietnamese and thirty thousand American troops that April. Though ARVN and 
American forces achieved some successes as a result of the invasion, including the 
capture of enemy munitions, food, and supplies, which created substantive setbacks for 
North Vietnamese and NLF forces, the invasion also radicalized the Khmer Rouge, with 
tragic consequences for the future of Cambodia.492 Nixon defended the temporary 
“incursion” into Cambodia by arguing that it was necessary to protect American troops 
remaining in Vietnam and guarantee the successful implementation of Vietnamization. 
Although Nixon removed all American and South Vietnamese soldiers from Cambodia 
by the end of June, the damage to U.S. domestic politics had already been done. 
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 The American invasion of Cambodia set off a firestorm of domestic protests. 
Indeed, the expansion of war during a supposed drawdown of the conflict angered an 
already disaffected American public. Antiwar protests on the Kent State University 
campus turned into a national tragedy on 4 May 1970, when the Ohio National Guard 
fired on the crowd, killing four students and wounding at least nine.493 In the following 
weeks, over four million college students participated in strikes, boycotts, and 
demonstrations to protest the continuing war. Adding to the domestic turmoil, two 
hundred pro-war construction workers attacked a group of high school and college 
students protesting the Cambodian invasion, the Kent State shootings, and the war in 
Vietnam on 8 May during the Hard Hat Riot. These incidents marked a period of 
widespread national outrage, including from politicians on Capitol Hill, directed at the 
Nixon administration. Members of the Senate, in fact, were so infuriated with the 
invasion that the Senate repealed the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that June. Although 
amendments to terminate funds for American operations in Cambodia and to mandate the 
withdrawal of American troops by 1972 did not pass, it was clear that members of 
Congress would continue to challenge Nixon’s broadening of the war.494  
As the U.S. violation of Cambodian neutrality turned the American public 
increasingly bitter toward Nixon’s foreign policies, leaders in Hanoi continued to press 
on with the war with the full intention of achieving a negotiated settlement on their terms. 
Indeed, Nixon and Kissinger underestimated the intransigence of North Vietnamese 
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leaders, who refused to surrender to American military threats. Despite declining morale 
among communist forces and no clear edge on the battlefield, North Vietnamese leaders 
rejected American suggestions for mutual troop withdrawals. Instead, Hanoi’s leaders 
continued to demand unilateral American troop pullouts and the establishment of a 
coalition government, the NLF’s Provisional Revolutionary Government, to rule the 
South after communist conquest. Most notably, Hanoi officials insisted on sidelining 
Thieu completely in this new government, which American policymakers rebuffed. With 
stalemate at the negotiating table, North Vietnamese officials continued their approach of 
“talking while fighting,” but they agreed to establish secret backchannel communications 
with the United States to continue negotiations outside of the official channels.495 
Although the Paris Peace talks began in 1968, both Americans and North Vietnamese 
were unwilling to compromise for an agreement until several years later. As in the past, 
both Washington and Hanoi sought military advantages to place themselves in better 
negotiating positions.   
While Hanoi remained firm in its demands, American attempts to curry the favor 
of Moscow and Beijing failed to coerce Hanoi into signing a peace settlement. These 
efforts, however, would eventually succeed in renewing relations with former communist 
adversaries. As American policymakers later discovered, by the end of the decade 
Moscow’s influence on Hanoi had waned from its peak in earlier years of the war. In fact, 
North Vietnamese leaders came to lean more on the Chinese for support and advice than 
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on the Soviets. As Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated, Nixon and Kissinger embraced 
triangular diplomacy to exploit the hostility between China and the Soviet Union. After 
efforts to convince the Soviets to pressure Hanoi came to naught, Nixon and Kissinger 
looked to Beijing to pressure Hanoi into peace. Chinese leaders, for their part, believed 
that friendly relations with the United States would not only isolate their Soviet rivals but 
also improve China’s international reputation. For Nixon, too, resumed relations with 
China could potentially strong-arm Hanoi into a peace settlement. Whereas Chinese 
leaders had previously called on Hanoi to spurn negotiations in favor of a military 
victory, at least by the early 1970s, it was clear to Hanoi that the Chinese could be more 
interested in improving relations with the United States than helping the North 
Vietnamese win the war. Indeed, in late 1969, secret communications between American 
and Chinese officials began, culminating in Kissinger’s private trip to China in 1971 
followed by Nixon’s visit in 1972, which formally normalized American relations with 
China.496  
As the evolving dynamic between the United States, China, the Soviet Union, and 
North Vietnam affected the strategies of ending the war, the situation in South Vietnam 
remained as unstable and fragile as ever. In practice, Vietnamization expanded the 
ARVN from 850,000 soldiers to more than one million by 1971, outfitted the ARVN with 
large quantities of the latest weapons and military vehicles, and improved wages, 
benefits, and conditions for military servicemen. As one of the largest and best-equipped 
armies in the world, the ARVN’s performance on the battlefield did improve overall, 
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although some ARVN success could be attributed to communist strategies of assuming 
more defensive positions and waiting out American troop withdrawals. Long entrenched 
problems of poor training, inadequate leadership, widespread corruption, and low morale 
continued to plague the South Vietnamese armed forces, and it was highly doubtful that 
ARVN could truly replace the fighting capacity of American soldiers.497 Meanwhile, 
Saigon’s control of the South Vietnamese population remained tenuous. Though the 
Saigon government focused more efforts on pacification in the countryside and 
redistributed over a million hectares of land in 1970, there was no clear evidence that 
Thieu had garnered more loyalty for his government. As historian George Herring has 
written, “Thieu had skillfully built a durable governing structure comprising Chinese 
merchants, loyal bureaucrats, and army officers and held together by the glue of 
corruption.”498 As South Vietnam’s legitimacy hung in the balance during this period of 
American withdrawal, the economic ramifications of policy decisions in Saigon and 
Washington would further complicate the South Vietnamese population’s attitudes 
toward their own government.  
POLICYMAKERS AND THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ECONOMY, 1969-1971 
  
In contrast to free-spending habits during the early years of the war, toward the 
end of the decade Saigon leaders began to implement plans for economic austerity due to 
American pressure. In late October 1969, Thieu issued a presidential decree imposing 
new taxes on imported luxury goods as part of an austerity program intended to reduce 
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the national deficit, which stood at a half billion dollars by the end of the 1969. Thieu’s 
goal to balance the national budget came at the urging of American economists, who long 
believed that South Vietnam had lived beyond its means. The new levies affected over a 
thousand imports and doubled, tripled, and in some cases even quadrupled the price of 
goods. Under these new taxes, a refrigerator that previously cost the piaster equivalent of 
about $300 increased to $400. Likewise, the price of a portable television increased from 
$175 to $300. The cost of a small Japanese or German car jumped from $4,000 to nearly 
$19,000.499 These duties naturally angered wealthy individuals, since the new levies 
targeted luxury consumers.  
Although the new levies were directed toward the upper class, in reality Thieu’s 
luxury tax affected the poor, who comprised most of South Vietnam’s 17 million people, 
more than the rich. As many lower-class South Vietnamese expected, taxes on luxury 
imported goods aimed at the top trickled down to everyone else, as Vietnamese 
merchants cited the new tax as a reason to implement across-the-board price increases. 
Indeed, the prices of commodities produced in South Vietnam such as rice, sugar, and 
milk soared the after Thieu’s announcement. A pound of rice, for example, cost twenty 
percent more just one week after Thieu declared the new luxury tax. The president’s 
austerity tax caused panic among Vietnamese citizens, who began purchasing and 
hoarding goods.500 The ensuing panic and profiteering also had the effect of raising prices 
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of both domestic and imported goods, aggravating inflation.501 The consequences of the 
presidential decree prompted protests from members of the National Assembly, business 
and labor organizations, as well as civil servants and members of the armed forces, who 
lived on fixed wages. During a special legislative session, one senator called his 
government a “pickpocket.”502 
In order to mitigate the domestic backlash, Thieu took to the airwaves to defend 
his austerity plans. In a 50-minute address broadcast on national television and radio on 
31 October 1969, President Thieu asserted, “We cannot be beggars, we cannot lean on 
others.” Invoking nationalism, Thieu continued, “The honor of the Vietnamese nation 
does not permit it, the pride of the nation does not permit it and the conscience does not 
permit it.” Thieu cited the statistic that South Vietnam spent $600 million on imports 
while making a mere $20 million in exports in the last year. The president acknowledged 
that South Vietnamese had been “living above our means during the past few years,” 
creating a situation of “false prosperity” that was “dangerous and unacceptable.” Thieu 
called on citizens to “to accept more efforts, more sacrifices than anyone else.” Referring 
to the new exigencies created by American troop withdrawals, he asserted, “We must 
carry responsibilities in every field, political, military and social.” Thieu also commented 
on South Vietnam’s economic dependence on American economic aid, stating that “we 
must do everything we can do for ourselves before we turn to our friends to ask for more 
aid. That is the way to self-support, self-reliance and self-sufficiency.” Toward the end of 
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his address, Thieu wept as he pledged that he would step down as president if the 
majority of citizens opposed his policies or if his policies led the country to 
communism.503 
 Alongside these new austerity measures, South Vietnamese officials also 
requested the cooperation of their American and international counterparts to stop the 
import of luxury items into South Vietnam. In November 1969, South Vietnamese 
Economic Minister Pham Kim Ngoc appealed to Bunker to prevent the import of luxury 
goods into the country through the PX system.504 This was the first time the South 
Vietnamese government formally asked American officials not to bring luxury goods to 
Vietnam, even though such goods were only for sale legally to American military 
personnel. The economic minister’s request arose as a result of criticisms from South 
Vietnamese businessmen, who asserted that while the Saigon regime increased taxes on 
imported luxury goods, luxury items from the PXs entered the local black markets and 
bypassed the new taxation. According to the Saigon Post, businessmen argued that the 
“tax-free commodities have been sold easily and at lower prices than the legally imported 
ones.”505 Though the United States sought to boost their soldiers’ morale with PX 
commodities, the program of bringing American comforts and luxuries to South Vietnam 
benefited local citizens as well but harmed the implementation of economic austerity in 
the country.  
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 As a way to crack down on black market corruption involving currency 
manipulation, moreover, the South Vietnamese government devalued the Vietnamese 
piaster to more accurately reflect its real value on the international market. For years, 
Thieu and other leaders resisted calls to devalue the Vietnamese currency, because they 
understood—correctly—that devaluation would lead to price increases. Meanwhile, 
members of Congress had good reason to trust that devaluing the piaster would lower 
inflation and discourage currency manipulation, but currency devaluation also produced 
other negative side effects, such as hurting citizens’ purchasing power. American 
advisers realized that devaluation was not beneficial in some regards for South Vietnam 
and therefore did not consistently pressure Thieu to devalue the piaster.506 By 1970, 
however, heavy pressure from Congress in addition to difficult economic circumstances 
in South Vietnam prompted Thieu to devalue the piaster. On 3 October 1970, Thieu 
devalued the piaster from one dollar to 118 piasters to one dollar to 275 piasters for 
certain transactions. With new the devaluation, American servicemen and civilians were 
granted an exchange rate of 275 piasters per dollar, instead of 118 piasters they received 
prior to the devaluation, but the 1 to 118 exchange rate remained for transactions between 
the United States and South Vietnam related to the import of essential commodities. 
Importers specializing in what American officials classified as luxury goods, including 
refrigerators, air conditioners, radios, and phonographs, needed 275 piasters to purchase a 
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dollar to bring such commodities into South Vietnam, making it more expensive for 
consumers to afford these goods.507  
The devaluation of the Vietnamese piaster, as Thieu and other leaders predicted, 
ultimately compounded the problem of inflation and income inequality. After the 
devaluation in 1970 and a further decrease in the value of the currency from 275 piasters 
to the dollar to slightly over 400 piasters in late 1971, South Vietnamese were forced to 
stop purchasing everything except for the most basic foods and eat fewer meals. Many 
citizens also complained about the price of rice; the cheapest American rice cost 4,000 
piasters per hundred-pound bag, the equivalent of about $10, while the best Vietnamese 
rice cost 11,500 piasters, up from the 6,000 piasters that it used to cost.508 As in 1966, 
occupation determined whether one’s family would be able to keep pace with the rise in 
inflation. In 1970, for example, a policeman made the equivalent of around $25 monthly, 
and a civil servant with twenty years of experience earned around $85. Meanwhile, a 
construction worker employed by the Americans could make $300, and a bar girl could 
earn more than $850 a month.509 The resurgence of potential runaway inflation continued 
to threaten the economic stability of the Saigon regime as American plans for troop 
withdrawal were implemented. 
While the Americanization of war created a boom in urban employment, the 
Vietnamization of war caused the burst of that employment bubble and the beginning of 
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severe recession. Rapid urbanization during the war brought many refugees from the 
countryside to the cities, where the labor force increased by 200,000 each year during the 
war.510 As agriculture and manufacturing production declined sharply during the war, the 
service and government sectors comprised 78 percent of the South Vietnamese economy 
by 1972.511 Because the South Vietnamese economy was predominantly centered on 
service occupations, the withdrawal of Americans caused massive unemployment. At the 
peak of the war in 1969, around 145,000 South Vietnamese worked for American 
agencies, but that figure declined to about 15,000 by the end of 1973. Indirect 
employment of Vietnamese by Americans in a variety of service work, including maids 
and prostitutes, was estimated to drop similarly.512 By 1972, Pham Kim Ngoc stated that 
“unemployment has never been this bad, and it is nothing short of catastrophic.”513 The 
economic condition of the urban population by the end of the war, as one economist 
described, was “dismal if not desperate.”514 
These indications of growing economic problems in South Vietnam beginning in 
1969 could not escape the attention of policymakers in Washington. In addition to news 
of the billion-dollar currency manipulation racket, reports of rising inflation in South 
Vietnam continued to worry American policymakers. Moreover, as Vietnamization came 
into full swing, some Nixon administration officials grew concerned about the 
implications of the program on South Vietnam’s economy. Indeed, as the decision for de-
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escalation of the war was made solely based on military and political factors, the 
economic consequences of troop withdrawal and Vietnamization were often not 
considered or discussed until after the policies had already been implemented.  
 As American officials understood after troop withdrawals commenced, the 
departure of American military forces generated new inflationary pressures on the South 
Vietnamese economy. During the course of the American buildup, the U.S. military, 
through the Department of Defense, purchased piasters from the National Bank of 
Vietnam at rates favorable to South Vietnam. As with economic aid, the military’s 
purchases of piasters gave more American dollars to the South Vietnamese government 
than the piasters were worth because of the generous exchange rate for U.S.-South 
Vietnamese commercial transactions.515 These piaster purchases were deflationary, and 
not inflationary as analysts had previously believed, because the South Vietnamese 
government was able to use this source of American dollars to finance not only military 
and civilian expenditures, but also their own version of an import program similar to the 
Commercial Import Program.516 By purchasing piasters from the South Vietnamese 
government, then, the Defense of Defense constituted a “major donor of ‘hidden’ 
economic aid” to the Saigon regime.517 American troop withdrawals therefore reduced 
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military spending, which increased inflationary forces on the South Vietnamese 
economy.  
In addition to inflation caused by troop pullouts, greater burdens on the South 
Vietnamese government to assume responsibility for fighting the war exacerbated 
inflation. As Secretary of State William Rogers observed, “The increase in GVN military 
and para-military force involves increased GVN expenditures with consequent 
inflationary effects and greater demand for imports…At the same time, there will be less 
foreign exchange available for imports, partly as a result of U.S. force reductions.”518 
Rogers believed that unresolved economic problems would ultimately harm the military 
and political objectives of Vietnamization. He wrote to Nixon, “Significant military and 
political advances may be seriously jeopardized if provisions are not made to maintain 
the economic underpinnings of the war effort as Vietnamization progresses.”519 
Kissinger, too, perceived the inflationary effects of Vietnamization and agreed on the 
need to contain inflation in South Vietnam. Conveying to Nixon the importance of 
managing inflation levels, Kissinger wrote that increased military and political efforts by 
the South Vietnamese government “will accelerate inflation there unless offsetting 
actions are taken. Some inflation is unavoidable in wartime, but it should be kept within 
tolerable limits since nothing erodes confidence so rapidly as a decline in the value of its 
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currency.”520 Analysis from the National Security Council appeared to confirm that 
economic weakness in South Vietnam had direct consequences for the war effort. A 
memo from Dean Moor, who served as part of the operations staff of the National 
Security Council, to Kissinger in July 1969 cited an increasing number of reports from a 
range of sources that inflation, budget deficits, and financial mismanagement in South 
Vietnam worsened noticeably in past few months. Moor wrote, “Already, these problems 
are beginning to sap some of the Government’s vitality in attempting to build a 
competitive position against Communists in a future post-war environment.”521 Though 
Moor assumed that the Saigon regime would continue to exist in a post-war setting, his 
belief that economic insecurity weakened Saigon’s position vis-a-vis the communists was 
an important one that others in the Nixon administration also shared.  
American officials understood that a solution to these new inflationary pressures 
of simultaneously expanding the ARVN and withdrawing American forces would require 
compromise between the United States and South Vietnam. Rogers forecasted that 
increasing South Vietnamese military forces while sending American GIs back home 
“could result in an increase in the money supply of more than 50% in CY [Calendar 
Year] 1970, unless extraordinary measures are taken.” These measures, he argued, 
“would have to include an increase in US financial assistance as well as monetary and 
fiscal action on the part of the GVN.” On the Americans’ part, Rogers urged the president 
to expand economic aid to South Vietnam to prevent economic catastrophe. He wrote, 
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“An essential element in our efforts to ‘Vietnamize’ the war is an increase in US 
economic aid to help meet the additional burdens on Vietnam’s already strained 
economy. The more rapid the pace of troop withdrawals and the shift of military 
responsibilities to the GVN, the larger will be its requirements for economic support.”522 
Implicit in Roger’s analysis is that the strategy of Vietnamization would fail if the United 
States did not increase its aid levels. 
Roger’s recommendation to Nixon was echoed by Robert Mayo, Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget within the White House, who asserted that both the United States 
and South Vietnam needed to take appropriate financial measures to avert economic 
disaster. Mayo, like several other officials, believed that Vietnamization would intensify 
the economic problems facing the Saigon government and that expanding the Vietnamese 
armed forces and the pacification program would cause higher levels of spending in 
South Vietnam. Conversely, he noted, “GVN receipts will fall as the phasedown reduces 
spending by US agencies and personnel. The resulting additional inflationary pressures 
must be restrained through some combination of more stringent GVN fiscal measures and 
increased US assistance.”523 Among Nixon’s closest advisers within the Cabinet and the 
White House, then, a consensus emerged that South Vietnam would require greater 
assistance to tamp down the menacing threat of runaway inflation.  
 Outside of the White House, a number of prominent individuals and organizations 
also sounded the alarm of possible economic collapse in South Vietnam due to high rates 
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of inflation, though often under the assumption that the Nixon administration was 
unaware of the impending danger. Writing in October 1969, Reed J. Irvine, a member of 
the Federal Reserve system, indicated his disapproval of the President’s handling of 
economic problems in South Vietnam to Arthur Burns, Counselor to the President. Irvine 
noticed there was a “marked contrast between the determination to come to grips with the 
problem [of inflation] in 1966 and the treatment of the problem today.” In 1966, Irvine 
commented, the Federal Reserve succeeded in generating “keen White House interest” in 
South Vietnam’s economic problems, and American officials “impress[ed] upon the 
leaders there, in both the Vietnam government and our military, of the importance of 
curbing inflation.”524 The urgency to deal with South Vietnamese inflation remained as 
important as in 1966, Irvine remarked, but the Nixon administration appeared to assign 
economic concerns to a low priority. Irvine wrote: 
We at the Federal Reserve have again taken the initiative in trying to stimulate 
some action. The response, however, has been very different. As far as we have 
been able to ascertain there has been no interest on the part of anyone connected 
with the White House…. The actual White House involvement in planning the 
1966 stabilization program was not great, but everyone had the feeling that it was 
a matter which was considered important by people at the top. This energized the 
lower ranks. This seems to be the ingredient that is now missing. The lower ranks 
do not seem to be getting clear signals that higher levels attach any importance to 
this matter. The result is a tendency to push the problem aside or assign it low 
priority. This is profoundly discouraging to those of us who know from past 
experience what a dangerous and demoralizing force rampant inflation can be in a 
country that is being subjected to a strong subversive attack.525 
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In the context of American troop withdrawal and Vietnamization, Irvine’s criticism of 
high-level Nixon administration officials emphasized that neglect of the inflation problem 
could erode South Vietnamese citizens’ faith in Saigon’s leadership. Although Burns 
recommended that the National Security Council “inquire into this problem immediately” 
as a result of Irvine’s observations,526 it is clear that all levels of the administration, 
including Nixon himself, were already well aware of the dangers of runaway inflation. 
The problem, as Irvine may have implied, was that little action had been taken by the 
administration to deal with inflation satisfactorily.   
As American troop withdrawal began to pick up speed, former officials from the 
Johnson administration similarly urged Nixon and his staff to pay greater attention to the 
economic consequences of Vietnamization on the South Vietnam population. In a memo 
dated December 29, 1969, Walt Rostow warned Kissinger of the economic pressures on 
the South Vietnamese population: “This more important than it may look, my non-
economist friend: Vietnamization means urban unemployment unless there is a surge in 
industrial employment; and Thieu’s recent experience with his austerity taxes should 
make it clear the Vietnamese electorate is like any other. We’d be damned fools to let 
Vietnamese political life fall apart because of an economic failure.”527 A staunch anti-
communist, Rostow believed that the combination of austerity measures and widespread 
unemployment in South Vietnam could spell defeat for the Saigon regime. Likewise, 
Bunker, a known hawk, believed that economic matters could undermine military efforts. 
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As one of the key policymakers on the ground in South Vietnam who served both 
Johnson and Nixon, Bunker recalled that by early 1970, members of the embassy thought 
that economic “problems were becoming more serious than the military threat and if left 
unsolved might undo everything that had been achieved.”528 
 In late 1969 and early 1970, then, fears of inflation undercutting the entire war 
effort harkened back to similar discussions among officials in 1966. As discussed in the 
second chapter, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara expressed serious concerns 
about the poor wages and conditions of ARVN soldiers in debates about troop escalation 
in 1966. In McNamara’s view, the most vulnerable victims of high inflation in South 
Vietnam were the very people who worked for the functioning and the defense of the 
country. As American troops departed and as the Saigon regime prepared to expand the 
number of ARVN forces in 1969, anxieties over hyperinflation were thus inextricably 
tied to the well being of those whose jobs were to serve the South Vietnamese 
government.  
Because a major part of implementing Vietnamization depended on the ability of 
the ARVN to recruit and maintain soldiers in its ranks, American policymakers 
understood that low wages and poor benefits for South Vietnamese soldiers presented a 
major obstacle for the ultimate success of Vietnamization. Like McNamara in 1966, 
Nixon suggested that the United States should increase its funding to support the 
expansion of the ARVN. In a November 1969 memo to Kissinger, Nixon wrote, “The 
desertion rates in the South Vietnamese armed forces [have] been raised on several 
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occasions, but little seems to be done about it. I gather from [Secretary of Defense 
Melvin] Laird that it really gets down in great part to a question of adequate pay and 
other financial incentives.” Nixon inquired, “If this is the case would this be an area 
where we ought to pay more now even though it means increasing the budget 
substantially in order to prepare the way for further reductions we are going to make 
later?”529 Although it is unclear what Kissinger’s response was, it appeared that the 
president considered the economic conditions of South Vietnamese soldiers to be worthy 
of additional American aid.  
Laird, one of the biggest proponents of Vietnamization and rapid American troop 
withdrawals, worried about the morale of the South Vietnamese armed forces as well. 
Laird, branded the “newest and most anxious student of South Vietnam’s economic 
problems” by the New York Times in July 1970, observed that inflation, corruption, and 
poor wages and conditions within the South Vietnamese army had spawned high 
desertion rates, estimated unofficially at around 10,000 deserters per month in 1970.530 
As a result, Laird not only tracked the performance of South Vietnamese military forces 
closely but also pressed Saigon leaders to implement programs of economic reform. 
However, improving wages and conditions was a solution that also generated additional 
problems, which explained why Thieu and other South Vietnamese policymakers did not 
raise wages to keep pace with inflation despite the fact that those in the armed forces and 
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civil service were hurt the most by inflation.531 Like Thieu, Bunker understood that 
increasing soldiers’ and civil servants’ salaries would likely only further increase 
inflation. As Bunker stated to his State Department colleagues, “The problem of the low 
salaries of civil servants and military in the face of inflation remains acute. There is no 
easy or quick solution to this problem because any significant increase in salaries would 
aggravate the already strongly inflationary situation.”532 Paying civil servants and the 
armed forces more would entail the South Vietnamese government printing additional 
piasters, unless the government were to receive additional funds from the United States to 
cover the costs or somehow generate additional revenue on its own. South Vietnam’s 
many years of dependency on American economic aid, therefore, ensured that no 
straightforward solutions could be implemented to solve the complex economic problems 
at hand. 
In fact, basic questions about the viability of the South Vietnamese economy 
resurfaced as Vietnamization brought economic problems into the spotlight. In A Report 
on the Economics of Vietnamization, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Economic Affairs, which worked closely with USAID and the U.S. embassy in Saigon to 
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assist Thieu in implementing economic reforms,533 remarked that it “would be ironic if 
the GVN were to destroy itself fiscally…while the war was being ‘won’ militarily.”534 
The report stated that inflation in South Vietnam “would be understandable if the war had 
seriously depressed per capita consumption. It is difficult for any government to tax away 
an extra part of the purchasing power of people who have already suffered a reduction in 
their living standards.” The office observed that in South Vietnam, however, the opposite 
was the case; consumption was higher than ever before, so the Saigon government could 
actually tax citizens. What was missing, the report stated, was “the machinery to collect 
such taxes and the will to levy them. For this last omission the blame must fall in part on 
past support policies of the USG [United States Government].”535 As the report implied, 
the distorted South Vietnam economy, long propped up by American economic aid, 
created a kind of economic dependency that was further exacerbated by the lack of 
commitment by both the United States and South Vietnam to establish an infrastructure 
for tax collection. The report was critical of American officials, who, in prioritizing 
military concerns, never encouraged the South Vietnamese government to generate its 
own sources of revenue.  
Besides staff at the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Economic Affairs, the 
Secretary of Defense also criticized economic policies condoned by the American 
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government in the past. In February 1970, Laird visited South Vietnam along with 
General Earle Wheeler, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during which they met 
with Bunker, his colleagues at the Saigon embassy, and South Vietnamese officials to 
discuss a variety of issues including the South Vietnamese economy. Laird wrote to the 
president that in the course of budget discussions with MACV and embassy staff, “it 
became clear that… economic aspects of Vietnamization are fraught with potential 
hazards.” The South Vietnamese economy, he asserted, was almost completely supported 
by the United States. Laird observed that as “part of the war effort designed to attract 
popular support to the cause, we have followed a policy of raising the standard of living 
for the SVN populace rather than imposing a regime of austerity.” Laird’s remarks 
referred to the Commercial Import Program, which primarily served as an anti-
inflationary tool, but also introduced many consumer goods to South Vietnamese society 
that boosted living standards instead of forcing citizens to make economic sacrifices 
common during wartime. 
Moreover, the Secretary of Defense expressed outrage at the lack of a basic 
understanding of economic problems in South Vietnam, especially since Vietnamization 
produced serious economic consequences for the South Vietnamese. Laird argued that a 
“prerequisite for Vietnamizing the economic institutions and apparatus is first and 
foremost some definition of the problem.” If “a stable and reliable SVN economy is to be 
insured,” the Secretary of Defense argued that the United States “must obtain a clear 
picture” of what the war was costing; what proportion of the cost was borne by the 
United States and by South Vietnam; what costs were valid and what were not; how the 
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cost of the war and its distribution would change with Vietnamization; and how the 
current and future costs of the conflict should be funded by the United States and by 
South Vietnam. Laird wrote, “Such a definition does not now exist. It is a matter of the 
utmost urgency that we obtain this understanding. The South Vietnamese shall be 
proceeding in the meantime between the Scylla and Charybdis of potentially destructive 
economic failure, from phenomena such as hyperinflation, and the equally destructive 
possibility of military failure because of too few resources to accomplish the security 
mission.”536 As Laird pointed out, if American officials did not know the total costs of 
the war or what proportion of the financial burden was on South Vietnam, the current 
uninformed path of dealing with economic problems would push the South Vietnamese 
government toward financial and military collapse.   
The worsening of economic problems for Saigon due to American troop pullouts 
and the imposition of austerity measures raised the stakes of answering these essential 
questions. As Chairman of the Vietnam Special Studies Group, Kissinger authored a 
background paper on the economic problems related to Vietnamization.537 Stating that the 
withdrawal of troops reduced Saigon’s foreign exchange but that neither the Department 
of Defense nor USAID wanted to “cover these shortfalls,” Kissinger asserted that the 
South Vietnamese government had two choices: spend more than its revenues, leading to 
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“intolerable rates of inflation,” or cut back programs and foreclose the possibility of any 
new programs necessary to carry out tasks formerly performed by American units. 
Moreover, Kissinger noted that Saigon’s economic policies have already demonstrated 
“serious political repercussions.” Specifically, Thieu’s austerity tax was “implemented 
hastily and ineptly causing major political problems with fixed wage earners, intimidating 
the National Assembly, and precipitating a Supreme Court ruling that is likely to be 
unfavorable to the government.” Moreover, a possible political confrontation arose 
between Thieu and disabled Vietnamese veterans over changes to their benefits.538 As 
Kissinger’s observations suggested, social and political unrest caused by troop 
withdrawals and austerity made the resolution of economic problems even more urgent. 
Kissinger, like Laird, pressed for decisions to intrinsic dilemmas related to the 
economics of Vietnamization. He wrote that the “U.S. has no idea what the GVN will do” 
in response to these economic difficulties, but “the best guess is they have not even 
decided themselves.” He cited that “recent official conversations have indicated the 
Vietnamese are not anywhere close to recognizing and solving the economic problems 
facing them.”539 On the part of Americans, however, Kissinger believed that the United 
States needed to decide on several matters of crucial importance, including “how the 
costs of Vietnamization are to be shared between the GVN and U.S.; that is, what will we 
provide, knowing the GVN must pay for the most of the rest with inflation,” “how is the 
American portion of the burden to be shared among the Departments and Agencies of this 
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government,” and “whether Congress will be asked for additional appropriations or 
whether already budgeted funds will be diverted from their planned use to fund 
Vietnamization.” Kissinger concluded, however, that there was “no satisfactory way to 
resolve these issues.” His resignation perhaps indicated that by the early 1970s, economic 
problems in South Vietnam were nearly intractable.  
 There were, indeed, no easy answers to these fundamental questions that Laird 
and Kissinger posed. Instead of addressing these basic inquiries, however, Nixon 
administration officials thought that finding the right person to handle these complicated 
economic problems would help the situation. Officials grew increasingly concerned that 
South Vietnam needed the expertise and guidance of an established American economist 
to avoid economic breakdown. Kissinger noted in 1970 that there was “no reputable high-
level US economist in Saigon today. Our top economic slot is filled with a development 
planner who is worried about post-war economic plans.”540 In April 1971, Nixon and his 
advisers proposed the idea of assigning an “economic czar” to be in charge of economic 
matters in Saigon, though there had always been an economist within the Saigon 
embassy. The president was “convinced that a well-respected American of known 
accomplishments who would represent [a] father [figure]” to the Vietnamese would be 
beneficial for the country.541 Nixon administration officials ultimately did not appoint an 
economic czar for South Vietnam, but the fact that such a proposal surfaced during this 
late stage of the war revealed that American policymakers believed that merely 
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identifying the right leader would solve South Vietnam’s complicated economic 
problems. 
The economic ramifications of Vietnamization were largely an afterthought for 
administration officials, as military and political priorities determined the direction of 
foreign policy during the last stages of the war. However, that is not to say that they were 
oblivious to the economic problems that continued to plague South Vietnam. The 
problem of inflation had preoccupied American policymakers since the country’s 
inception and rates of inflation veered dangerously close to politically-destabilizing levels 
at times. By the time Nixon entered office, however, the stakes of uncontrolled inflation 
were greater than ever before, but the options for ameliorating the problem were limited 
by decisions made in the past.  
 
SOUTH VIETNAMESE REACTIONS TO AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL, 1969-1971 
 
Although news of American troop withdrawal elicited a range of views from 
South Vietnamese who had grown accustomed to years of war, one of the more common 
reactions was that of feeling disappointed by the decisions of the United States. Among 
South Vietnamese policymakers, the exit of American troops signaled the beginning of 
the end of Saigon’s partnership with Washington. As Bui Diem, South Vietnamese 
ambassador to the United States, asserted, 
The Vietnamese couldn’t think in terms of the Americans intervening in 
something and not succeeding, and so it is a kind of blind trust that the South 
Vietnamese wrongly or rightly put into the Americans. They couldn't think that 
the Americans—once having committed their troops in Vietnam, having spent so 
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much money in Vietnam—could one of these days leave everything behind and 
call it quits.542 
 
Given the long relationship between the United States and South Vietnam since 1955, it 
was not unusual for South Vietnamese officials to express feelings of being let down by 
their American allies. These attitudes of disillusionment among South Vietnamese would 
become more pronounced as North Vietnamese communists grew more emboldened 
militarily and as the United States prepared to extricate itself completely from the war.  
In addition to the shock and disbelief that the United States would pull out of a 
conflict and alliance it had invested so much in, feelings of betrayal by the United States 
began to emerge within South Vietnamese politics and society. As early as 1968, when 
peace talks between Washington and Hanoi commenced, Saigon leaders expressed 
insecurities about their own positions and the future of their country. Though South 
Vietnamese leaders had often publicly criticized the United States as a way to boost their 
own legitimacy among citizens, they also realized that South Vietnam could not exist 
without the continued assistance of the United States. The possibility of complete 
American military withdrawal thus prompted great anxiety and vulnerability among 
South Vietnamese politicians. In fact, as The Baltimore Sun reported, those who had 
“committed themselves to the Saigon Government fear[ed] that the Americans like the 
French before them, will negotiate a defeat at the conference table, while the South 
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Vietnamese stand helplessly by.”543 As Americans withdrew their soldiers, then, it 
appeared that the leverage held by Saigon leaders over their American counterparts could 
diminish to a point where the United States could unilaterally negotiate a political 
settlement with North Vietnam.  
Although hostile attitudes toward the United States existed in South Vietnam ever 
since large numbers of U.S. combat troops arrived to the country, a different kind of anti-
Americanism—a form that simultaneously revealed a loss of faith in the United States 
and invoked the notion of Vietnamese sovereignty—began to emerge as the war started 
to unwind. The betrayal felt by some Saigon policymakers manifested in South 
Vietnamese publications as denunciation of American actions and policies. The Saigon 
Daily News, for example, stated in an editorial that the “Americans must be told that they 
cannot help defend our freedom and at the same time trample on our sovereignty.”544 
Sentiments like this not only positioned American intervention as wholly incompatible 
with South Vietnamese autonomy, but also revealed profound skepticism of the motives 
behind American intervention. Soon after the announcement of American troop 
withdrawals in early 1969, a South Vietnamese newspaper published a poem, excerpted 
below, similarly critical of the American presence:  
You Americans came here in droves, and 
our country suffered many upsets on 
every side and in every respect. Those 
are things that belong to the past, and 
you also must have heard them and seen 
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them…. The money you have thrown around  
has blurred the perspectives of a 
number of people who have forgotten their 
own homeland which is in the flames of 
war. A minority of people. dependent 
upon you, have naturally become a rich 
ruling class. For that reason, a new 
element has manifested itself in our 
society: an element of people who wish 
to maintain the conflict, to prolong 
the conflict, to live clinging to it in 
order to enrich themselves and produce 
personal profits. That is the tragic 
situation, you have created unintentionally or purposefully… 
 
We do not believe that you will eventually 
withdraw completely from here, because 
from Japan to Korea the truth has already 
been proven. And in our humble opinion, 
if it is really so that you will slowly 
withdraw completely, it will only be because 
we Vietnamese can defeat the enemy 
more easily. In saying this we do not 
mean to be ungrateful but we say it because 
your presence here has crowded us 
to the point where we have had enough, and, 
invisibly, has created for the enemy a 
righteous cause in his continued prosecution 
of the conflict.545 
 
In a matter-of-fact tone, the poet asserted that the influx of American dollars had created 
a citizenry that had “forgotten their own homeland” and instead pursued selfish lives 
“clinging” to war. Additionally, the poet referred to the socio-economic class 
stratification that intensified as a “ruling class” grew more and more dependent on 
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American money, causing great divisions within Vietnamese society. The ultimate 
tragedy of the American presence, as the poet contends, was the undermining of South 
Vietnamese unity. The poet also used the continued presence of Americans in Japan and 
South Korea to question whether the United States would carry through a full withdrawal, 
with the rhetorical effect of provoking the Americans to leave quickly. The anti-
American tone combined with an assertion of South Vietnamese sovereignty in the poem, 
therefore, suggests that the United States and South Vietnamese sought divergent goals in 
prosecuting war and should terminate the alliance. Despite the poet’s stated humility and 
deference toward the United States, the poem ultimately leaned more toward criticism of 
Americans than ambivalence.   
 Beyond the press, anti-American sentiments were also expressed in 
demonstrations, sit-ins, and parades. Student leaders in Saigon in particular articulated 
the following attitude: “If only the Americans would go away, we Vietnamese could 
settle the war between ourselves.”546 Such students were largely anti-communist, but they 
began to protest the actions of Americans as a result of witnessing the consequences of 
the American presence first-hand. Ha Dinh Nguyen, chairman of the Student Struggle 
Committee at Saigon University stated, “I was a senior in high school when I saw 
Americans for the first time in my life….I admired those soldiers.” After he moved to 
Saigon, however, his attitudes toward the Americans changed: “I saw how they interfered 
at all levels in Vietnamese society…I saw myself how the lives of city people were 
disrupted by the American presence. I began to feel that the American presence itself is 
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the reason the Communists continue the war.” Nguyen’s attitudes resonated with other 
student activists, some of whom protested at the American Embassy in June 1970, 
writing “Peace Now” and “Bunker Go Home” on walls and pavements.547  
As the exodus of Americans forced South Vietnamese to directly confront the 
transformations to their society wrought by the American presence, reactions on the 
ground to American withdrawal confirmed the view that some Vietnamese had a strong 
interest in the continuation of war. As the first chapter illustrated, the South Vietnamese 
citizens who prospered during the war were often those who worked for Americans in the 
service-sector. It was natural, then, that such employees saw the pullout of American 
troops as detrimental to their lives. A 23-year-old Saigon bar girl named Madeleine, for 
example, expressed her desire for the continued presence of American soldiers. Although 
she disliked many of her GI customers, she also profited from their business; Madeleine 
asked, “Why should I want the war to end? I’ve saved enough to make most Americans 
look poor.”548  
After Nixon’s April 1971 announcement that 100,000 additional American troops 
would be withdrawn from South Vietnam, service workers in South Vietnamese cities 
conveyed disappointment but also hope at the news. As the United Press International 
reported, bar girls interviewed at the Osaka bar in downtown Saigon believed this phase 
of withdrawals would be “bad for their business.”549 However, they also expressed 
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optimism for the future. “It’s bad for us,” one of the bar girls stated, “but this has 
happened before and they always come back. Sure, they will this time. The United States 
is here to help us. My boyfriends have me [believe] the Americans won’t run out on 
us.”550 Although the hopes of this bar girl would soon be dashed, that she trusted 
Americans to return to South Vietnam was indicative of a desire to see the war persist.  
As troop withdrawals continued, some South Vietnamese who made a living 
through black market transactions articulated their adjustment to the gradually 
diminishing presence of American troops and PX commodities. “Business is sometimes 
good, sometimes bad,” said a woman selling stolen PX goods on a sidewalk stall in 
Danang. “If we can not sell this thing, we will switch to other things.” Moreover, she 
asserted that “there is nothing to be afraid of. Instead of eating three bowls of rice you 
may eat only one, but nobody will die of hunger after all.”551 Although this woman 
expressed an adaptability to the changing economic situation, many more Vietnamese 
conveyed feelings of hopelessness and despair at the increasingly dire economic situation 
in South Vietnam.  
Although black market corruption involving American PX commodities 
decreased as the war wound down, other forms of corruption continued to plague all 
segments of South Vietnamese society, including members of the armed forces and their 
families. The expansion of the South Vietnamese armed forces and brutal inflation after 
the withdrawal of American troops contributed to the growing ubiquity of petty 
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corruption. Although Saigon officials attempted to crack down on corruption within the 
government, their efforts yielded few results. In January 1972, Thieu authorized Vice 
President Tran Van Huong to curb corruption among civil servants and members of the 
armed forces at all levels. To this end, Huong ordered government officials to decline 
“gifts” from subordinates who sought personal favors or benefits. However, most 
Vietnamese believed that the vice president’s promulgation would produce no real 
effects.552  
As Vietnamization added new pressures on the South Vietnamese army to enlist 
more soldiers, many South Vietnamese families resorted to bribery to escape the draft or 
to avoid the most dangerous aspects of enlistment. A South Vietnamese hoping to dodge 
the draft, for example, would have to pay more than $100 to acquire a fake identification 
card presenting a false age. A family who wished to transfer their soldier son from being 
in a combat role to being in the rear would have to pay twice as much, about 80,000 
piasters.553 The beneficiaries of bribes were often those in government positions who 
were eager to supplement their meager salaries, the value of which was eroded by 
inflation, with additional income.   
For those within the military, fixed wages continued to be a source of motivation 
for corruption and pilferage. Despite awareness among Nixon administration officials and 
Saigon leaders of the importance of improving salaries and conditions for members of the 
armed forces, no significant enhancements were made regarding military pay or benefits. 
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In fact, as historian Gabriel Kolko has written, the real income of those in the South 
Vietnamese armed forces fell more precipitously after 1972 than the period from 1963 to 
1969, when their income shrank by two-thirds. From January 1973 to May 1974, 
moreover, soldiers’ real incomes dropped by another two-thirds.554 Opportunities to move 
up the military ranks through promotion were few and far between, and the 
Vietnamization budget did not include finance resources to ameliorate soldiers’ living 
conditions. The habit of corruption among high-level officers was demoralizing to lower-
ranked soldiers, who witnessed their superiors abusing their public office for private gain. 
The commander of one ARVN division, for example, used a military helicopter to 
transport his wife for a hair appointment in Saigon, while another division commander 
ordered some of his men to construct a summer home for his enjoyment. These examples 
of corruption at the highest levels of military service no doubt affected the morale of 
rank-and-file soldiers. As one recruit asked in exasperation, “Why should I risk my life 
for people like that?” He continued, “You feel like you’re fighting for the Mafia, not for 
your country’s honor.”555  
As corruption within the military became more entrenched toward the last stages 
of the conflict, there was a noticeable change in the style of corruption among those on 
the take in South Vietnam, from disgraceful concealment of corruption to unabashed 
acknowledgement of it. The story of a mother who attempted to protect her son by 
seeking his transfer from Kientuong Province near the Cambodian border to Saigon 
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demonstrated this shift in attitudes regarding corruption. “Mrs. Thuy,” the pseudonym of 
this mother, had spent over 40,000 piasters in bribes to military officials, in particular the 
wife of a colonel at the armored cavalry command in Saigon. Mrs. Thuy stated, “When I 
came to her and asked for help I expected her to tell a lie and say that she had to give 
money to such and such people to have my son transferred.” Mrs. Thuy asserted, “But no, 
not at all, she did not lie. She shamelessly told me that the money went to her and her 
husband as the price for their help.” Mrs. Thuy’s son later volunteered to become a 
noncommissioned officer and was relocated to Quangtri Province below the demilitarized 
zone, but it would cost his family 50,000 piasters to transfer him to Saigon again. “This 
family has sunk deeper and deeper into trouble,” said Mrs. Thuy, whose husband earned 
15,000 piasters monthly as a welder. She conceded, “It is impossible for us to pay again. 
Instead of paying, I now pray for my son.”556 Like many other parents, Mrs. Thuy paid 
numerous bribes above the financial resources of their families in the hopes of 
safeguarding their son from the dangers of war, but there was often no guarantee that 
their payments would bring results.  
While those within the military grew dependent on bribes, civil servants, too, 
found that dishonesty was the only way to survive. A teacher by the name of Mr. Thien, 
for example, earned a monthly salary of 20,000 piasters, which amounted to less than 
$50. According to Thien, “Teaching is an ideal job, but in peacetime only.” To augment 
his low teacher’s salary, Thien accepted “coffee money,” a term which Vietnamese used 
to refer to supplemental income from corruption, by helping place young men of draft 
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age in army roles safe from combat. “I started making coffee money when a friend of 
mine, a recruiter officer, suggested that if I knew of any draft-age boys who wanted to 
stay out of the war, I should contact him and we would both be richer for it,” stated Mr. 
Thien, who usually earned over $200 for his services. The profits were then split with his 
friend.557 As Mr. Thien’s personal story illustrates, the low wages of serving the state as a 
teacher motivated him to seek other sources of income.  
 As American troops began their departure from South Vietnam, military bases 
and the physical objects within soon became abandoned. In fact, the departure of 
American troops from military bases contributed to a new form of black market 
corruption: the dealing of various parts of military bases, including equipment, supplies, 
and the physical infrastructure of bases. A South Vietnamese major general, Ngo Dzu, for 
example, was accused of “masterminding the black market sales of the base’s goods.”558 
Moreover, American intelligence officials became aware that American troop withdrawal 
produced direct effects on the morale of South Vietnamese military forces. In late 1971, 
an intelligence information cable stated that the withdrawal of American forces from 
bases in Military Region I, which consisted of five northern provinces in South Vietnam, 
provided new opportunities for large-scale corruption among the officers of the ARVN. 
An ARVN officer reported “that the widespread corruption was having a serious effect, 
not only on the morale of the troops and minor unit commanders, but also on the military 
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effectiveness of the installations and the security of the surrounding areas.”559 The officer 
observed that division commanders often held informal auctions where regimental 
commanders vied for the chance to occupy a vacant American installation. According to 
the officer, the price of occupancy was usually between three and five million piasters, 
roughly the equivalent of $11,000 to $18,000. The intelligence report further explained 
that the “materials turned over by the departing American unit become the personal 
property of the unit commander, who sells everything from buildings to individual 
weapons in order to recover his investment. On some occasions, so much is removed 
from an installation that it becomes both uninhabitable and indefensible.” As Americans 
gradually withdrew from military involvement in Southeast Asia, little thought was given 
to the extravagant military bases and equipment that the Americans left behind in 
Vietnam. Even Nixon himself was indifferent toward the topic, stating, “This business of 
just picking up a lot of stuff and hauling it home, it doesn’t do anything except for 
bookkeeping…. Leave it in Vietnam. Let ‘em sell it, put it on the black market, anything 
they want.”560  
 The degree to which corruption infiltrated every aspect of military and civilian 
life in South Vietnam caused many of Saigon’s intellectuals to lament the collapse of 
national morale. One leading Saigon journalist stated, “It’s not simply a matter of paying 
the police a few hundred piasters to overlook a traffic violation, or even of the large-scale 
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war profiteering and black-market operations.” The journalist asserted, “It’s much more 
serious. Now we have reached the stage at which human pity has mostly left us. We steal 
some poor soldier’s watch for a few extra piasters. Our commanders drive over their own 
troops in their desperation to escape battles. We are ready to sell our wives to afford a 
television set.” The journalist went on to bemoan what corruption had done to the South 
Vietnamese nation: “We have come to despise ourselves and our nationality and the more 
revulsion we feel the more we excuse ourselves on ground that you cannot survive in 
such a system without participating in it.”561 This journalist’s comments focused on the 
dehumanizing effects of American wealth and consumerism on human relations in the 
context of a war-ravaged land. By making economic circumstances difficult for most 
South Vietnamese while enriching others, the journalist asserted, the effect of the 
American presence was the imposition of money-centered thinking and the destruction of 
national solidarity.  
 Some Vietnamese intellectuals and officials placed the blame of worsening social 
relations toward the end of the war on the economic policies of the United States. An 
unidentified former Vietnamese official contended that the effects of generous American 
economic aid were devastating. He stated, “The Americans have introduced the devil of 
luxury consumer goods and the whole philosophy of keeping up with the Joneses. When 
they leave, we shall no longer be able to afford these things, but we shall still want them.” 
Moreover, the official argued that the “Americans have helped disrupt the old ways, in 
which 90 percent of the people felt they were living fairly well in their rice fields, and 
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have brought in things for which Vietnam is not prepared.” Referring to the rapid rise of 
living standards and the flood of consumer goods during the war, the official suggested 
that it would have been better for South Vietnam had the United States not pursued those 
policies. The official also asserted, “If we could have achieved those things slowly and 
naturally on our own, we could have avoided the cruel dislocations and shock.”562 
Sentiments like this were shared by other intellectuals in the country. Ton That Thien, 
who served as a Cabinet Minister before later heading the sociology department at 
Saigon’s Van Hanh University, believed that the United States should have either 
colonized South Vietnam or “left us to work out our own problems.” Under formal 
colonization, he believed, “They could have forced new skills and new attitudes on us 
that would have made survival a possibility. The French at least built a civil service they 
left us.” Instead, Thien argued, the United States “preserved the fiction of Vietnamese 
sovereignty by avoiding taking direct control of anything. Instead, they run Vietnam 
more or less behind the scenes, tampering with every aspect of our national life. Worst of 
all, they send us amateurs instead of colonial professionals, and by the time they learn 
something here they are ready to leave and be replaced by a new batch.”563 Criticizing 
what he perceived as the lack of professional experience and constant turnover among 
American staff and officials in South Vietnam, Thien does not hold back on his censure 
of the operations of the U.S. government. His observations imply a sense of anger, 
frustration, and even ingratitude toward American intervention.  
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Although American officials believed that the departure of American forces was 
“less dislocating to the Vietnamese society than their arrival and presence had been,”564 
the withdrawal of American troops was, in fact, immensely disruptive to South 
Vietnamese life, particularly in urban areas which were most affected by the American 
presence. South Vietnamese criticisms of the United States, already evident even before 
news of troop withdrawal spread, would intensify after the Americans formally ended all 
military involvement in Southeast Asia. These anti-American attitudes, to be sure, both 
demonstrated feelings of betrayal as well as resentment toward the disruptions of the 
American presence. The signing of a peace agreement in 1973, combined with trends and 
events in and outside of Vietnam, would further exacerbate the tenuous livelihoods of 
South Vietnamese.  
RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS, BOMBINGS, AND THE ELUSIVENESS OF PEACE, 1972-1973  
 
As Americans became more embittered with U.S. interventions in Southeast Asia, 
revelations of American actions regarding Vietnam further undermined their faith in the 
U.S. government. Reports of U.S. soldiers’ massacre of hundreds of civilians in My Lai 
raised grave doubts among Americans about the morality of U.S. intervention. 
Furthermore, the publication of the Pentagon Papers in 1971 revealed that the Johnson 
administration deceived the American public and even members of Congress about the 
extent of American military involvement in Indochina. During a time of already declining 
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trust in the American government, these events added to a national atmosphere that 
would no longer tolerate a continued prosecution of the war. In Vietnam as well, the 
decline of morale and willingness to fight among American soldiers was evidenced in the 
rise of fraggings and drug use.565  
Despite adopting a variety of techniques to achieve success in Vietnam, Nixon 
realized that domestic agitation would constrain him to the point where he could not 
achieve peace in Vietnam on American terms. Despite expanding the use of military 
force, the United States was unable to force Hanoi into capitulation. Similarly, Nixon and 
Kissinger’s attempts to get Moscow and Beijing to break the stalemate between 
Washington and Hanoi were to no avail. As domestic political unrest could ultimately 
harm his own electoral prospects, Nixon hoped to sign a peace settlement before the 1972 
presidential election. In 1971, deliberations toward a political settlement broke out of 
deadlock due to a major shift in the American negotiating position. Though both Hanoi 
and Washington had insisted on a mutual withdrawal of troops throughout the negotiation 
process, Kissinger, through secret channel communications with Hanoi, stated that the 
United States would agree to unilaterally withdrawal its troops from South Vietnam. In 
forgoing the requirement for North Vietnamese troops to withdraw simultaneously, then, 
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American officials conceded that they could not force North Vietnamese communists out 
of South Vietnam.566   
For Nixon and Kissinger, however, the bargaining concession and a subsequent 
peace settlement could still lead to victory for American credibility. Though they still 
hoped that Vietnamization would allow South Vietnam to remain independent, they also 
prepared for the strong likelihood of Saigon’s collapse. In granting the concession to 
North Vietnamese negotiators, Kissinger believed that, in the event that communists take 
over South Vietnam, there would be some amount of time between the extrication of 
American troops and communist victory in South Vietnam, so that the American 
government could be absolved of responsibility for Saigon’s defeat. This “decent 
interval,” as Kissinger called it, would allow the United States to achieve “peace with 
honor.”567  
Although negotiations resumed with renewed vigor after the new American 
concession, American and North Vietnamese still did not arrive at an agreement in 1971. 
In response to Kissinger’s concession, Hanoi agreed to free all American prisoners of war 
as soon as the last American troops departed. However, Hanoi and Washington still did 
not see eye to eye on the future of Thieu’s leadership in Saigon. North Vietnamese 
negotiators demanded the removal of Thieu, but Nixon, believing that doing so would 
hasten South Vietnam’s defeat, refused to acquiesce.568  
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In light of these breakdowns in discussions, the North Vietnamese sought further 
military actions to pressure Americans into signing an agreement favorable to Hanoi. 
Aware of Nixon’s preoccupation with the 1972 election and the antiwar political climate 
in the United States, North Vietnamese leaders believed that they should undertake a 
major offensive, just like they did in 1968, to demonstrate their resolve for decisive 
victory and force the United States to grant additional concessions.569 Emboldened by the 
ARVN’s defeat in its invasion of Laos earlier in the year, Hanoi officials also sought to 
capitalize on military aid from Moscow and Beijing, which supported Hanoi for the time 
being despite rapprochement with Washington, and the continued withdrawal of 
American troops. Hawks within North Vietnamese leadership agreed on the need to 
secure more advantages on the battlefield. On March 30, 1972, North Vietnamese troops 
invaded South Vietnam, initiating the Nguyen Hue Offensive, more commonly known in 
the United States as the Easter Offensive. North Vietnamese forces fought well, so well 
in fact that Nixon, concerned about the possibility of Saigon’s collapse, responded with 
continuous raids to stop communist advances in the South. In an operation code-named 
Linebacker, the United States, for the first time since Operation Rolling Thunder ended, 
launched a continuous large-scale aerial campaign directed toward transportation lines, 
military installations, and cities in North Vietnam. Additionally, Nixon ordered the 
mining of Hai Phong harbor to disrupt Hanoi’s naval supply lines.570 American actions 
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weakened the offensive and helped ARVN forces recapture territory, but they did not 
place the United States in a significantly better negotiating position, as Nixon had hoped.  
By mid-July, American and North Vietnamese negotiators returned to the 
negotiating table closer to agreeing to a peace settlement than ever before. Like Kissinger 
had done earlier, Le Duc Tho, the chief North Vietnamese negotiator, offered a major 
concession the Americans: Hanoi would relinquish their demand for Thieu’s ouster.571 
Tho proposed instead that the existing Saigon regime would partake in a tripartite 
commission alongside the Provisional Revolutionary Government and neutralist 
elements. Moreover, Tho added, Thieu would have veto power in the commissions’ 
decision making. In October 1972, Kissinger and Tho appeared ready to sign a deal 
stipulating that the United States would withdraw troops in South Vietnamese within 
sixty days of the ceasefire and that Hanoi would release all American prisoners of war. 
Under the plan, the future of South Vietnam would be determined by a tripartite 
organization called the National Council of Reconciliation and Concord.572  
As Kissinger and Tho prepared to sign the deal, however, Thieu rejected the 
proposal, furthering delaying the production of a ceasefire. Already frustrated that he was 
not included in peace negotiations, Thieu found the provision that American troops 
would withdraw unilaterally to be completely unacceptable. Kissinger, however, 
dismissed Thieu’s objections and encouraged Nixon to sign the agreement anyway. Freed 
from domestic political calculations after his landslide reelection, Nixon instead wished 
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to re-negotiate parts of the accord. When North Vietnamese negotiators refused, Nixon 
ordered Operation Linebacker II, the so-called “Christmas Bombings,” which dropped 
over 20,000 tons of bombs on Hanoi and Haiphong, to attempt to break the stalemate and 
demonstrate American support for South Vietnam.573   
By the end of 1972, North Vietnamese leaders announced their interest in 
reopening negotiations, which they would likely have done even without the devastation 
of aerial bombardment.574 Nixon’s “Christmas Bombings” provoked major outrage across 
the globe and in the United States, particularly within Congress.575 Predicting that 
Congress would soon vote to end the war, Nixon agreed to a ceasefire. On January 27, 
1973, Kissinger and Tho signed a peace agreement that ended direct American military 
involvement in Vietnam. Officially called the “Agreement on Ending the War and 
Restoring Peace in Vietnam,” the negotiated settlement resembled the exact deal that 
Kissinger and Tho had initially agreed to in October 1972 but that the United States had 
previously rejected.576  
The Paris Peace Accords neither ended the war nor restored peace in Vietnam. In 
fact, the war would continue to rage for another two more years before all hostilities 
ceased. “There was not a single senior member of the Nixon administration,” Kissinger 
later admitted, “who did not have doubts about the precariousness of the agreement.”577 
In fact, Kissinger believed that there would be “inevitable violations” of the ceasefire 
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even before he signed the agreement.578 In the aftermath of the Paris Peace Accords, 
Nixon promised Thieu that the United States would “respond with full force” if the 
communists violated the ceasefire, and Thieu acquiesced to the Accords.579 It was not 
surprising, then, that Thieu expected the aid of American airpower when North 
Vietnamese forces later invaded below the seventeenth parallel.  
THE END OF THE ROAD IN SOUTH VIETNAM, 1973-1975 
 
The tenuous future of the Paris Peace Accords for South Vietnam would become 
further complicated by domestic politics in the United States and decisions in North 
Vietnam. In the United States, Nixon’s cynicism toward domestic anti-war protesters and 
his authorization of illegal forms of surveillance on such individuals and groups 
culminated in the Watergate scandal, which led to Nixon’s resignation in August 1974. 
Meanwhile, leaders in Hanoi settled on more aggressive military actions to reunite the 
country under communist leadership, contributing to the rapidly deteriorating military 
and economic situation in South Vietnam. In South Vietnam, the signing of the peace 
agreement produced serious consequences for citizens, who had to adapt to life without 
the large presence of American soldiers, after so many years of living with it. 
1973 was the year that witnessed not only the Paris Peace Accords but also 
profound global economic instabilities that would shape the remainder of the twentieth 
century. In addition to the complete withdrawal of American troops resulting from the 
Paris Peace Accords, global economic crises would exacerbate the economic situation in 
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South Vietnam. In October 1973, Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries declared an oil embargo, sending oil prices skyrocketing from $3 a 
barrel to $12 a barrel at the end of the embargo in March 1974. The oil crisis generated 
massive surpluses for oil-exporting nations but caused severe inflation and dampened 
economic growth—a combination known as “stagflation”—for Western industrial 
nations.580 In the United States, the oil shock made gas rationing a part of daily life. More 
significantly, however, the oil crisis further strained an American economy that, after 
years of massive spending on the Vietnam War and on domestic programs without tax 
increases, was already badly damaged. Coupled with the demise of the Bretton Woods 
system in 1971, which ended the American dollar’s gold convertibility and devalued the 
dollar, the oil shock marked a period of economic recession globally, especially in the 
United States. Dependent almost entirely on American economic aid, South Vietnam 
would suffer the consequences of the global economic downturn as well as the 
consequences of the American exit. Due to global inflation, in fact, the volume of 
imported goods into South Vietnam in 1974 was 54 percent that of 1971, even though the 
United States spent more in dollars in 1974 than in the years before.581   
By the end of March 1973, the extrication of American troops from South 
Vietnam was complete. Alongside soldiers, the majority of military support personnel 
and employees of the large American construction companies left Vietnam as well. In 
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this climate of phasing down the war, it became clear that American economic and 
military aid, too, would soon decline, as Thieu and other American policymakers had 
predicted. Indeed, American military aid fell from $2.3 billion in 1973 to $1 billion the 
next year.582 As historian Robert Schulzinger has written, “With Americans gone, 
spending by U.S. personnel on bars, taxis, prostitutes, servants, and souvenirs shrank 
from $400 million in 1971 to $100 million in 1973.”583 The economic ramifications of 
American troop pullout, long felt by the South Vietnamese population before 1973, 
would intensify after that momentous year particular in unemployment and inflation 
figures. By 1974, in fact, three to four million South Vietnamese were unemployed.584 
Prices, which increased 26 percent in 1972 and 45 percent in 1973, rose by 63 percent in 
1974.585  
Severe economic recession after the complete pullout of American military forces 
brought feelings of hopelessness and desperation among South Vietnamese citizens. 
Those who had benefited from the bonanza of wartime spending in earlier years found 
themselves suffering from the inability to afford basic necessities. Taxi drivers, for 
example, who were maligned by fellow citizens during the peak of the American 
presence for their profiteering during the war, saw their business dwindle after the exit of 
American GIs. One taxi driver stated despondently, “We are going to die.” The driver 
remarked that the government raised the cost of gas by 47 percent and communists had 
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destroyed half of the nation’s civilian supply of gas in a depot near Saigon. After 
purchasing gas and paying for his rental car, the driver admitted that he only had 500 
piasters, equivalent of ninety cents, which was not enough to feed his wife and six 
children.586 Even South Vietnam’s millionaires believed the economic recession 
foreboded disaster for the country. Nguyen Ngoc Linh, a successful businessman who 
served as president of the Mekong Group of Companies, observed that the “recession is 
in full swing” and that if the rate of inflation continued at the present rate around 40 
percent, “then everything will fall apart.”587 The sense of national pessimism in South 
Vietnam affected the rich and the poor.   
Members of the armed forces and civil servants again bore the brunt of economic 
recession in the wake of troop departures. As one former Saigon military and political 
leader, Van Don Tran, recalled, after American troops exited the country, the resultant 
spiraling inflation hurt people on fixed incomes such as civil servants and soldiers the 
most. Tran wrote, “A sergeant with a family might make 10,000 piasters a month, 
amounting to perhaps $50.00 buying power. Rice to feed his family would take this entire 
amount, leaving nothing for necessities, so he would have to look to other methods for 
additional funds.”588 Other soldiers and civil servants earned less. In 1973, some 
                                                
586 James M. Markham, “Thieu’s Warnings of a Communist Drive Are Greeted in Saigon by Weary 
Shrugs,” New York Times, 29 Dec. 1973. 
587 Ibid.  
588 Tran, Our Endless War, 171. 
 338 
government clerks and army lieutenants made the equivalent of $25 a month and could 
not afford to feed their families.589  
The rise in hunger and unemployment contributed to a spike in corruption after 
the departure of American troops.590 Corruption, which was prevalent during the peak of 
the war, appeared to be the only way to survive, but dishonest wheeling and dealing also 
contributed to the decline in support for the Saigon regime. “Corruption may not actually 
be any worse, but with the American withdrawal there is less fat around to live off,” a 
former colonel who later participated in the National Assembly remarked. He continued, 
“corrupt officials these days have to turn for money to ordinary Vietnamese not the 
American[s].” As this former colonel revealed, Vietnamese corruption after American 
withdrawal more frequently involved Vietnamese stealing from each other. Despite 
evidence that corruption harmed average South Vietnamese citizens and undermined 
support for the Saigon leadership, some Vietnamese and Americans believed that Thieu 
tolerated corruption in exchange for loyalty to his government.591  
The combination of poverty, despair, and the war itself in urban areas led to 
surges in crime that was unusual in South Vietnam. Stories of robberies, rapes, and 
murder in cities like Saigon began to top headlines. As the New York Times reported in 
late December 1973, a Saigon policeman named Tran Van Duoc went on a killing spree 
after losing in a card game. Duoc used his service revolver to kill his fellow card player, 
three young girls, and himself. In a separate incident, a robber who was later reported to 
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be an army captain stabbed and strangled a businessman, his wife, and their three-year-
old grandson.592 These violent acts constituted outward manifestations of the desperation 
and fatalism experienced by many South Vietnamese.  
Despite grim economic realities on the ground, however, American policymakers 
refused to acknowledge the deteriorating financial crisis in South Vietnam. Much like 
their optimism in the military progress of the war, American officials continued to exude 
confidence in the future direction of the South Vietnamese economy. American 
policymakers, in fact, touted the economic success of South Vietnam to convince 
members of Congress to continue appropriating economic aid to the country. When 
Congress ultimately denied further military and economic aid to South Vietnam, as many 
American officials anticipated, those in favor of continuing to support South Vietnam 
militarily could and did foist blame on Capitol Hill for the eventual collapse of South 
Vietnam.  
In the face of staggering unemployment figures in South Vietnamese cities, U.S. 
policymakers cited migration back to the countryside as an indicator of South Vietnam’s 
improving economy. Although serious economic problems remained, Ford administration 
officials remained optimist about overall economic trends. During the Nixon 
administration, officials reported that despite serious economic problems, “a quiet 
economic revolution has taken place in rural Vietnam. While urban income has declined 
from inflation, the peasant has been getting higher and higher prices for his rice and his 
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real income has risen significantly.” Due to increased security in the countryside, new 
and rebuilt roads, the availability of transistor radios which helps farmers determine the 
best prices, and the development of “miracle” rice, Vietnamese in rural areas were able to 
witness growing incomes.593 American officials, in fact, later fixed on any sources that 
reaffirmed South Vietnamese accomplishments in rice production, including a survey that 
claimed that “the degree of success achieved in reversing the decline in rice production” 
was “most spectacular of all.”594 From the end of 1972 to the end of 1974, the price of 
rice indeed increased 143 percent.595 One South Vietnamese official, Nguyen Tien Hung, 
stated that the price of a one hundred pound bag of rice in the final years of the war was 
14,000 piasters, or the equivalent of about $20.596 However, officials often failed to take 
into account the drastic decline in purchasing power for most South Vietnamese, who 
could not afford the rising price of rice.  
The satisfaction that American officials exhibited at the “quiet economic 
revolution” in the countryside ignored the chaos and desperation in urban areas, where 
unemployment was estimated to affect 1.2 million people, or 14 percent of the South 
Vietnamese populace by 1974.597 The percent of South Vietnamese urban citizens was 
approximately 20 percent by that year.598 In addition to the rise in urban unemployment, 
real wages for employed workers dropped by around 30 percent, and the total per capita 
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income decreased by 36 to 48 percent. As economist Douglas Dacy argues, the political 
implications of widespread urban unemployment and poverty were felt among citizens 
even before 1975.599  
Ford administration officials, however, continued to cast aside serious economic 
concerns in the cities in favor of embracing more hopeful narratives of the South 
Vietnamese economy. In March 1975, the National Security Council hired an expert on 
Southeast Asia, Sir Robert Thompson, to travel to South Vietnam and give his testimony 
of the economic progress he observed there. In a report that included his opinions on the 
South Vietnamese economy, Thompson wrote, “If anyone, even three years ago, had 
forecast the present economic situation they would have predicted a total collapse. A year 
ago I too had thought that, with the high unemployment and under-employment in the 
cities, disturbances might occur which could bring down the Government. No other 
country has proved itself so resilient.” Moreover, Thompson commented that the “most 
encouraging aspect has been that, in spite of the fuel crisis and the high price of fertilizer, 
agricultural production has again increased.”600 In a memo to the president which 
included the attachment of Thompson’s report, Kissinger wrote that Thompson was “one 
of the leading experts on Southeast Asia” and that his past reports have “generally proven 
to be quite accurate and reliable.”601  
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Wolfgang Lehman, who served as Deputy U.S. Ambassador in Saigon and 
Deputy Chief of Mission from 1974 to 1975, echoed the interpretation that the last two 
years of South Vietnam’s existence demonstrated signs of optimism for the economy. He 
argued that the “economic situation in South Vietnam in these last two years was in many 
ways a difficult one but also one in which the South Vietnamese people again 
demonstrated the amazing resiliency for which they have never received appropriate 
credit.” The South Vietnamese economy, Lehmann contended, rebounded from the 
effects of American troop withdrawal, worldwide inflation, and the 1973 oil crisis, “all 
outside the control of the Vietnamese.” He asserted that “with the extraordinary resilience 
which those of us who are familiar with the Vietnamese know, as well as courageous and 
intelligent economic and monetary policies, the Vietnamese economy began slowly to 
climb out of its deep trough in the course of 1974.”602 
Members of Congress, however, would not buy these arguments of a buoyant 
South Vietnamese economy offered by administration officials. In 1972, some members 
of Congress expressed the sentiment that American support for the Saigon government 
had reached an end point. Appearing on national television, Senator Edmund Muskie 
asserted, “We have done as much for the South Vietnamese government as anyone could 
reasonably have asked of us. It is not unreasonable now to ask that government to test its 
own ability to survive.”603 Similarly, other members of Congress believed that South 
                                                
602 Wolfgang J. Lehmann Speech, “Vietnam—The Last Two Years,” 8 March 1977, Box 1, Wolfgang J. 
Lehmann Papers, 1973-1979, GRFL. 
603 “Indochina: Another View” Remarks, ABC Television, 22 April 1971, Box 2, NSA Presidential Subject 
File, GRFL. 
 343 
Vietnam was simply not deserving of additional human or financial costs. Senator 
George McGovern maintained, “General Thieu is not worth one more American dollar, 
one more American prisoner, one more drop of American blood.”604 By 1973, these 
attitudes toward the war in Vietnam led Congressional members to pass the War Powers 
Resolution, which prohibited presidents from extending combat deployment without 
congressional approval, and to ban further U.S. military combat in Indochina after 
August 1973. Although Congress did not cut off aid to Vietnam completely, both parties 
in Congress voted in 1974 to further cut economic aid to South Vietnam to $700 
million.605  
  As North Vietnamese forces advanced southward toward Saigon, after capturing 
Hue, Da Nang and other cities, members of the Ford administration continued to apply 
pressure on Congress to vote for continued aid to South Vietnam in March 1975. In 
meetings with several members of Congress, including James B. Pearson (R-KS) and 
Frank Church (D-ID), Ford attempted to convince them of the strength of the South 
Vietnamese economy. In fact, Ford’s talking points for his meetings included the 
following appraisal of South Vietnam’s economic prospects: “South Vietnam has 
considerable economic potential and is by no means a permanent basket case. It should 
soon be able to export rice, sugar and other valuation products; moreover, oil and natural 
gas have been struck off its coast. In time, those deposits could be important sources of 
revenue.” Moreover, another talking point emphasized the economic progress South 
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Vietnam had made thus far: “The South Vietnamese have managed their economy 
well…During the last quarter of 1974, for example, they only had a single digit inflation 
rate—because they have really tightened their belts.”606 Whether Ford administration 
officials truly believed that in the positive appraisal of South Vietnamese economy or 
whether they only echoed these optimistic assessments for political maneuvers is difficult 
to determine. However, their positive portrayal of South Vietnam aimed to strengthen 
their argument, when Congress eventually denied military and economic aid, that 
Congress was responsible for the collapse of South Vietnam.   
Throughout April 1975, Ford administration officials continued to lobby members 
of Congress to approve an additional $722 million in military and economic aid to South 
Vietnamese allies. Congressional members, however, did not trust the administration’s 
rationale. Representative Millicent Fenwick (R-NJ) stated, “We’ve sent, so to speak, 
battleship after battleship, and bomber after bomber, and 500,000 or more men, and 
billions and billions of dollars. If billions and billions didn’t do at a time when we had all 
our men there, how can $722 million save the day?”607 Fenwick’s statement embodied 
the sentiments of many Americans, who wished to see America’s financial commitment 
to South Vietnam end.  
The administration linked Congress’s reductions in aid to military difficulties 
faced by South Vietnamese forces. Though the Ford administration conceded that the 
United States did not have a legal commitment to aid South Vietnam, it asserted that 
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there was a moral commitment to assist America’s long-time ally. However, when it 
became clear that Congress would not approve the $722 million that Ford requested, the 
president began to pinpoint blame on Congress for the deteriorating military situation in 
South Vietnam. Ford lamented, “For just a relatively small additional commitment in 
economic and military aid, relatively small compared to the $150-billion that we spent, 
that at the last minute of the last quarter we don’t make that special effort and now we are 
faced with this human tragedy. It just makes me sick…”608 He was “absolutely 
convinced” that had Congress approved the military aid he requested, “the South 
Vietnamese could stabilize the military situation in South Vietnam today.”609 With 
Congress steadfast in its refusal to continue aid, Ford declared on April 23 that the 
Vietnam War was “finished as far as America is concerned.”610 
The end of aid to South Vietnam justifiably angered Thieu, whose government 
depended on the flow of American funds. On April 22, Thieu resigned as President of 
South Vietnam in a long, impassioned, and rambling address to South Vietnamese 
citizens. He stated indignantly, “If the Americans do not want to support us anymore, let 
them go, get out! Let them forget their humanitarian promises!”611 Thieu recalled 
Nixon’s promise to aid South Vietnam in the event that North Vietnamese forces violated 
the Paris Peace Accords: “President Nixon told me that all accords are only pieces of 
paper, with no value unless they are implemented. What was important, he said, was not 
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that he had signed the accord but that the United States would always stand ready to help 
South Vietnam in case the Communists violated the accord.”612 Thieu stated, “The United 
States has not respected its promises. It is unfair. It is inhumane. It is not trustworthy. It is 
irresponsible.”613  
Among South Vietnamese intellectuals, too, a sense of betrayal by the United 
States emerged as the collapse of South Vietnam became more likely. Just before the Fall 
of Saigon on April 30, 1975, Le Hoang Trong, a South Vietnamese intellectual and a 
member of the democratic opposition, advocated for the end of the American economic 
aid program as it had operated for the last decade in favor of a new aid program based on 
loans instead of grants. He provided an analogy to demonstrate the destructive 
consequences of the United States bombarding South Vietnam with economic aid and 
then rescinding it years later. Trong wrote, 
The situation is comparable to the liquidation of an union between a rich man and 
a poor girl. It costs money to get divorced. Some say there was no legal 
marriage—it was a rape, they argue. The indisputable fact is that there has been 
cohabitation—peaceful or otherwise—for over eight years and this has produced a 
number of unwanted children. The eldest child has a name: dependency. Others 
could be named: e.g., “newly created needs and wants.” The mother and the 
children are habituated to the luxury of the father's home. She is broke now and 
was not prepared for the day when she would have to earn a living on her own. 
Moreover, she has to fight off an aggressor.614  
 
Contrary to Trong’s view, however, the relationship between the United States and South 
Vietnam was borne out of war; it was not intended to be a perpetual union until death did 
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them part. Trong’s interpretation of the U.S.-South Vietnam alliance led him to believe 
that Congress betrayed the South Vietnamese nation by cutting off aid. In fact, Trong 
writes, “To put pressure on Thieu or to ‘punish’ him, Congress cuts the aid and the 
people of South Vietnam get the punishment. This punishment takes the form of runaway 
inflation, unemployment, skyrocketing cost of living, shortages of commodities essential 
to everyday life and functions.”615 Trong’s observations reflect a belief that the United 
States had stabbed its partner in the back. However, Trong’s assertion that the Americans 
were culpable in the event of Saigon’s downfall is premised on the overpowering 
presence of American power in South Vietnam over the span of almost twenty years: 
It must be emphasized that the Americans have overwhelmingly affected the 
course of events in South Vietnam during the past two decades and they will 
continue to do so for a few more years—either by action or by inaction. At this 
point, an absence of action is itself action. The staggering impact has been due to 
the sheer scale and scope of its presence in Vietnam and to the magnitude of 
power (technological, economical, military) at its command. The largest share of 
responsibility, therefore, for the events of the coming months lies with the 
Americans. Should South Vietnam collapse as a result of unwarranted aid cuts, 
the Americans must bear the responsibility.616 
 
Although Trong places the blame for many of South Vietnam’s economic problems on 
the United States, he appears to be more critical of the years of misguided American 
economic policies rather than the singular moment during which Congress voted to 
discontinue aid. 
Conclusion  
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Americans policymakers’ optimism toward the South Vietnamese economy in the 
last stages of the war has played a large role in shaping scholarly debates on the reasons 
for South Vietnam’s collapse. Their positive narrative contributed to revisionist views 
that Congress had stabbed South Vietnam in the back by denying the country much-
needed and much-deserved aid. After Congress denied Ford’s request of military aid, 
Saigon fell on April 30, ending the war and South Vietnam’s twenty-year existence. For 
American and South Vietnamese leaders who had vested interests in the future of South 
Vietnam, it was convenient to link the actions and attitudes of Congress and antiwar 
constituents during those last months to the final outcome of the Vietnam War: a defeat 
for the United States and the collapse of a country that was allied with the United States 
for so long.  
The house of cards that the Americans built in South Vietnam collapsed in 1975 
when aid was no longer free-flowing. However, the interesting question is not what blew 
down the house of cards but what held it together in the first place. Political scientist 
William Turley argues that “corruption had become the glue that held the Thieu regime 
together.”617 It was the availability of American dollars, I argue, that enabled corruption 
to take place and hold together the house of cards together for years. The viability of 
South Vietnam was premised upon the continued flow of American aid. Independent of 
the results on the battlefield, the very basis of South Vietnam’s existence was that its 
economy was supported almost entirely by American dollars. At no point during the 
alliance between South Vietnam and the United States, however, did American or 
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Vietnamese policymakers make any serious attempts to wean South Vietnam off of 
American assistance. The choices that American and South Vietnamese policymakers 
made, in fact, contributing to fostering the economic dependence. Moreover, even when 
choices had to be made, American policymakers settled on shortcuts that did not actually 
solve the problems but continued to support Thieu with economic aid, even as inflation 
and corruption demonstrably tore away at national morale. 
The enormous amounts of American aid gave rise to numerous economic and 
social problems. Despite, and perhaps because of, measures that the United States took to 
curb inflation, South Vietnam was flooded with mass quantities of consumer goods it 
could never had produced. Moreover, the influx of American dollars was coupled with 
opportunities for gains, incentivizing jobs working for comparatively wealthy Americans 
economic and illegal transactions that guaranteed easy profits. As the war wore on, the 
legitimate economy in South Vietnam continued to erode as an artificial economy took 
hold. As inflation soared, corruption worsened, and aid reduced toward the end of the 
war, South Vietnam became a country where citizens stole from each other in order to 
feed themselves. Desperate economic circumstances forced Vietnamese into corruption, 
including members of the armed services and civil servants, who functioned as crucial 
members providing legitimacy to the state. The unsolved problems of wage inequality 
and corruption ultimately undermined the South Vietnamese population’s faith in their 
own leaders.   
While some South Vietnamese became increasingly disenchanted by their leaders, 
others became apathetic with regard to the political future of their nation. As American 
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officials grew preoccupied with military objectives to win the conflict, it is arguable that 
some Vietnamese became more and more apolitical. The uncertainty of the war’s 
outcome and the future of their nation prompted an attitude to seize the day. As 
Newsweek reported, “The Vietnamese who have capitalized on the war economy have, by 
and large, tended to invest their money not in industry or in other lasting enterprises, but 
in hotels, bars, massage parlors and residences for Americans, all designed for a quick 
profit.” The result, the magazine asserted, was that South Vietnam “built more nightclubs 
than hospitals, more luxury apartment buildings than schools.”618 Indeed, the incentives 
of private profits for Vietnamese never aligned with the incentives of national economic 
development.  
For American policymakers, too, the priority of waging war against the 
communists ending up conflicting with the goal of building a stable and independent 
South Vietnam. If South Vietnam was ever to become truly economically independent, 
the ways in which Washington cultivated dependence in Saigon prevented the realization 
of that goal. It was no wonder that the lack of progress toward South Vietnamese 
problems caused ordinary Americans and members of Congress to question why 
Americans continued to sacrifice their tax dollars to support a corrupt government that 
lacked the popular support of its own people. The lack of accountability by American 
leaders and their condoning of South Vietnam’s corrupt leaders eventually forced an end 
to a war that had sacrificed so many Vietnamese and American lives.  
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Conclusion 
On April 30, 1975, the political goal American and South Vietnamese leaders had 
worked toward for nearly two decades—an independent, anticommunist South 
Vietnam—came to an end. After bombarding Saigon’s Tan Son Nhut Airport with heavy 
artillery the day before, North Vietnamese tanks rolled into Saigon’s presidential palace 
and captured the South Vietnamese capital. General Duong Van “Big” Minh, president of 
South Vietnam for just two days, surrendered unconditionally to the communists. North 
Vietnamese troops raised their flag over the South Vietnamese presidential palace, 
marking the end of a decade-long war and the beginning of reunification in Vietnam.  
As the fall of Saigon became imminent in late April, many South Vietnamese, 
with the assistance of Americans on the ground, were already planning to leave their 
homeland. In the chaotic final days of South Vietnam’s existence, thousands of 
Vietnamese gathered at the American embassy and rushed to get on the last helicopters 
leaving the capital. As depicted in the 2014 documentary Last Days in Vietnam, 
Americans ultimately evacuated approximately 135,000 Vietnamese, many of whom had 
close connections to Americans and were considered by American officials to be at high 
risk of communist retribution if left behind.619 Those who received priority included 
South Vietnam’s top military and political leaders, wives and mistresses of Americans 
and their biracial children, and employees of American government organizations. 
Americans coordinating the evacuation also recalled trying to save their South 
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Vietnamese friends, as well as Vietnamese who did not work for the U.S. government but 
nevertheless interacted frequently with Americans, including their favorite cooks and 
tailors. While the formal evacuation directed by Ambassador Graham Martin commenced 
on April 29, several South Vietnamese air force generals took their futures into their own 
hands, piloting helicopters, including a few Hueys and one Chinook, to evacuate 
themselves and their families from Saigon.  
For the most part, those with the most intimate relations with Americans escaped 
their country, but South Vietnamese who had no direct link to Americans and thus did not 
have the personal connections to leave Vietnam had no option but to stay. As the highest-
ranked ARVN officials deserted their positions to prepare for new lives in the United 
States, ordinary ARVN soldiers were left leaderless and fearful of their fates in the 
newly-captured capital. They took off their boots and uniforms and destroyed all military 
identification papers as thousands of North Vietnamese troops patrolled victoriously in 
downtown Saigon. Often left wearing nothing but their underwear, these former low-
level ARVN soldiers felt vulnerable to fears of communist reprisal anticipated upon 
South Vietnam’s defeat.  
Although the images of ARVN combats boots and uniforms strewn on the streets 
of Saigon symbolized the formal end of the South Vietnamese state, many rank-and-file 
functionaries of the South Vietnamese government had begun to shed their loyalty and 
obligation to the state long before North Vietnamese troops conquered Saigon in 1975. 
ARVN soldiers and civil servants, the very people whose jobs entailed maintaining the 
functions of South Vietnam’s military and government, were also some of the most 
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vulnerable citizens during the war. Although the problem of state legitimacy afflicted 
South Vietnam from the country’s inception, soldiers and civil servants, by performing 
their roles, granted some form of legitimacy to the state. As the war progressed, however, 
the ARVN suffered from high rates of desertion, corruption, poor training, and poor 
leadership. ARVN soldiers and civil servants alike, as employees of the South 
Vietnamese state, experienced the largest blow to their purchasing power, as their salaries 
failed to keep pace with ever-increasing rates of inflation in a war-torn country. Many 
employed by the state had to resort to corrupt practices to stay alive. By the time that 
South Vietnamese leaders capitulated to North Vietnamese rule, many ARVN troops and 
civil servants had already functionally abandoned their posts.  
Examining who could leave Vietnam and who had to stay in the final days of the 
war thus offers a window into the social, economic, and cultural transformations wrought 
by the American presence and the consequent collapse of state legitimacy. In the long 
lines of Americans and Vietnamese waiting to be evacuated by helicopters, South 
Vietnamese who arguably benefited the most from the American presence were also 
those who were rescued and brought to the United States. Many employees of the U.S. 
government, wives and mistresses, high-ranking military officials and political leaders, 
service workers catering to American needs, and some businessmen, whose lives 
depended on the Americans, left South Vietnam when they had the opportunity.620 Often 
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closely associated with Americans, these South Vietnamese were able to escape the 
aftermath of communist takeover that those less connected could not.  
The story of many South Vietnamese who left their fallen country in 1975 would 
continue in the United States, where many immigrated as refugees. As historian Nhi Lieu 
has written, “Introduced and exposed to American democratic ideals and consumer 
capitalism before migrating to the imperial center, Vietnamese refugees arrived in the 
United States with hopes of assimilating, fitting in, and becoming free subjects in an 
advanced capitalist society; in essence, they wished to live the American Dream.”621 As 
Lieu argues, though narratives of Vietnamese refugees have often overwhelmingly 
focused on their status as traumatized war victims, Vietnamese refugees in America, in 
fact, endeavored to use popular culture to assimilate into middle-class American society 
as Vietnamese Americans. Lieu observes, moreover, that the “cross-cultural and 
economic exchanges between the United States and South Vietnam transformed the 
Vietnamese citizenry and, in some respects, prepared them for life in America.”622 In the 
years after 1975, Vietnamese-Americans created their own ethnic communities in the 
United States and preserved their cultural identities while assimilating into American 
culture and society. Although many of the former South Vietnamese who left often 
express nostalgia for their fallen country and have continued to display the flag of South 
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Vietnam in their local communities, they are also grateful to have had the opportunity to 
become citizens in the United States.   
Back in the newly reunified Vietnam, however, those who remained faced 
persecution under the communist regime. Indeed, although the number of communist 
executions remains unclear, scholars have estimated that communists executed as many 
as 65,000 former South Vietnamese residents. Over 200,000 Vietnamese who stayed in 
southern Vietnam, including many former ARVN soldiers, were forced to endure hard 
labor at reeducation camps under the new communist regime.623 In the years between 
unification and the country’s market economy reforms in 1986, life in the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam was characterized by severe economic deprivation. The communist 
government seized all private property in the former South Vietnam, displaced citizens 
from their homes and forced them into “new economic zones,” and subjected citizens to 
strict food rations. The regime mismanaged the collectivization of industrial and 
agricultural production, resulting in widespread starvation. Dire economic and political 
circumstances forced between one to two million Vietnamese to flee the country in 
multiple waves between the late 1970s and the early 1990s. “Boat people” who attempted 
to escape Vietnam faced many mortal dangers on the high seas, and many perished 
before reaching safe haven. Meanwhile, those who did not flee continued to suffer from 
economic hardship in a country devastated by decades of war. The contrast of 
experiences between Vietnamese who migrated to the United States and those who 
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remained in Vietnam again harkens back to the divergent experience of South 
Vietnamese citizens during the height of the war.  
This dissertation argues that the twin problems of inflation and corruption 
ultimately led to the destruction of national morale in South Vietnam. The American 
presence during the war, as we have seen, widened social and economic inequalities 
among the South Vietnamese population. By introducing vast sums of money and 
consumer goods in the midst of war, the American presence incentivized the pursuit of 
wealth and rewarded South Vietnamese who worked for the Americans. In an 
environment of military, political, and economic insecurity, it made rational sense for 
Vietnamese to ingratiate themselves with the American presence. Those not employed by 
Americans, however, often found themselves unable to keep pace with inflation in South 
Vietnam. Consequently, it was necessary for many South Vietnamese, especially soldiers 
and civil servants, to resort to corruption in order to support their families. Citizens of 
South Vietnam were thus placed in circumstances where defending and serving the 
interests of their country was at odds with supporting their families. The U.S. military 
presence, in exacerbating inflation, encouraging South Vietnamese to work in jobs 
serving American employers, and forcing those on fixed incomes to engage in corruption 
for survival, contributed to eroding South Vietnam’s legitimacy.  
Moreover, this dissertation contends that American policymakers responded to the 
consequences of the U.S. military presence in South Vietnam by undertaking measures 
that only superficially addressed the problems of inflation and corruption. Though 
policymakers had some idea, based on U.S. involvement in previous military 
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interventions, of the potential impact of the American presence on inflation and 
corruption in South Vietnam, they were nevertheless unprepared and unable to address 
the root causes of those problems. Due to various constraints of policy decisions made 
before American escalation as well as the increasingly tenuous relations between the 
United States and South Vietnam, American leaders often pursued measures that aimed 
more at appeasing American critics of problems in Vietnam than actually solving them. 
They paid lip service to those who voiced concern over the high level of inflation. 
Similarly, American and South Vietnamese officials attempted to allay criticism of 
corruption in Vietnam through temporary crackdowns to catch low-level participants. In 
the end, both American and South Vietnamese policymakers could not contain the 
economic, social, and cultural consequences of the American military presence from 
South Vietnamese society.  
This dissertation contributes to scholarship on the Vietnam War by examining 
American nation-building in South Vietnam after escalation. Although scholars have 
often contended that U.S. nation-building in South Vietnam had already failed in the 
early 1960s, and was thus no longer a focus of American policy, this dissertation asserts 
that nation building continued throughout the war, albeit with similarly scant results. In 
fact, the overall aims of nation-building—the establishment of an independent, 
anticommunist state below the seventeenth parallel—never eluded American and South 
Vietnamese policymakers during the war. The overwhelming presence of Americans 
created new challenges and aggravated old ones, changing the nature of the American 
task of protecting and enhancing political legitimacy in South Vietnam.  
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Moreover, though scholars have often pointed to military and political problems 
in relations between the United States and South Vietnam, they have often overlooked the 
war’s economic impact on South Vietnam. Indeed, the Republic of Vietnam’s economic 
viability deserves scholarly attention, because it is a fundamental matter that determined 
the country’s existence from its very inception. In examining the war’s inflationary 
consequences and the everyday lived experience of widespread inflation and corruption 
in South Vietnamese society, this study shows that questions of economic survival were 
intricately tied to questions of the country’s political and even military survival. As many 
South Vietnamese leaders asserted both during and after the war, corruption was a 
primary factor that led to the collapse of the South Vietnamese state. Analyzing the 
economic effects of the war through the problem of inflation and corruption demonstrates 
that the American infusion of wealth and the inflation and corruption that ensued was 
harmful to South Vietnamese national morale, particularly among those who were 
arguably the most important to the state—ARVN soldiers and civil servants.  
In examining the effects of the American presence on South Vietnamese economy 
and society during the Vietnam War, this dissertation underscores several implications 
for understanding the Vietnam War and America’s role in the world broadly. First, in the 
case of the Vietnam conflict, the American presence abroad produced a “catch-22” for 
American policymakers. On the one hand, South Vietnam could not have survived as an 
independent, anticommunist country without the intervention of the United States. On the 
other hand, American involvement in war and the concomitant disruptive presence of 
soldiers and civilians, were detrimental and even lethal to South Vietnamese political 
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legitimacy. This dilemma was not lost on America’s South Vietnamese allies, who were 
aware that the American presence undermined their own political credibility. As Nguyen 
Cao Ky stated, “The Americans controlled the fighting of the war. American aid financed 
the country; without it we could not survive.”624 His assertion underscores the paradox of 
U.S. nation-building abroad, particularly when it involves military assistance or 
economic aid: efforts intended to help an allied government solidify its nationalist 
credentials can end up instead harming its political legitimacy in the eyes of its own 
people. Striking the right balance to help without hindering South Vietnam’s political 
legitimacy was thus an extremely difficult task, since any intervention from the United 
States on behalf of South Vietnam naturally undermined South Vietnamese leadership.  
Second, the evolving patron-client relationship between the United States and 
South Vietnam limited what both countries could achieve in South Vietnam. The 
assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963 deeply shaped the importance with which 
American policymakers attached to South Vietnamese political stability after that 
consequential event. As a result, the U.S.-South Vietnam relationship was characterized 
by fear on both sides; leaders in Washington often worried that demanding their 
counterparts in Saigon to adopt strict, austere, and iron-clad policies could destabilize 
South Vietnam’s leadership, while South Vietnamese officials worried about upsetting 
their American partners if they pointed out the problems caused by the American 
presence, ranging from the widespread availability of luxury goods to the sometimes 
disruptive behaviors of American servicemen. For the most part, however, given how 
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much South Vietnam mattered to the United States in the minds of U.S. policymakers, 
particularly Lyndon Johnson, U.S. officials arguably feared the possibility of South 
Vietnam’s collapse more than South Vietnamese fretted over unsettling their American 
counterparts. In the end, the very fragility of South Vietnam also constrained the options 
that American policymakers considered to address some of the most serious matters 
afflicting South Vietnam. 
Finally, American policymakers’ method of waging wage in Vietnam to satisfy 
domestic constituencies and maintain support for the war also undermined and limited 
their own success in nation-building in South Vietnam. With regard to both inflation and 
corruption in South Vietnam, U.S. leaders could not publicly admit that the American 
presence contributed significantly to exacerbating those problems, because doing so 
would have turned the American public against the war. Instead, leaders in Washington 
often blamed Saigon leaders for those problems. As American officials attempted to 
downplay the severity of corruption, even though many Americans themselves enabled 
corruption to grow to the extent that it did, corruption in South Vietnamese society 
continued to eat away at national morale. This dissertation thus demonstrates that 
American leaders’ lack of reflection upon mistakes made by the United States and 
inability to admit fault also produced serious consequences for its political objectives 
overseas. 
In the decades after the end of the Vietnam War, U.S. defeat in Southeast Asia 
would continue to haunt American policymakers. While some leaders interpreted the 
failure of Vietnam as a lesson for more restrained actions in foreign policy, others leaders 
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used the Vietnam War as an example for more aggressive military interventions. Despite 
the different and even contradictory lessons drawn from Vietnam, however, one lesson 
that has yet to be fully absorbed into the exercise of American foreign policy is the 
importance of understanding the economic, cultural, and social consequences of 
American interventions abroad. Indeed, examining the gap between the intentions of 
high-level military and political policies and the actual results of those policies on the 
local society and economy could help those who make policy better understand the full 
consequences of their decisions.   
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